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This dissertation analyses how the policies of Suharto’s New Order government (1966-
98) and post-Asian Financial Crisis reforms shaped Indonesian SME development. 
Indonesia featured as one of the high-growth Tiger Economies in the World Bank’s 
(1993) East Asian Miracle report. One of the features of the East Asian model is the 
‘principle of shared growth’, implemented through various reforms, including SME-
targeted support policies. Suharto restructured the Indonesian economy along similar 
lines, yet it is commonly argued that Indonesia suffered from a ‘missing middle’ - a gap 
in firm-size distribution due to small firms staying small and large firms being born 
already relatively large. This perceived inability of indigenous firms to grow is subject to 
recurrent heated public debate. Chapter 2 places indigenous entrepreneurship in 
historical context, showing that attempts to foster it during the late colonial and early 
post-independence period largely failed. Chapter 3 explores the question of the missing 
middle in the manufacturing sector despite the New Order government’s objective to 
strengthen small enterprises. Using Economic Census data on number of firms, workers 
and value added by firm-size category reveals that as the Indonesian economy grew a 
missing middle emerged and persisted. A comparison with South Korea and Taiwan 
shows that this could not be explained by Indonesia’s stage of economic development 
and is indicative of a dual economy. Chapter 4 focuses on access to credit, a main 
constraint to SME development. Using Bank Indonesia data and statistical yearbooks, I 
analyse the various small business credit schemes introduced since the early 1970s. 
These generally showed – at best – mixed results. I identify a turning point when the 
approach shifted from subsidised targeted government credit programmes to market-
led financial intermediation by commercial and local rural banks with market interest 
rates on savings and loans. However, the vast majority of SMEs remained self-financed 
and access to credit continued to be a pervasive issue for Indonesian SMEs during the 
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(Indonesia’s five-year development plans). At BAPPENAS we met with Dr. Leonardo 
Sambodo (Head of Sub-Directorate for SME Support & System), who kindly took the 
time to explain how SME support by the Indonesian government and different 
ministries developed since the 2000s. This interview helped me connect my historical 
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documents and official exchanges regarding the nationalization of Dutch enterprises in 
the late 1950s, which was only made possible by the endless patience of the ANRI staff 
helping me navigate the 20+ volume catalogue to locate my sources.  
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mountain of gratitude to Pak Agus, his support, insights and patience. 
This research visit was made possible by the financial support of the Royal Historical 
Society, the Economic History Society and the Radwan Travel Fund. The Radwan 
Travel Fund furthermore enabled my visit to the Leiden University Library (UBL) to 
consult the collection of the Royal Netherlands Institute of Southeast Asian and 
Caribbean Studies (KITLV).  
I would have had to conduct many more archival research visits had it not been for the 
LSE Library Interlending Service. I would like to particularly thank Elizabeth Galloway 
from LSE Interlending, who patiently sorted through my very many, very long and 
often complicated requests. When I had to complement my Indonesian Economic 
Census data with provincial data (which meant every request consisted of 26 volumes), 
our emails changed from anonymous requests and official LSE Library confirmations to 
exchanges over my PhD topic and where in the world we could source my book 
requests from. Over the years Liz organised books from everywhere, including 
Australia, Singapore and the United States. When I began my comparative work she 
patiently worked through my requests for South Korean and Taiwanese census data, 
which often left both of us having to rely on Google Translate to browse through 
Mandarin and Korean book titles. I could not have added the in-depth regional analysis 
with Indonesia or taken the comparative approach with South Korea and Taiwan in my 
PhD had it not been for Liz and the LSE Interlending team locating and ordering my 
sources from all over the world. 
This PhD has greatly benefited of the mentorship of the late Michael Marx. Growing up 
I knew Michael as a distant relative and colleague to both my parents. Half-way into my 
  
viii 
PhD we caught up over some family gathering and realised that we had enough overlap 
in our interest in Indonesian development and distance in our areas of expertise that I 
had a lot to gain from this outsider perspective on my PhD. At first we discussed my 
research paths, where I struggled and where I needed advice to make the story that was 
clear to me, interesting and persuasive to my reader. Michael then read my chapters and 
highlighted where the story was clear and when the red thread was lost because I had 
ventured in one too many side avenue discussions. Finally, when I began feeling 
overwhelmed by the prospect of starting yet another chapter from scratch, Michael 
invited me to come back to Cologne for a writing retreat. For two weeks Michael and 
Fulvio set aside a desk in their office with one mission: writing the credit chapter. They 
made sure I stayed nourished over daily lunches and Turkish-Italian espressos and 
rewarded me with lavish home-cooked dinners. Every couple of days we reviewed my 
progress and whether I was sticking to my story line. Even after I returned to London 
Michael kept checking in on my progress, making sure I was keeping up with my own 
schedule, even during his own travels to Nigeria. This mentorship was crucial to 
breaking the wall between what I had in me and bringing my story onto paper. 
I have presented my work at many conferences and workshops and would like to thank 
everyone along their way for their comments and feedback. However, I would like to 
mention one in particular. I experienced my personal breakthrough in my work at the 
‘Development Under Dictatorship? - Revisiting economic development under authoritarian regimes in 
the periphery’ session organised by Montserrat López Jerez, Cristián Ducoing Ruiz and 
Sara Torregrosa Hetland at the World Economic History Congress in Boston. I had just 
completely changed the framing of my paper and went to Boston to test it out for the 
first time. The positive response and constructive feedback I received reinvigorated my 
research spirit and my work started to fall into place quite naturally. I felt like Montse 
had taken me under her wing, inviting me along to a couple of South-East Asia 
workshops and conferences thereafter, following my research trajectory and helping me 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
The role of small and medium enterprises (SMEs) in the Indonesian economy has long 
been a topic of heated discourse. Early attempts to foster an indigenous entrepreneurial 
class during Dutch colonial rule and then by the first independent government largely 
failed. President Suharto’s New Order Government introduced various policy initiatives 
to strengthen (indigenous) SMEs, motivated by welfare considerations as well as to 
address the idea of the weak indigenous enterprise in need of government support and 
protection, which it had inherited from previous governments. But only when the New 
Order Government began liberalising trade, deregulating the economy and promoting 
export-orientation in the 1980s did private business begin to flourish.1 And yet, despite 
this private sector growth and SME support, there was a widespread public perception 
that only businesses owned by ethnic Chinese entrepreneurs managed to grow and 
flourish while indigenous SMEs were held back by an invisible glass ceiling and stayed 
small. This dissertation analyses Indonesian SME development and SME policies during 
the New Order period, the Asian Financial Crisis and its aftermath. The focus of this 
dissertation is on the New Order period (1966-98) and extends the timeframe to 2006 
to take into account the restructuring and reforms that have been implemented in the 
immediate aftermath of the Asian Financial Crisis.2  
Much research has been dedicated to explaining the importance of SMEs to 
national economies, which are seen to contribute to economic growth, create 
                                            
1 Although a number of business groups emerged in the early days of the New Order period, the private 
sector generally only indirectly benefited from the oil boom of the 1970s, as a result of increasingly 
restrictive policies towards FDI and the re-emergence of interventionist policies more generally; see Thee 
Kian Wie, 2006, ‘Policies for Private Sector Development in Indonesia, ADB Institute Discussion Paper, 46: 
1-46, pp. 10-11, 39. 
2 The immediate policy responses to the crisis were based on the fourth agreement with the IMF signed 
on 24 June 1998 (Second Supplementary Memorandum of Economic and Financial Policies, MEFP), 
which set out various policies and measures to implement fiscal and structural reforms, including 
improving access to credit for small-scale enterprises. In 2003 the Indonesian government decided to 
terminate the programme with the IMF and introduced a new economic policy package with the objective 
to maintain and strengthen macroeconomic stability, restructure and reform the financial sector, and 
increase investment, exports and employment (see INPRES 5/2003, Part I). Economic recovery was only 
achieved by 2004.  




employment, foster innovation and entrepreneurship, and provide a source of 
successful future medium and large enterprises.3  This raises a few questions: What 
factors influence the creation and success of SMEs? And how do those firms, in turn, 
affect the national business landscape? In particular, the apparent resilience of SMEs in 
the Tiger economies during the 1997/8 Asian Financial Crisis and their role in the 
economic recovery has sparked the interest of policymakers and academics alike, raising 
the question of how governments can contribute to the development of a dynamic and 
innovative SME sector.4 This requires better understanding of how government policies 
have historically influenced SME development. Some national governments have 
actively shaped the structural composition of their industrial sector, e.g. Taiwan 
deliberately limited enterprise size in order to ensure political stability. Korea, in 
contrast, actively supported large business groups.5 Indonesian policymakers, by 
comparison, had a long history of trying to foster the emergence of an indigenous 
entrepreneurial class, but have found limited success.  
The Indonesian case deserves closer attention given that 90 per cent of firms are 
SMEs; yet, similar to Korea, its large firms are considered the drivers of innovation.6 
The East Asian Tiger economies have been subject to extensive research attempting to 
identify the pivotal factors in the ‘East Asian miracle’ (an economic growth of around 6 
                                            
3 Charles Harvie and Boon-Chye Lee, 2002a, ‘East Asian SMEs: Contemporary Issues and Developments 
– An Overview’, in: The Role of SMEs in National Economies in East Asia (pp. 1-20), Cheltenham: Edward 
Elgar Publishing Limited, p. 3. 
4 The World Bank’s Miracle Report groups Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand under the term “newly 
industrialising economies” (NIEs), which with the four Tiger economies (South Korea, Taiwan, Hong 
Kong and Singapore form the “high-performing Asian economies” (HPAEs) – for the purpose of this 
dissertation, the term NIEs is used interchangeably with Southeast Asian Tigers, while the second group 
is referred to as East Asian Tigers. 
5 The Korean government neglected its SMEs until the mid-1970s in its efforts to promote selected 
industries for which large enterprises had a competitive advantage. Only when Korea passed the 
transitional point from labour abundance towards labour scarcity in 1975 and thus shifted from 
promoting labour-intensive to capital-intensive industries did Korean chaebols begin relying on 
subcontracting labour-intensive production to SMEs. In response the Korean government slowly began 
to support SMEs from the mid-1970s onwards; 
see Nakki Baek and Wonchan Ra, 2001, Entrepreneurship in Korea: An Analysis of Factors Affecting SME Start-
Up, Seoul: Korea Institute for Industrial Economics and Trade (KIET), p. 42 and Makoto Abe and 
Momoko Kawakami, 1997, ‘A Distributive Comparison of Enterprise Size in Korea and Taiwan’, The 
Developing Economies, 35(4): 382-400, pp. 391-392. 
6 Tulus Tambunan, 2007, ‘SME Development in Indonesia with Reference to Networking, 
Innovativeness, Market Expansion and Government Policy’, in: Hank Lim (Ed.), SMEs in Asia and 
Globalization, ERIA Research Project Report 2007, No. 5 (Chapter 4), Jakarta: ERIA. 




per cent per annum between 1960 and 1995).7 The Tiger Cub or Southeast Asian Tiger 
economies (Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia and the Philippines), have arguably followed 
the East Asian Tigers (Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore) in their export-
driven path to industrialization.8 However, they each differ in their natural and human 
capital endowments, ethnic heterogeneity and forms of government and thus should be 
studied individually in order to evaluate the causal factors behind these growth miracles. 
One key difference is their business structures, as reflected in the juxtaposition of the 
archetypical SME-based Taiwanese economy and the Korean chaebols-dominated 
economy. 
While the case of Indonesia can shed light on the issue of SMEs, it is also an 
interesting case study from a development economics perspective, given that the lessons 
learned arguably have different applicability than the cases of Korea and Taiwan, which 
are smaller, ethnically homogeneous countries that had achieved food self-sufficiency 
and relatively strong income equality by the time they began industrialising in the 1960s. 
By contrast the ethnic heterogeneity, social issues, shortage of skilled labour and 
exchange rate volatility that have characterised Indonesia for the greater part of the 
twentieth century are issues many developing countries face today. Indonesia is argued 
to have been rich with natural resource endowments at the time the period of 
industrialization began and has thus natural advantages rather than having to actively 
develop their comparative advantage.9 This argument requires closer inspection, 
especially because this would be an important distinguishing characteristic compared to 
the initial situation in Korea and Taiwan when both countries began to industrialise. 
Indonesia’s geographical conditions allow for intra-country comparison of SME 
development as the islands have different experiences in terms of colonial pasts and 
industrial development. Finally, the development of the Indonesian SME sector 
                                            
7 The World Bank, 1993, The East Asian miracle: economic growth and public policy (World Bank policy research 
reports), Washington, D.C.: The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/The World 
Bank; William Cline, 1982, Reciprocity – A New Approach to World Trade Policy?, Washington, D.C.: Institute 
for International Economics; Robert Wade, 2004, Governing the Market: Economic Theory and the Role of 
Government in East Asian Industrialization (2nd Edition), Princeton University Press. 
8 With its leading position amongst the Southeast Asian Tigers Malaysia has attracted some attention, see 
for example:  Shahid Yusuf and Kaoru Nabeshima, 2009, Tiger Economies Under Threat: A Comparative 
Analysis of Malaysia’s Industrial Prospects and Policy Options (Volume 566), Washington, DC: The World Bank. 
9 For a discussion of governments shaping their countries’ comparative advantages see Alice Amsden, 
1989, Asia’s Next Giant: South Korea and Late Industrialization, New York: Oxford University Press, Part III 
and Robert Wade, 2004, Governing the Market: Economic Theory and the Role of Government in East Asian 
Industrialization (2nd Edition), Princeton University Press, pp. 355-356. 




deserves more attention, as most studies have only focussed on selected case studies 
and failed to structurally analyse the long-term trends and developments of SMEs. 
Aswicahyono, Bird and Hill have found in their study of the Indonesian 
industrialisation process that industrial ownership patterns were formed by the 
“interplay of history, policy and industrial organization factors”.10 This dissertation 
analyses how these factors have shaped Indonesian SME development. 
The Indonesian archipelago and its people are characterised by an incredible 
diversity: Indonesia is the world’s fourth most populous country; the archipelago’s 
population is dispersed amongst an estimated 6,000 inhabited islands out of a total of 
some 17,000 islands which fall into three distinct climate zones.11 It thus comes to no 
surprise that human and economic development should differ considerably between 
Indonesia’s regions. Some of these differences can be explained by differential policy 
treatment by colonial and subsequent independent national governments; conversely 
some of these differences explain why some policies are more effective in some areas 
than in others. Part of this links to factor endowments – policies can change some 
factor endowments (e.g. educational investments in selected regions will lead to 
differences in human capital), differences in factor endowment in turn mean that the 
same policy may have different effects in different regions (e.g. policies strengthening 
local entrepreneurship should have stronger effects in regions with higher education 
levels and where people have more business experience).  This thesis takes a regional 
perspective to account for and analyse these differences. This variation helps 
disentangle the causes of SME development at the regional level.  
The main data source used in this thesis is the under-utilised Economic Census 
data, collected from the archives of the Indonesian Central Statistics Office in Jakarta 
(details in section 1.4.4). The Economic Censuses cover all non-agricultural economic 
sectors and distinguish between number of establishments and workers by firm-size and 
province, as well as variables such as value added, exports, ownership, source of capital, 
constraints faced in developing the business and type of assistance received through 
                                            
10 Haryo Aswicahyono, Hal Hill and Dionisius Narjoko, 2011, ‘Indonesian Industrialization: A Latecomer 
Adjusting to Crises’, UNU-WIDER, Working Paper No. 2011/53: 1-32, p. 5. 
11 Masato Kawanishi, Benjamin Preston and Nadia Ridwan, 2016, ‘Evaluation of National Adaptation 
Planning: A Case Study in Indonesia’, in: Shinji Kaneko and Masato Kawanishi (Eds.), Climate Change 
Policies and Challenges in Indonesia (pp. 85-110), Osaka/Tokyo: Springer Japan, pp. 89-91. 




SME-targeted support and credit programmes. Tracing these variables over time 
through a regional lens allows for an intra-country comparison and makes an original 
and important contribution to the literature on Indonesian economic development. 
This thesis seeks to understand how government policies affected SME 
development in Indonesia from 1966 to 2006 through two overarching research 
questions:  (1) What factors influenced the creation and success of SMEs? (2) How did 
SME development in turn affect the national business landscape? These research 
questions lead I turn to more specific issues that are addressed I chapters 3 and 4 as 
indicated below. The second chapter situates the narrative in historical context and 
explores the legacies that shaped the Indonesian business landscape (and perception 
thereof) when Suharto came to power. The third chapter analyses SME development to 
understand how the national business landscape and the role of SMEs changed. To 
understand what role SMEs played in the Indonesia economy the chapter-specific 
question asks whether a so called ‘missing middle’ really existed, what explained it and 
how productive SMEs were relative to micro and large enterprises. To identify crucial 
factors the chapter analyses which constraints SMEs regard the main barrier to their 
business development. Having identified access to credit as the crucial factor that 
prevented SMEs from growing in Chapter 3, the fourth chapter analyses the 
development of small business credit. The chapter traces the expansion of SME credit 
programmes and policies and identifies which types of firms were most likely to benefit 
from these schemes. This analysis explains why despite targeted SME-support policies 
we observe a bottleneck in the growth of small firms.  
1.1 Indonesian Economic Development during the New Order 
Regime 
New Order is the term commonly used to describe the Suharto Presidency (1966-1998). 
The New Order (orde baru in Bahasa Indonesia) brought many changes from the 
preceding Sukarno Presidency (1945-1967), aptly referred to as the Old Order (orde 
lama). As the first independent national government the Old Order’s main objective was 
to transform Indonesia from a colonial to a national economy. During this period, the 
government’s approach shifted from a moderate stance influenced by social democratic 




ideals towards growing nationalism and socialism. The 1950s saw an increase in 
nationalist elements: in 1950 an Indonesian nationality requirement was attached to the 
eligibility criteria of some important licenses to strengthen indigenous entrepreneurship, 
and by 1958 the government’s growing hostility towards private capitalism led the 
government to nationalise Dutch enterprises. On August 17, 1959 President Sukarno 
announced a new political manifesto in his Independence Day Address: the ‘Guided 
Economy’, which nationalised key sectors of production supplying basic needs. When 
Suharto came to power in 1966 he took over a country with a weak economy, plagued 
by high currency volatility, low overall education and mass malnourishment. Gunnar 
Myrdal wrote in Asian Drama that “as things look at the beginning of 1966, there seems 
to be little prospect of rapid economic growth in Indonesia”.12  
And yet under Suharto’s leadership Indonesia developed from a mainly 
agricultural economy towards an industrialised economy. It was included as one of the 
high-performing Asian economies (HPAEs) featured in the World Bank’s (1993) 
famous East Asian Miracle report which “grew more rapidly and more consistently than 
any other group of economies in the world from 1960 to 1990”. Moreover, tracking the 
GDP growth rate of 119 economies between two periods, 1960-1970 and 1970-85, the 
report found Indonesia to have been “one of only three economies to move from the 
bottom to the top of the distribution of growth rates between the two periods”.13 The 
economic policies of the New Order regime were widely regarded as a success: rice 
production and rice per capita availability increased, GDP grew by over 7 per cent per 
annum until the early 1980s, and the terms of trade improved dramatically.14  
The New Order was also a turning point for Indonesia’s relationship with the 
West, abandoning Sukarno’s anti-capitalist and anti-Western policies.15 The government 
turned to a team of largely USA-trained economists teaching at the University of 
Indonesia in order to regain legitimacy with the international financial community, in 
                                            
12 Gunnar Myrdal, 1969, An Asian Drama: An Inquiry into the Poverty of Nations, Vol. I,  New York: 
Pantheon, p. 489. 
13 The World Bank, 1993, The East Asian miracle: economic growth and public policy (World Bank policy research 
reports), Washington, D.C.: The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/The World 
Bank, pp. 28-29. 
14 Anne Booth, 1998, The Indonesian Economy in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries: A History of Missed 
Opportunities, Basingstoke: Macmillan and New York: St. Martin’s Press, pp. 76-7. 
15 Thee Kian Wie, 2003, Recollections: The Indonesian Economy, 1950s-1990s, Singapore: Institute of Southeast 
Asian Studies, p. 32. 




particular because of the importance of foreign credit and aid to combat inflation and 
increase production whilst reducing government expenditure.16 Suharto’s efforts proved 
successful and foreign aid began flowing into Indonesia.   
However, at the same time the regime was plagued by widespread corruption, 
nepotism and political repression (in particular of perceived Communists). Thus in the 
latter years of the New Order era the view spread amongst Indonesians that its 
economic policies and practices had led to great income inequalities (despite a relatively 
stable Gini coefficient), particularly between the indigenous (pribumi) and non-
indigenous population, many of whom were Sino-Indonesians. After the beginning of 
the Asian Financial Crisis in 1997 anti-government demonstrations broke out. Tensions 
led to many brutal anti-Chinese riots in Indonesia.17  
The military leadership found itself unable to resolve the growing dissent and 
control the protests and Suharto finally resigned in May 1998, his vice president B.J. 
Habibie becoming president.18 The instability and uprisings continued and Habibie’s 
government gave in to reformist demands for early free elections rather than finishing 
Suharto’s term. On 19 October 1999, Abdurrahman Wahid became the first freely 
elected president of the Republic of Indonesia.19 Wahid suffered from lack of political 
support by the parliament and was finally dismissed by the People’s Consultative 
Assembly (Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat, MPR) in July 2001 and succeeded by 
Megawati Sukarnoputri (2001-2004).20  
1.2 Indonesia in the Asian Development Model 
The East Asian industrialisation model is characterised by state-led industrialisation that 
moved from import substitution towards export-oriented growth, employing several 
                                            
16 Anne Booth, 1998, The Indonesian Economy in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries: A History of Missed 
Opportunities, Basingstoke: Macmillan and New York: St. Martin’s Press, p. 74. 
17 Thee Kian Wie, 2003, Recollections: The Indonesian Economy, 1950s-1990s, Singapore: Institute of Southeast 
Asian Studies, pp. 30, 32. 
18 Harold Crouch, 2007, The Army and Politics in Indonesia, Singapore: Equinox Publishing, pp. 19-20. 
19 Leo Suryadinata, 2002, Elections and Politics in Indonesia, Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 
pp. 51-2, 58-9, 67, 162. 
20 Harold Crouch, 2007, The Army and Politics in Indonesia, Singapore: Equinox Publishing, pp. 30-2. 




policy tools, most prominently promoting selected industries through infant industry 
protection. Rapid economic growth was accompanied by increased income equality, as 
well as the building of a business-friendly environment. Indonesia being a Southeast 
Asian Tiger we expect (a) a move from import-substitution towards export orientation 
and, arguably, (b) a stronger role of SMEs. All the Tiger economies (with the exception 
of Hong Kong) moved from import-substituting policies towards export-orientation. 
The Southeast Asian Tigers are argued to have used different policy instruments, in 
particular focussing on more general reductions of import protection and providing 
export credit rather than the ‘highly selective interventions’ that characterised the East 
Asian Tiger economies’ approaches. Yet this shift from import-substitution towards 
export orientation has still been observed in the policies of the Southeast Asian Tigers 
in the late twentieth century.21 The second part of the hypothesis is based on the 
assumptions that in the East Asian growth model rapid economic growth was 
accompanied by increased income equality as well building a business-friendly 
environment.22  
According to the World Bank’s (1993) East Asian Miracle report, one of the 
features of the East Asian model was the ‘principle of shared growth’ – wealth was 
shared with the middle and poor classes through land or other agricultural reforms, but 
also by encouraging SME development through targeted support-policies.23 Suharto and 
his authoritarian New Order government restructured the economy along similar lines, 
reflected in economic growth targets and industrial policy goals set out in five-year 
development plans - which also included strengthening small businesses to promote 
income equality. While the rise of business conglomerates, similar to Korea, and the 
strength of state-owned enterprises, resembling Taiwan, both became key features of 
the Indonesian economy, it is unclear how these changes affected the overall business 
landscape and the SME sector.  
                                            
21 The World Bank, 1993, The East Asian miracle: economic growth and public policy (World Bank policy research 
reports), Washington, D.C.: The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/The World 
Bank, pp. 12-13. 
22 The World Bank, 1993, The East Asian miracle: economic growth and public policy (World Bank policy research 
reports), Washington, D.C.: The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/The World 
Bank, pp. 2-4, 14. 
23 The World Bank, 1993, The East Asian miracle: economic growth and public policy (World Bank policy research 
reports), Washington, D.C.: The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/The World 
Bank, pp. 13-14. 




Wade, Rodrik and Amsden have made important contributions to analysis of 
the role of the government in the industrialization of Taiwan and Korea. Wade argues 
that both governments altered the price structure in order to create environments 
conducive to industrial investment and, through capital controls and credit rationing, 
actively formed a class of industrial capitalists.24 Amsden similarly argued that both 
states deliberately manipulated relative prices to create investment opportunities and 
that their success was based on “getting the control mechanisms right”.25 Wade comes 
to the conclusion that the government “led” the private market to invest in specific 
industrial sectors.26 Rodrik et. al. expand on the argument, claiming that the 
coordination and encouragement of investment helped remove coordination failures.27 
Wade explains the difference in firms sizes through a mixture of economic differences 
(lower saving rates in Korea meant higher foreign borrowing, leaving less credit for 
non-priority sectors), timing (Korea entered heavy and chemical industries rather late, 
and had to build them up much faster), and political reasons.28  The primary aim of the 
transplanted Nationalist regime in Taiwan was “to promote economic stability and 
prevent the overconcentration of capital”. This led the Taiwanese government to 
restrict scale and concentration of business groups.29 Korea, facing different political 
conditions, had no inhibitions in promoting large industries. Fields identifies the state as 
the key factor shaping the environment of these enterprises.30 Taiwan deliberately 
limited enterprise size in order to ensure political stability. Korea, in contrast, actively 
supported large business groups. 
                                            
24 Robert Wade, 2004, Governing the Market: Economic Theory and the Role of Government in East Asian 
Industrialization (2nd Edition), Princeton University Press, pp. 301-303, 306-307. 
25 Alice Amsden, 1989, Asia’s Next Giant: South Korea and Late Industrialization, New York: Oxford 
University Press, pp. 13-14; Alice Amsden, 2001, The Rise of “the Rest”: Challenges to the West from Late-
Industrializing Economies, New York: Oxford University Press, p. 11. 
26 Robert Wade, 2004, Governing the Market: Economic Theory and the Role of Government in East Asian 
Industrialization (2nd Edition), Princeton University Press, p. 303. 
27 Dani Rodrik, Gene Grossman and Victor Norman, 1995, ‘Getting Interventions Right: How South 
Korea and Taiwan Grew Rich’, Economic Policy, 10(20): 53-107, p. 97. 
28 Robert Wade, 2004, Governing the Market: Economic Theory and the Role of Government in East Asian 
Industrialization (2nd Edition), Princeton University Press, pp. 321-322. 
29 Karl Fields, 1995, Enterprise and the State in Korea and Taiwan, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, p. 
240.  
30 Karl Fields, 1995, Enterprise and the State in Korea and Taiwan, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, p. 
239. 




A comparison of Indonesia with South Korea and Taiwan requires a number of 
qualifications. The most obvious is addressing the disparities in economic growth. In 
Chapter 3, which embarks on a systematic comparison between Indonesia, South Korea 
and Taiwan this is resolved through using a 15 year gap in data comparisons. This gap 
was calculated based on a comparison of GDP per capita as well as their industrial 
policy histories (see Chapter 3, Section 3.3.4). Second, South Korea and Taiwan not 
only followed similar export-led paths of industrialization, but both featured high 
economic growth rates along with an equalization of income distribution, and shifted 
from labour-intensive to capital- and technology-intensive industries. 31 The relative 
income equality achieved in Korea and Taiwan in the 1950s, when they embarked on 
their paths of state-led industrialisation, stands in stark contrast to the uneven economic 
growth and human development that characterised Indonesia at the end of the Old 
Order period. Jomo argues that “the World Bank’s generalization about income 
inequality reduction is erroneous”, because unlike South Korea and Taiwan, Indonesia, 
Malaysia and Thailand started with higher income inequality and had greater 
fluctuations during their period of rapid economic growth.32 Jomo further argues that 
the extent of the difference in income inequality between Indonesia on the one hand 
and South Korea and Taiwan on the other is obscured by the fact that most Indonesian 
Gini coefficients were based on consumption rather than income data.33 
This high initial income equality in South Korea and Taiwan is linked to land 
reforms both countries implemented from 1948 to the mid-1950s, which led to a 
substantial redistribution of income and wealth.34 This was very different to the 
Indonesian experience. In Indonesia legislation introducing redistributive land reforms 
was passed in 1960. Booth identifies three main reasons why these reforms largely 
failed: first, it was based on the mistaken assumption that the majority of rural poor 
cultivated land and vice versa that tenant farmers were generally part of the poorer 
classes; second, the reforms did not account for the constraints posed by land scarcity; 
                                            
31 Tamio Hattori and Yukihito Satō, 1997, ‘A Comparative Study of Development Mechanisms in Korea 
and Taiwan’, The Developing Economies, 35(4): 341-357, pp. 341-3. 
32 Jomo K.S., 2006, ‘Growth with Equity in East Asia?’, UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs 
(DESA) Working Papers, No. 33: 1-52, p. 40. 
33 Jomo K.S., 2006, ‘Growth with Equity in East Asia?’, UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs 
(DESA) Working Papers, No. 33: 1-52, pp. 39-40. 
34 Jong-sung You, 2014, ‘Land Reform, Inequality, and Corruption: A Comparative Historical Study of 
Korea, Taiwan, and the Philippines’, The Korean Journal of International Studies, 12(1):191-224, pp. 203, 217. 




and finally, Muslim landowners in Java and elsewhere constituted a powerful special 
interest group that strongly opposed these reforms.35  Subsequent agricultural policies 
after Suharto came to power aimed at dealing with the issue of overpopulation but not 
redistribution per se.36 Comparing the trajectories of these different experiences with land 
reforms Palacio and Axelsson found that “Indonesia has not succeeded in creating 
these egalitarian preconditions for sustained growth [which characterise the East Asian 
development model]”.37 
Hendra Esmara analysed Indonesia’s regional income disparities between 1968 
and 1972 and found a sharp increase in regional income inequality during the early days 
of the New Order period and traced the rise to increased timber and oil production.38 
Akita found that Indonesia’s coefficient of variation of GRDP in 1972 was comparable 
with the Philippines, but dropping the three richest provinces (Riau, Central and East 
Kalimantan) from the equation, would have put Indonesia at par with France and 
Japan.39 After this initial increase in equality Indonesia’s provinces converged until the 
mid-1980s, after which disparities continued to grow. 
Indonesia’s development must be further contextualised in comparative 
perspective to disentangle global trends and understand where Indonesia lags behind 
and where its achievements lie. In Table 1 Indonesia’s achievements in education, 
health and GDP per capita during the New Order period are compared to the 
development of its Southeast Asian neighbours, other large developing countries as well 
as the averages of low income and OECD countries respectively. The results show a 
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Pustaka Obor Indonesia, pp. 77-78. 
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Perspective, 1968-2010’, in: Vincente Pinilla and Henry Willebald (Eds.), Agricultural Development in the 
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pp. 52-53. 
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mixed picture of Indonesia’s achievements in primary school enrolment; in regional 
comparison it consistently lagged behind Malaysia and Thailand. While still slightly 
behind the OECD average, however, Indonesia performed far above the low income 
country group. Its achievements in secondary school enrolment are considerably 
weaker, despite the New Order government’s 1989 policy to increase mandatory years 
of schooling to nine. Indonesia was overtaken by China in 2000 and Thailand in 2006 in 
terms of secondary school enrolment rate, the only country it consistently outperforms 
is India. Overall trends in health development measured through the infant mortality 
rate (IMR) are promising: there is clear convergence overall. However, Indonesia is the 
second worst performer of the ten countries listed – outperforming, again, only India. 
GDP per capita at purchasing power parity (PPP) has also converged between the ten 
countries. In regional comparison Indonesia was consistently in the middle, behind 
Malaysia and Thailand but before the Philippines and Vietnam. Noteworthy is that the 
Asian Financial Crisis, which originated in Thailand and rapidly spread through the 
region in 1997 did not alter the relative performance of the countries in the region.  
Indonesia’s weak performance on health and education indicators corresponds 
to low public expenditure on these health sectors compared to other countries in the 
region. Measured as share of GDP Indonesia’s spending has been amongst the bottom 
two countries throughout the entire period (see Table 2). Indonesia’s position within 
this ranking is similar when measuring public education expenditure as share of 
government expenditure.40 However, Francisco Javier Arze del Granado et al argue that 
direct comparisons of education expenditure as shares of GDP or government 
expenditure are of limited use, as they do not take the size of the public sector or the 
economy, amongst many other factors into account. They found that when controlling 
for population size and density, GDP per capita, degree of fiscal decentralisation and 
budget balance, Indonesia’s education spending - relative to national budget – is close to 
the optimal level.41 However, considering Indonesia as a Tiger economy, its educational 
spending is low compared to the other Southeast Asian Tigers. Spending less than 
                                            
40 Francisco Javier Arze del Granado, Wolfgang Fengler, Andy Ragatz and Elif Yavuz, 2007, ‘Investing in 
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Research Working Paper, 4329: 1-43, p. 5. 
41 Francisco Javier Arze del Granado, Wolfgang Fengler, Andy Ragatz and Elif Yavuz, 2007, ‘Investing in 
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Malaysia can be explained by smaller size of government, but against Thailand, which 
has a smaller government but spends more on education, this argument does not hold. 
Indonesia also ranks at the bottom for public expenditure on health, as share of 
GDP as well as share of public expenditure (see Table 2). Here Indonesia’s expenditure 
lie far below the optimal level, even when considering the other factors discussed in the 
context of education expenditure.42 Already in 1985 the World Bank found Indonesia to 
be spending roughly half of what would have been expected based on the spending 
levels and performances of neighbouring countries.43 In 2006 the World Bank still 
found Indonesia’s health spending too low, in particular given Indonesia’s still relatively 
high IMR. They concluded that ‘Indonesia is not yet prioritizing health spending’.44 
                                            
42 Francisco Javier Arze del Granado, Wolfgang Fengler, Andy Ragatz and Elif Yavuz, 2007, ‘Investing in 
Indonesia’s Education: Allocation, Equity, and Efficiency of Public Expenditure’, World Bank Policy 
Research Working Paper, 4329: 1-43, p. 6. 
43 The World Bank, 1991, Indonesia: Health Planning and Budgeting, Washington D.C.: World Bank, p. 14. 
44 The World Bank, 2008, Spending for Development: Making the Most of Indonesia's New Opportunities, 
Washington, DC: World Bank, p. 57. 
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Table 1: Education, Health and GDP in Comparative Perspective, 1971-2006 
 Primary School Enrolment Rate  Secondary School Enrolment Rate 
 1971 1981 1991 2001 2006 1990 2000 2006 
Indonesia 70.07 90.13 95.37 91.96 91.60 46.59 55.10 62.59 
Malaysia 83.89 n/a n/a 97.04 96.62 54.66 66.16 67.97 
Philippines n/a 93.17 n/a 89.50 86.86 71.99 n/a 81.24 
Thailand n/a n/a n/a n/a 94.10 28.50 n/a 71.76 
Vietnam n/a 93.85 n/a 95.53 91.29 34.82 n/a n/a 
China n/a n/a 97.13 n/a n/a 37.32 61.03 68.45 
India 61.32 n/a n/a 79.63 n/a n/a 45.06 55.08 
Japan 99.91 99.96 99.96 99.97 99.98 95.62 101.83 100.98 
Korea 96.52 99.94 99.40 99.77 n/a 92.62 98.39 97.30 
Brazil n/a n/a n/a 98.03 n/a n/a n/a n/a 
Low Income Countries n/a 49.61 46.87 56.62 71.81 20.11 23.08 30.77 
OECD Countries 90.13 94.84 97.20 97.45 96.45 85.51 94.82 97.50 
 
 IMR (per 1,000 live births) GDP per capita, PPP  
(constant 2011, international USD) 
 1970 1980 1990 2000 2006 1990 2000 2006 
Indonesia 113.10 85.40 62.20 41.10 32.10 4,477 5,806 7,120 
Malaysia 43.50 25.40 14.30 8.70 6.90 10,451 16,146 19,164 
Philippines 55.40 53.20 40.80 29.90 26.90 4,010 4,227 4,954 
Thailand 71.80 47.00 30.30 19.10 14.60 6,651 9,228 11,961 
Vietnam 56.40 46.80 36.60 26.10 22.00 1,501 2,650 3,687 
China 80.40 48.00 42.10 30.20 18.70 1,526 3,701 6,411 
India 142.80 114.30 88.30 66.40 53.90 1,773 2,521 3,457 
Japan 13.40 7.40 4.60 3.30 2.70 30,447 33,872 36,142 
Korea 41.40 12.30 6.10 5.20 4.50 12,087 20,757 26,734 
Brazil 102.50 75.90 50.90 28.10 18.20 10,246 11,308 12,533 
Low Income Countries 151.30 134.80 113.00 92.30 73.20 1,147 1,085 1,206 
OECD Countries 38.68 26.57 17.04 10.71 8.26 26,925 32,758 36,159 
Data source: The World Bank, 2017, World Development Indicators, Washington, D.C.: The World Bank, http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/world-development-indicators. 




Notes: The (net) primary school enrolment rate is the ratio of children of official school age who are enrolled in school to the population of the corresponding official school age; 
The (gross) secondary school enrolment rate is the ratio of total enrolment, regardless of age, to the population of the age group that officially corresponds to the level of education 
shown; 
The infant mortality rate is the number of infants dying before reaching one year of age, per 1,000 live births in a given year; 
GDP per capita is here converted to international dollars in constant 2011 prices using purchasing power parity rates. An international dollar has the same purchasing power over 
GDP as the U.S. dollar has in the United States. GDP at purchaser's prices is the sum of gross value added by all resident producers in the economy plus any product taxes and 








Table 2: Government Expenditure on Health and Education in Comparative Perspective, 1972-2007 
 
Public education expenditure 
(% of GDP) 
Public health expenditure 
(% of GDP) 
Public health expenditure 
(% of government expenditure) 
 1972 1989 1995 2001 2007 1995 2001 2006 1995 2001 2006 
Indonesia 2.64 0.83 1.00 2.46 3.04 0.71 0.96 0.91 4.93 4.54 4.54 
Malaysia n/a n/a 4.34 7.48 4.37 1.67 1.99 2.01 5.23 5.37 5.88 
Philippines n/a n/a 3.04 3.03 2.60 1.36 1.32 1.45 7.42 7.21 8.72 
Thailand 3.03 2.50 3.17 4.82 3.60 1.97 2.29 3.90 11.75 11.08 19.81 
Vietnam n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 1.76 1.63 1.94 7.91 7.21 7.46 
China 1.63 n/a 1.85 n/a n/a 1.78 1.62 1.84 15.95 9.29 9.94 
India n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 1.05 1.08 1.11 4.52 4.25 4.40 
Japan 4.08 5.47 3.51 3.57 3.46 5.45 6.30 6.60 14.99 16.21 18.35 
Korea 3.08 3.04 2.97 3.90 3.95 1.38 2.63 3.15 6.27 9.95 10.45 
Brazil n/a n/a 4.47 3.84 4.98 2.80 3.04 3.49 8.36 4.75 5.17 
Low Income Countries n/a n/a n/a 3.27 n/a 1.53 2.03 2.69 n/a n/a n/a 
OECD Countries n/a 4.75 4.86 5.11 n/a 5.84 6.08 6.65 13.37 15.40 16.72 
Data source: The World Bank, 2017, World Development Indicators, Washington, D.C.: The World Bank, http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/world-development-indicators. 
Notes: Public education expenditure (current, capital, and transfers) includes expenditure funded by transfers from international sources to government. General government 
usually refers to local, regional and central governments;  
Public health expenditure consists of recurrent and capital spending from government (central and local) budgets, external borrowings and grants (including donations from 
international agencies and nongovernmental organizations), and social (or compulsory) health insurance funds. 




This comparison shows that while Indonesia implemented similar industrial policies as 
the East Asian Tiger economies, there were important differences both at the point of 
departure to its industrial transformation as well as during its period of rapid economic 
growth. These qualifications will be borne in mind when comparing Indonesia to South 
Korea and Taiwan.  
1.3 Literature Survey 
There is an extensive debate about whether SMEs contribute to increased income 
equality and poverty alleviation. Proponents of SMEs argue for their labour-intensity 
and hence employment creation.45 David Birch’s seminal work The Job Creation Process 
demonstrated that it was smaller (and younger) firms that created the majority of jobs in 
a case study of the U.S between 1969 and 1976, a finding which has been later 
replicated for other countries.46 Counter arguments question these findings (after 
unsuccessful attempts to replicate the results using the same data set) as well as their 
significance, arguing that employment in larger firms tends to offer better working 
conditions and more stability.47  Further advantages ascribed to large firms include their 
ability to produce at economies of scale and their inherent advantage in bearing fixed 
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Colin Gallagher, Michael Daly and Jeremy Thomason, 1990, ‘The Growth of UK Companies 1985−87 
and their Contribution to Job Creation’ Small Business Economics, 3(4): 269−286; Neumark et al test Birch’s 
hypothesis with a different dataset, the National Establishment Time Series for 1992-2004 and found that 
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David Neumark, Brandon Wall and Junfu Zhang, 2011, ‘Do Small Businesses Create More Jobs? New 
Evidence for the United States from the National Establishment Time Series’, The Review of Economics and 
Statistics, 93(1): 16-29. 
47 For the unsuccessful replication of Birch’s results see: Catherine Armington and Marjorie Odle, 1982, 
‘Small Business – How Many Jobs?’, Brookings Review, 1(2): 14−17; On better working conditions in larger 
firms see: Charles Brown, James Hamilton and James Medoff, 1990, Employers Large and Small, Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press. 




costs for research and development.48 Another strand of argument points to differences 
in factors that shape comparative advantages, such as natural resource or human capital 
endowments, which determine optimal firm size (distribution) as some products are 
better produced by large firms (e.g. heavy industry) and others by smaller firms (e.g. 
artisan and handicraft industries).49  
One of the most important roles for SMEs in their contribution to economic 
development is to form the starting point for future successful larger firms. To fulfil this 
role, however, they often require support.50 This support can take the form of the 
facilitation of access to credit and finance, vocational training, encouragement of 
knowledge and technical spillovers through subnetworks, setting up industrial clusters 
and supporting a conducive ease of doing business framework, including appropriate 
regulation and the facilitation of registration procedures. In Indonesia, SMEs have 
historically been “a clear and consistently enunciated . . . government priority”.51 There 
are many reasons offered why they should be. The post-Asian Financial Crisis literature 
highlights their crisis resilience. Others advocate SME support based on their 
employment creation potential, contribution to economic growth, fostering of 
innovation and entrepreneurship.  
In Indonesia the motivation behind government support for SMEs can be 
traced to social factors. One way in which the Indonesian government sought to 
address the ethnic tensions it perceived as a “deterrent to development” was to 
promote SMEs to encourage “asset redistribution along ethnic lines”.52 In contrast to 
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52Hal Hill, 2001, ‘Small and Medium Enterprises in Indonesia: Old Policy Challenges for a New 
Administration’, Asian Survey, 41(2): 248-270, pp. 248-249. 




the East Asian Tiger economies (Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore), 
Indonesia, as noted earlier, is a heterogeneous society. The more than 250 million 
citizens who identify themselves as Indonesians also identify with one of the country’s 
200-plus ethnic groups.53  These social goals, however, stand in contrast to the 
economic efficiency goals of government officials. Thus, the gap between official 
discourse and policy implementation regarding SMEs has been wider in Indonesia than 
anywhere else in East Asia.54 This leads to the question of how far government policy 
has in fact influenced the development of SMEs. 
In Indonesian case, the country developed from a mainly agricultural economy 
towards an industrialised economy during the New Order period. We would expect a 
change in the role of SMEs and a shift in firm-size distribution and mechanisation from 
traditional cottage industries towards modern SMEs, consistent with the Staley and 
Morse thesis.55 These authors made the first important contribution to the analysis of 
SMEs in developing countries.56 They describe how the SME sector (using a definition 
of firms with up to 99 workers) changes as a country develops, emphasizing that SMEs 
remain important, but change by moving away from traditional household industries to 
modern factory SMEs with more complex production lines. They argue that artisans 
will still have a role to play, albeit a different one. Rather than working independently, 
artisans will supplement and collaborate with factories, through providing product 
design or individualising the final product, as well as providing maintenance and repair 
services.57 Staley and Morse disparage household industries as constituting barriers ‘to 
improvements in production technology and managerial practices’; their only role is 
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seen to integrate socially marginalised groups into the economies (e.g. people with 
disabilities or ethnic minorities).58  
Ian Little found that for most industries worldwide, capital productivity and 
total factor productivity is highest in medium-sized enterprises (with 50-500 
employees).59 Yet protectionist measures, investment incentives, state control of credit 
and selecting industries for promotion usually favour larger firms, which also tend to 
have economies of scale in export marketing.60 In this context, Little discusses the 
apparent contradiction between the widespread existence of SME promotion policies 
and the “relative decline of small-scale enterprises in most developing countries”. This 
is highly relevant for a case study of Indonesia and its large dichotomy between official 
policy discourse and implementation. Little accuses the majority of developing country 
governments of only having “cosmetic” SME policies, if any. He attributes this to the 
inherent bias which most industrial policies have towards larger firms. He points to 
trade regulation that favours larger firms because they are in a better position to obtain 
import permits and tariff rebates; and investment incentive laws that either restrict tax 
concessions to firms of a minimum size (an example of direct discrimination) or which 
smaller firms are unable to take advantage of because of weaker administrative 
capacities (an example of indirect discrimination).61 Similarly the effect of Indonesia’s 
SME policies has been described as marginal at best and harmful at worst.62 
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Snodgrass and Biggs show that SMEs foster entrepreneurship, at least during 
early stages of economic development. They believe that with increased economic 
development average firm size increases and potential entrepreneurs have to make a 
decision between starting their own business and working as managers in large 
enterprises.63 They argue that it is only those SMEs owned or managed by someone 
with strong managerial and entrepreneurial abilities that succeed in growing larger. As 
average manufacturing firm size grows, small firms growing into larger firms make up 
only a minor contribution. Snodgrass and Biggs find that the main reason average firm 
size in manufacturing increases tends to be displacement: small firms churn, while more 
medium enterprises enter the market and grow into large enterprises. In addition more 
firms entering the market start out large, in line with the Schumpeterian principle of 
creative destruction.64 However, one way in which SMEs are found to be able to 
overcome the competitive advantage of large enterprises in economies of scale and 
exploit their own distinct advantage is through niche markets.65  
Looking at SMEs, one has to distinguish between small enterprises which stay 
small, and those which might evolve into medium enterprises. The distinction is 
important because some authors have observed a “missing middle” in the firm size 
distribution of developing countries, where small firms remain small and large firms 
grow larger.66 James Tybout has looked at the missing middle in more detail. He finds 
that this drop-off in the middle is uncommon in industrialized countries. According to 
Tybout, “it never pays to be just large enough to attract enforcement”, particularly in 
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heavily regulated countries.67 Reasons why SMEs in developing economies stay small 
can be their lack of access to credit and suitable management resources, high transport 
costs, and poor infrastructure, acting as barriers, as well as the ability to avoid taxes 
whilst being part of the informal sector.68 
Howard and Hine analyse why small firms (need to) grow bigger and consider 
ways in which governments can support those small enterprises, which have positive 
net effects for the economy as a whole. They explain the concept of the population of 
organisations’ life cycle as follows: When a firm enters a new market, exploiting a niche, 
there is little to no competition. However, being the first to enter a niche also means 
that a firm cannot benefit from the experience of others, thus there are no “lessons 
learnt” to draw from. As the market develops, firms need to grow in size and increase 
productivity. As the profitability increases, new firms enter the niche. They now have 
the advantage that they can draw from the organisational learning and models of the 
first innovative firms, but they also bring in new approaches and knowledge. However, 
with increasing competition the niche approaches maturity: the market size and 
investments decrease and inputs become scarce. To remain competitive, costs have to 
be cut, so economies of scale become more important. At this point small firms either 
have to grow to exploit the economies of scale or move on to a new niche.69 
Howard and Hine not only distinguish between the different effects of 
government support to SMEs depending on type, but also the stage of the organisation 
life cycle. At the beginning, when a niche just starts to develop, firms can be assisted 
through supporting organisational learning in the form of good practices in production 
and marketing. This improves the utilisation of resources and thereby makes entering 
the niche more attractive to other firms, which creates job opportunities for existing 
firms and new entrants in the market. Supporting existing firms or the start-up of new 
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firms as the niche grows will only create jobs within these supported firms, as the 
competition for resources is increasing and thus entering the market will become 
increasingly unattractive to firms without support. However, the same type of support 
at the point of niche maturity could have the effect of net job losses, as firms without 
support may become unable to compete and will therefore have to downsize or 
dissolve.70 
Given the assumption that SMEs are labour intensive and geographically 
dispersed, it is presumed that they contribute to increasing income equality by 
employing people who would otherwise remain in less productive agricultural activities. 
It is difficult to imagine increased (regional) income equality in Indonesia without a 
stronger role for SMEs given the geographical dispersion of the population and hence 
the remoteness of large parts of the country.  
1.4 Methodology  
1.4.1 Defining SMEs 
The focus of this dissertation is on non-agricultural SMEs. One of the key issues is the 
definition of SMEs employed, given the lack of an international standard and 
inconsistent definitions used by various Indonesian government agencies and banks. 
Most commonly defined by the number of employees, other frequently used indicators 
include capital, assets, and turnover.71 Some definitions of small enterprises include 
microenterprises (or cottage industries).72 As observed by Hall: “The only really 
common characteristic of SMEs is that they are ‘not large’”.73  
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71 Charles Harvie and Boon-Chye Lee (Eds.), 2005, Sustaining growth and performance in East Asia: the role of 
small and medium sized enterprises, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing Limited, p. 2. 
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Mathur, 2001, Towards Economic Development, New Delhi: Discovery Publishing House, pp. 224-225. 
73 Chris Hall, 2002, ‘Profile of SMEs and SME Issues in East Asia’, in: Charles Harvie and Boon-Chye 
Lee (Eds.), The Role of SMEs in National Economies in East Asia (pp. 21-49), Cheltenham: Edward Elgar 
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In Indonesia, different government agencies employ different definitions: The 
Indonesian Ministry of Cooperatives and SMEs defines SMEs as enterprises owned by 
an individual or business entity that carry out productive economic activities and are not 
controlled, owned or part of large businesses, applying the asset and turnover criteria 
shown in Table 3. These bracket categories are also applied for taxation of small firms 
(micro and small) and medium firms.74 Financial criteria are also employed by the 
Ministry of Industry and Trade, the Ministry of Finance and Bank Indonesia.75  The 
Indonesian Central Board of Statistics (BPS) distinguished between categories not just 
on the basis of number of workers but also on whether they used power-driven 
machinery. However, since the 1974-75 Industrial Census it has based its definitions solely 
on size, irrespective of other factors such as use of machine power or financial criteria 
(see Table 4).76  
                                            
74 Annabelle Mourougane, 2012, ‘Promoting SME Development in Indonesia’, OECD Economics 
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75 Tulus Tambunan, 2000, Development of Small-Scale Industries during the New Order Government in Indonesia, 
Aldershot, UK/Brookfield, USA: Ashgate, p. 29. 
76 Badan Pusat Statistik (BPS) / Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS), 1998, Statistik Indonesia 1998/Statistical 
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Table 3: Current Definition of SMEs employed by the Ministry of Cooperatives 
and SMEs (in IDR) 
Type of enterprise Criteria 
Assets Turnover 
Micro ≤ 50 Million ≤ 300 Million 
Small > 50-500 Million > 300 Million – 2.5 Billion 
Medium > 500 Million – 10 Billion > 2.5 Billion – 50 Billion 
Sources: Kementerian Koperasi dan Usaha Kecil dan Menengah Republik Indonesia (Indonesian 
Ministry of Cooperatives and SMEs), 2008, Kriteria Usaha Mikro, Kecil dan Menengah Menurut UU No. 20 
Tahun 2008 Tentank UMKM (Criteria for Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises by Act No 20 Year 2008 
on MSMEs), Retrieved October 24 2014 from: 
http://www.depkop.go.id/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=129 
 




Before 1974-75 Industrial Census Since 1974-75 Industrial 
Census 
Number of workers Number of workers 
with power without power 
Household 
(micro/cottage) 
Enterprises without paid workers 1-4 
Small 1-4 1-9 5-19 
Medium 5-49 10-99 20-99 
Large ≥50 ≥100 ≥100 
Sources: Chris Hall, 2002, ‘Profile of SMEs and SME Issues’, for APEC, 1990-2000, for the APEC Small 
and Medium Enterprises Working Group in cooperation with PECC (Pacific Economic Cooperation 
Council), Singapore: World Scientific Publishing (on behalf of the APEC Secretariat), pp. 7-8; Peter 
McCawley, 1981, ‘The Growth of the Industrial Sector’, in: Anne Booth and Peter McCawley (Eds.), The 
Indonesian Economy During the Soeharto Era (pp. 62-101), Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, p. 97. 
 
This dissertation will try to ascertain in comparisons if the underlying data are based on 
different definitions of SMEs and discuss how this may bias the results. The focus here 
is on small and medium enterprises. But given the blurred lines in many data sets 
between household industries/cottage industries/micro and small enterprises as well as 
between medium and large enterprises, the analysis will also have to include these 
categories. This dissertation will interpret the results as far as possible in terms of their 
implications for SMEs. Whenever the data permits the focus will be on enterprises with 
5-99 employees in line with the definition of SMEs employed by the BPS.  
SME development will be based on a number of variables. The first is absolute 
and relative changes in firm size distribution within the SME category as well as SMEs 
relative to microenterprises and large enterprises. This is not just important to 




understand relative changes in firm size distribution but ideally indicates the origins of 
SMEs, i.e. whether they develop from household enterprises, and whether they manage 
to grow and eventually develop into large enterprises. This also requires an 
understanding in terms of share of number of firms, employment, value added and total 
exports made up by SMEs according to sector. 
1.4.2 Working Definition of Indonesia’s Regions 
There are fluid definitions of what constitutes Indonesia’s regions, varying by scale (e.g. 
island groupings, the provincial level) and geographical groupings (e.g. Java versus the 
rest of Indonesia or what encompasses Eastern Indonesia, often referred to as the 
‘Outer Islands’). The concept of the ‘Outer Islands’ originates from the Dutch colonial 
government’s administrative separation of Indonesia into Java and Madura on the one 
hand, and ‘Buitenbezittingen’, the Outer Islands, on the other.77 The concept has since 
broadened to allow for looser geographical interpretations, such as the occasional 
grouping of Java with Bali based on population density, but generally it continues to be 
used to emphasize the political, economic, social and/or cultural distinctiveness of 
Java.78 
But socio-economic differences did not just exist between Java and all outer 
islands. Chris Manning has made an attempt to group the provinces of Indonesia’s 
outer islands (with the exception of Bali) according to five characteristics that are 
indicative of differences in labour market structures: (i) resource abundant provinces: 
Aceh and Riau (Sumatra), East and Central Kalimantan, Papua and Maluku (Eastern 
Indonesia); (ii) major transmigration destinations: South Sumatra, Jambi, Bengkulu and 
Lampung (Sumatra); (iii) areas with major out-migration: provinces of North and West 
Sumatra; (iv) land-abundant provinces largely depending on agriculture: West and South 
Kalimantan, Central and Southeast Sulawesi; and (v) densely populated/poor provinces: 
North and South Sulawesi, West and East Nusa Tenggara, and East Timor (Eastern 
                                            
77 Oei Tjong Bo, 1948, Niederländisch-Indien: Eine Wirtschaftsstudie [The Dutch East Indies: An Economic 
Study], Zurich: Orell Füssli Verlag, p. IV. 
78 Francisco Javier Arze del Granado, 2009, ‘Spatial considerations on decentralization and economies of 
concentration in Indonesia’, in: Yukon Huang and Alessandro Bochhi (Eds.), Reshaping Economic Geography 
in East Asia (pp. 135-155), Washington, DC: The World Bank, pp. 142-143; 
Iem Brown, 2009, The Territories of Indonesia, London: Routledge, p. 52. 




Indonesia).79 Manning himself acknowledged an extent of arbitrariness behind this 
grouping. Some of these groupings changed over time, Aceh for example saw a drastic 
change to its economy through the huge influx of foreign aid after a tsunami devastated 
the region in December 2004. Similarly the destinations of large-scale transmigration 
changed over time. Lampung was initially a major in-migration destination, in particular 
due to government attempts to alleviate population pressures in Java. However, in the 
early 1980s the government stopped transmigration programmes into Lampung. This 
cut to in-migration was paired with an increase in out-migration, towards nearby urban 
areas facilitated by a new road connecting Lampung to Bengkulu. The key point here, 
however, is that an analysis of regional differences in Indonesia must go beyond 
comparing Java (or Java-Bali) to the Outer Islands. 
 
Table 5: Key Regional Geographical Statistics, 2010 
 Area in km2 
Percentage of 




people per km2 
Java 129,438 6.77% 1,086 1,055.41 
Sumatra 480,793 25.16% 5,277 105.31 
Sulawesi 188,522 9.87% 2,500 92.15 
Kalimantan 544,150 28.48% 1,061 25.34 
Bali 5,780 0.30% 85 673.13 
Eastern Indonesia 562,247 29.42% 7,495 27.30 
INDONESIA 
TOTAL 1,910,931 100.00% 17,504 124.36 
Sources: Area and number of islands: BPS, 2010, Statistical Yearbook of Indonesia 2010, Jakarta: BPS; 
Population figures calculated from: BPS, Population Census 2010, Jakarta: BPS. 
 
The main geographical break down in this thesis is made according to province and 
summarised at island-level for the five most populated islands: Java, Sumatra, Sulawesi, 
Kalimantan and Bali. East and West Nusa Tenggara, Maluku and Papua have been 
grouped here into ‘Eastern Indonesia’, Indonesia’s remotest and poorest region (see 
population share by island group in Figure 1).80 Given the diversity not just between 
                                            
79 Chris Manning, 1998, Indonesian Labour in Transition: And East Asian Success Story?, Cambridge University 
Press, p. 156; 
Where not self-evident the respective island has been added in brackets for clarification. 
80 Eastern Indonesia is used as a fluid grouping in the literature, here it includes East and West Nusa 
Tenggara, Maluku and Papua, as used in: Hal Hill, Budy Resosudarmo and Yogi Vidyattama, 2009, 




but also within islands this thesis compares islands as the main unit and provinces as 
sub-units that reflect the differences within islands/island groups.  
 
Sources: Calculated from BPS, Population Census (1971, 1980, 1990, 2000, 2010), Jakarta: BPS. 
Notes: Eastern Indonesia here includes East and West Nusa Tenggara, Maluku and Papua and until 1996 
East Timor, which gained independence in 1999. 
 
To ensure comparability over time the country and provincial provinces have been 
standardised in the use and representation of the data in this thesis as visualised in 
Figure 2. There was only one change to the country borders during this period, which 
was East Timor. 81 East Timor was occupied by Indonesia in 1975 and formally annexed 
in 1976, it left in 1999 and gained its formal independence in 2000. The data here 
generally leave out East Timor, and in the few cases where the datasets do not allow for 
                                                                                                                           
‘Economic geography of Indonesia: location, connectivity, and resources’, in: Yukon Huang and 
Alessandro Bochhi (Eds.), Reshaping Economic Geography in East Asia (pp. 115-134), Washington, DC: The 
World Bank, pp. 117-8 as well as Arianto Patunru and Erman Rahman, 2014, 'Local governance and 
development outcomes', in: Hal Hill (Ed.), Regional Dynamics in a Decentralized Indonesia (pp. 156-186), 
Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, p. 161.  
81 Note that Papua became part of the national territory in 1963 (prior to first Industrial Census), then called 
Irian Barat, was renamed in 1973 as Irian Jaya and in 2000 as Papua. In this thesis the province is referred 


































Figure 1: Regional Shares of Total Population, 1971-2010 (in per cent) 




separation (e.g. summaries by industrial code rather than by province in the SME 
chapter), this is clearly indicated. However, while this was the only change to 
Indonesia’s national borders, provincial borders have changed over time as shown in 
Figure 2.  
In this thesis the provinces are standardised throughout to the provincial 
borders between 1976 and 1998 (25 provinces, excluding East Timor). Figure 2 shows 
the provincial boundaries used in this thesis: the blue arrows indicate which provinces 
were joint territory before 1976 and when they split and the red arrows indicate which 
provinces have split after 1998. For the harmonisation of economic census data in this 
dissertation this means that the only adjustment to the provincial borders in the 
1975/75 Industrial Census, 1986 Economic Census and 1996 Economic Census was the 
exclusion of East Timor. However, there were a number of changes in the 2006 
Economic Census. In the previous censuses Banten was included in the West Java figures, 
North Maluku in the Maluku figures, West Papua in Irian Jaya figures (listed here as 
Papua), Gorontalo in the North Sulawesi figures, West Sulawesi in the South Sulawesi 
figures, Kepulauan Riau was included in the Riau figures, Bangka Belitung Islands were 
included in the South Sumatra figures. The 2006 Economic Cemsus reported these 
provinces separately; in this dissertation the data has been recalculated and these 
provinces merged to facilitate comparison. 
 




Figure 2: Standardisation of Indonesian Provinces 
 
Source of underlying base map: D-Maps, n.d., Indonesia: outline, provinces, Retrieved March 20 2017 from http://d-maps.com/carte.php?num_car=15298&lang=en   
Notes: Blue arrows indicate changes prior to 1976 and point towards newly created provinces; red arrows indicate changes after 1998 and point towards home provinces the newly 
created province split away from. The grey shaded area shows East Timor.





1.4.3 The Collection of Economic Statistics in Indonesia 
When Suharto came to power, new support was lent to the work of the Indonesian 
Central Statistics Office (Biro Pusat Statistik, BPS). The BPS was initially founded in 
1960 to conduct population censuses and censuses required for the economic planning 
underlying the Guided Economy. However, during the Old Order Period the BPS was 
severely underfunded and hence unable to process all the data it collected. 82 Under the 
new regime, a wave of regional expansion commenced so that by 1968 the provincial 
statistical offices were formally established as Kantor Sensus dan Statistik, covering all 
regions. Between 1972 and 1995 the improvement and expansion of statistical reporting 
were reflected in a growth from 4,334 to 12,415 in number of personnel. Important 
censuses conducted by the BPS were the population censuses in 1971, 1980 and 1990, 
the agricultural censuses in 1973, 1983 and 1993 and the economic censuses of 1986 
and 1996. The economic censuses cover all economic sectors except agriculture and 
cover all non‐agricultural formal and informal businesses. However, since the 1960s the 
BPS has become less open about its methods of data collection, complicating an 
assessment of the quality of data.83  
1.4.4 Data 
The main data sources for this dissertation are the Indonesian Industrial Censuses 
conducted in 1964 and in 1974/1975 as well as the Indonesian Economic Census, 
which has been conducted every ten years since 1986 (1986, 1996 and 2006) which 
combined the former Industrial Census and Construction Census. The census data was 
collected during an archival research visit to the Indonesian Central Statistics Office in 
Jakarta in 2015 (details below). The vast majority of existing work on Indonesian 
business development relies on the Large and Medium-scale Manufacturing Survey, 
which only enumerates manufacturing firms with more than 20 employees. However, 
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little analysis exists of the much more comprehensive Economic Census, which covers 
all non-agricultural economic sectors and all firms, including firms with 1-20 workers. 
Making use of this previously largely unused data is therefore one of the key 
contributions of this thesis. 
The primary data was mostly collected during a four-month research visit in 
Indonesia in 2015 as a visiting researcher at the Economic Research Center of the 
Indonesian Institute of Sciences (LIPI).84 With the support of the institute I was able to 
conduct archival research at the National Archives (Arsip Nasional Republik Indonesia, 
ANRI), Indonesian Central Board of Statistics (Badan Pusat Statistik, BPS), the 
Indonesian National Development Planning Agency (Badan Perencanaan Pembangunan 
Nasional, Bappenas), and Bank Indonesia. With the support of LIPI in Jakarta and 
thanks to the financial support from the Economic History Society, the Royal Historical 
Society and the LSE’s Radwan Travel and Discovery Fund I was able: 
 To visit the Central Bureau of Statistics (Badan Pusat Statistik, BPS) and access the 
1964 and 1974/1975 Industrial Censuses and the Indonesian Economic Censuses 
from 1986, 1996 and 2006. I also interviewed BPS officials about the methods of 
data collection for the economic censuses and discussed resulting limitations of the 
data.    
 To visit the Indonesian National Archives (Arsip Nasional Republik Indonesia) where I 
collected policy documents and official exchanges regarding the nationalisation of 
Dutch enterprises in the late 1950s. 
 To visit the central bank archives of Bank Indonesia and review Annual Reports of 
Bank Indonesia from 1953 to 2006 on credit policy, lending and interest rates. 
 To visit the Ministry of National Development Planning (BAPPENAS) to collect 
information from the six five-year economic development plans (Repelita I-VI, 1969 
– 1999) on industrial development policies in general and SMEs and 
entrepreneurship support in specific. At BAPPENAS I also met with Dr. Leonardo 
Sambodo, Head of Sub-Directorate for SME Support & System. 
 
After returning from the research visit to Indonesia, I transcribed, matched and cleaned 
the industrial and economic census data. The three economic censuses collected for this 
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thesis consist of provincial as well as thematic volumes (i.e. manufacturing, which was 
in itself subdivided into medium- and large-scale manufacturing, and small-scale 
manufacturing). I matched the provincial economic census results with the results 
summarised at thematic level in order to expand the dataset, in particular to include 
value added data by region and firm-size category. Part of the contribution of this PhD 
dissertation is building the first regional database measuring value added per worker for 
the New Order period.  
The Economic Censuses cover all non-agricultural economic sectors and 
distinguish between number of establishments and workers by firm-size and province, 
as well as variables such as value added, exports, ownership, source of capital, 
constraints faced in developing the business and type of assistance received through 
SME-targeted support and credit programmes. Tracing these variables over time 
through a regional lens allows for an intra-country comparison and makes an original 
and important contribution to the literature on Indonesian economic development.  
The Industrial Census covered the following sectors:85 
1. Large manufacturing establishments (engaging 100 persons and over); 
2. Medium manufacturing establishments (engaging 20 to 99 persons); 
3. Small manufacturing establishments (engaging 5 to 19 persons); 
4. Household and cottage industries (engaging less than 5 persons); 
5. Organised mining of petroleum and other minerals; 
6. Unorganised mining & quarrying of gravel, sand, lime, salt-pans, etc.; 
7. Generation and distribution of electricity; 
8. Production and distribution of gas; 
9. Waterworks. 
The Economic Census provides data on businesses in all economic sectors except 
agriculture, as agricultural businesses are covered by the Agricultural Census.  
The 1986 Economic Census was conducted with the following targets:86 
a. Obtaining statistical data on forestry, mining and quarrying, manufacturing, 
electricity, gas and water supply, construction, trade, transportation and 
communication, banking and other financial institution and service. 
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b. Obtaining more detailed data on company operations: legal status, ownership, 
number of employees, wages and salaries, operational cost, capital formation, 
marketing, production and others. 
c. Compiling a directory of legally incorporated establishments. 
d. Getting an overview of all non-agricultural establishments engaged in the 
economy to develop a complete sampling frame for various surveys. 
e. Obtaining more detailed data on village potential and cooperatives. 
The 1996 Economic Census set the following objectives:87 
a. To compute the number of establishments and employees of all non-agricultural 
sectors at the national level and by region 
b. To obtain information about the structure and size of all non-agricultural 
establishments at the national level and by region 
c. To construct an integrated establishment directory of medium and large 
enterprises with legal business status to form the basis of a sampling frame and 
other establishment surveys 
d. To provide detailed economic data on business activities and inform economic  
indicators 
The 2006 Economic Census pursued the following specific purposes:88  
a. To provide information on the number of establishments, broken down by 
industrial sector/category, activity, business scale, and region. 
b. To provide basic information on various business issues, broken down by 
industrial sector/category, business scale, and region. 
c. To disseminate basic statistics related to non-agricultural economic activities 
nation-wide as well as at district, regency and municipality level. 
d. To compile complete and integrated maps and directories of establishments in 
each district/regency/municipality.  
e. To develop a complete sampling frame that will be used in surveys especially 
surveys relating to economic issues. 
The industrial category coverage of the 1996 and 2006 Economic Censuses differs from 
the 1986 coverage in so far as they exclude forestry, but the scope is sufficiently similar 
to allow for meaningful comparison of the census data.89  
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In the economic censuses, the number of establishments is broken down by 
business scale, region, range of employees, range of assets and sales. The censuses 
include establishments with and without fixed locations as well as registered businesses 
and businesses without legal status. Large and medium-sized establishments are 
captured in complete enumeration, whereas micro and small establishments are 
captured in a census sample. For the 2006 Economic Census the BPS estimates that five 
per cent of micro and small enterprises were sampled.90 The business register was 
compiled through the door to door method and the snowball method. With the door to 
door method, every building and establishment with and without fixed locations was 
visited. For the snowball method a neighbourhood chief administrator was chosen as a 
resource person, with the help of whom all businesses were listed and subsequently 
visited by the enumerator. In each case the key information collected included the name 
and address of the establishment, its main activity, the number of employees/workers, 
the year of start of operation, the amount of sales and assets.91  
The 1996 Economic Census was carried out in complete enumeration in all urban 
areas. In rural areas the census was conducted as a complete enumeration with one 
exception: businesses were enumerated on a sample basis in sparsely populated areas in 
which fewer than 50 per cent of physical buildings were used for business activities and 
there was no business activity centre that served at least 50 firms.92 What share of the 
businesses in those remote areas were actually sampled remains unclear. The 1986 
Economic Census also captured medium and large enterprises in full enumeration. Small 
manufacturing enterprises were captured in full with the exception of six provinces: 
Jakarta, Central Java, East Java, North Sumatra, South Sumatra and Maluku. In these six 
provinces 50 per cent of small scale industry was selected as a sample.93 
Microenterprises were selected on a sample basis, however official publications provide 
little information as to how large that sample was and how it was constructed beyond 
the assurance that “they were selected systematically” and proportional to the total 
number of microenterprises in each district.94 The 1974/75 Industrial Census enumerated 
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all small, medium and large industrial establishments. Microenterprises were enumerated 
on a sample basis covering 8 per cent of microenterprises in all urban and rural census 
blocks respectively. However, microenterprises in the following provinces were 
excluded and not enumerated at all: East Kalimantan, Central Kalimantan, Central 
Sulawesi, Southeast Sulawesi, Maluku, Papua and East and West Nusa Tenggara.95 
In a review of the 2006 Economic Census, BPS hinted at the existence of 
problematic issues collecting data in remote geographical areas.96 This problem also 
surfaced in a review of the data collection for a different census, the 2010 Population 
Census.97 Given that these problems were still an issue in 2006, despite the 
improvements that have been made in infrastructure and transportation as well as the 
expansion of BPS Regional Offices, it is only reasonable to assume that they were even 
larger constraints for the census enumerators in 1974/75, 1986 and 1996. This 
assumption is further supported by the fact that the 1974/75 Industrial Census excluded 
some remote provinces entirely from its enumeration of microenterprises. Despite these 
limitations the Economic Censuses still offer the most comprehensive geographical 
coverage of any firm-based survey conducted in Indonesia during the New Order 
period. 
The interviews conducted in Jakarta with BPS regarding the development of 
Economic Censuses and those with BAPPENAS about the evolution of 
SME/industrial policy were useful to get a better understanding of current events and 
recent developments. However, at both BPS as well as BAPPENAS the main constraint 
was the issue of institutional memory. It was generally difficult to retrace developments 
from the early days of the New Order regime to today. The interviews with BPS 
indicated that there is little knowledge about whether the data collection or 
interpretation has improved between the different Economic Censuses, which makes it 
very difficult to assess the extent to which there are limitations when it comes to 
comparing the data from different censuses. Unfortunately this limits the certainty with 
which analyses of the development can be made between the 1986, 1996 and 2006 
Economic Censuses.  
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However, the Head of Statistics Consultation Hady Suryono and the vast 
majority of his team were involved in the preparation of the 2006 Economic Census. 
This Census has impressive coverage, however the Statistics Consultation Division of 
BPS did report issues with ensuring participation. Medium and large enterprises were 
covered in complete enumeration. In contrast, micro and small enterprises were 
captured by a sample, which was estimated to constitute 5 per cent of all micro and 
small enterprises in Indonesia. It was in particular in interviewing micro and small 
entrepreneurs that BPS enumerators faced issues with some entrepreneurs being 
hesitant to participate. When this occurred the most common method of avoidance was 
that the entrepreneurs pretended to be absent from the premises.  
The reluctance of some entrepreneurs to participate in the Economic Census 
survey was mostly related to fear that the information collected could be used for tax 
purposes or would be lacking in confidentiality. This concern is not uncommon in 
census enumerations generally.98 Legally, respondents were only obliged to provide 
basic statistics, based on Article 26(1) and Article 27 of Statistics Act Number 16 issued 
in 1997. However, in practice it was difficult for enumerators to enforce participation 
when a potential respondent refused. Another, closely related, issue pertained to the 
acquisition of information about the sales and assets of firms.99  To address these issues 
BPS conducted awareness campaigns during the first phase of field operation in 2006 to 
promote participation and inform entrepreneurs about data confidentiality as well as the 
purpose of conducting the Economic Census.100  
1.5 Thesis Outline 
This introductory chapter has laid out a brief overview of Indonesian economic 
development during the New Order period, which is the key to understanding how the 
                                            
98 For a discussion of widespread concerns about misuse of census data for taxation purposes elsewhere, 
for example in the context of Ghana, see: Gerardo Serra, 2018, ‘“Hail the Census Night”: Trust and 
Political Imagination in the 1960 Population Census of Ghana’, Comparative Studies in Society and History, 
60(3): 659-687, p. 668 
99 BPS, 2011, ‘Economic Census: Indonesia’s Experience’, Presentation given at the Regional Seminar on 
International Trade Statistics (24-26 October 2011) in Beijing, p. 13. 
100 For more detailed information on the sequence and timing of the different Economic Census 
Activities as well as a discussion of the awareness raising campaigns see BPS, 2008, ‘The Indonesian 2006 
Economic Census’, Paper presented at the 12th East Asian Statistical Conference (13-15 November 2008) in 
Tokyo, pp. 2-3, 21-22. 




role of SMEs and SME-policy making changed. I then discussed the literature 
addressing the key arguments for why SMEs matter in a national economy, how their 
roles differ between developed and developing countries and changes as a country 
industrialises, as well as the key arguments for government support for SMEs. The 
chapter-specific literatures, i.e. on the historical background of Dutch colonialism and 
Japanese occupation, on Sino-Indonesian entrepreneurship, the missing middle debate 
and access to credit are reviewed within the respective chapters. Finally, this 
introduction has discussed the data collection and data quality of the economic 
censuses, which form the foundation of this entire dissertation. 
The second chapter analyses Indonesian entrepreneurship in historical 
perspective to inform the context and legacies which the New Order government 
inherited when Suharto came to power. Understanding the colonial legacy and the 
Sukarno heritage is fundamental to the understanding of the New Order. This historical 
background chapter forms the basis of the analysis of how government policies affected 
the development of small and medium enterprises in Indonesia from 1966 to 2006. 
Building on this chapter the thesis establishes the role of path dependence in the 
formation of the occupational structure in the private sector and in SME policies.  
Given the focus of the Dutch colonial state on Java until the end of the 19th 
century, it can be assumed that the colonial legacy of the Dutch had a very different 
impact on Java compared to the Outer Islands, which had hitherto been only loosely 
integrated.101 Under Japanese rule (1942-45), Java was developed as the main production 
centre for shipbuilding and other key sectors, while the ‘Outer Islands’ “reverted to a 
subsistence mode of production”. Much of the progress in terms of economic 
development made under Dutch rule was reversed under Japanese occupation.102 
Finally, this chapter traces the origins of the special role of Sino-Indonesian 
entrepreneurs in the Indonesian economy to the – often conflicting – relationship they 
had with the Dutch colonial authorities, the Japanese during Indonesia’s occupation as 
well as with the first independent government.  
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Chapter two shows that there were a few Sino-Indonesian SMEs that grew into 
some of the largest conglomerates of the 1990s, but the share of people with ethnic 
Chinese origins in Indonesia is small. Therefore instead of focussing on Sino-
Indonesian entrepreneurs, the following chapter takes their supposed advantages as a 
starting point to analyse whether Indonesian SMEs were really constrained by an 
invisible glass ceiling that prevented them from growing. The factors that have been 
identified for the success of Sino-Indonesian entrepreneurship, such as better 
education, access to business network as well as credit motivate this research, which 
looks into the apparent missing middle in wider Indonesian manufacturing SME 
development as well as the issue of access to credit for SMEs. 
The third chapter takes a regional approach to analyse SME development and the 
role government policy played during the New Order period. The main research 
question is whether the Indonesian manufacturing business landscape is indeed 
characterised by a missing middle, how firm-size distribution and the role of SMEs has 
developed, and what were the main barriers to growth faced by small firms and how 
they have been addressed by the government. This chapter addresses the question of 
how SMEs developed in Indonesia between 1966 and 2006 and what were the crucial 
factors in this development, particularly in light of any gaps between policy 
implementation and official statements. Answering this question will give insight into 
the issues holding small firms back from growing, and the possible existence of a ceiling 
that keeps even reasonably successful businesses from growing. This issue is also 
relevant from a comparative perspective, as in this respect Indonesia seems to stand in 
contrast to Taiwan, where SMEs flourished and grew and were the dynamic firms 
behind the Taiwanese growth miracle. Secondly, it establishes that there is considerable 
regional diversity. But this diversity and variation is much more complex than the 
expected divide between Java and the Outer Islands, given the better support from the 
government, easier access to finance and markets for SMEs in Java and the dominance 
of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) in the Outer Islands.  
To measure SME trends, I have collected data on numbers of manufacturing 
firms, workers and value added by firm-size category and province from the Industrial 
Census 1974/75 and decadal Economic Censuses (1986-2006). The constructed 
database on value added per worker is the first that compares manufacturing value 
added over the New Order period by region. For this exercise, I constructed a database 




on value added per employee according to firm-size categories for 1974/75 to 2006 by 
province from Economic Census data, supplemented by provincial medium and large 
enterprise manufacturing statistics and provincial annual yearbooks. This is the first 
database that constructs a provincial or even regional comparison of manufacturing 
value added over the New Order period. Using these data, I distinguish how distinct 
policy episodes shaped the role of SMEs. The regional approach enables a detailed 
study of the variations in SME development and inclusiveness of the economic 
development process in Indonesia. Indonesia is then compared with South Korea and 
Taiwan, two Tiger economies pursuing similar industrial developmental models to 
Indonesia with distinct firm-size distributions. 
Considering both formal and informal enterprises allows deeper analysis of an 
issue summarised by Tybout: “it never pays to be just large enough to attract 
enforcement”.103 Many enterprises do not officially register to obtain a business permit, 
despite meeting the official criteria. The process is complicated, slow and expensive; it is 
plagued by lack of transparency, inefficiency and high corruption in the process of 
obtaining a business license.104  The potential benefits thus need to outweigh the 
investments necessary for registration. The question is whether the level at which these 
investments are beneficial is visible in a size cut-off between firms that are registered 
and those that remain informal, or whether there are other distinguishable 
characteristics that are likely to determine whether a firm opts to formally register. 
The chapter shows that in Indonesia the missing middle existed and persisted 
throughout the New Order. There was a shift in firm-size distribution, as expected, but 
that shift was mainly from microenterprises to small enterprises, while there has been a 
persistent gap in medium-sized firms. The comparison with South Korea and Taiwan at 
similar levels of GDP per capita shows that this missing middle cannot be explained by 
Indonesia’s stage of economic development. The low value-added per worker in 
microenterprises and small firms is indicative of a dual economy model. 
The fourth chapter analyses the crucially important issue of the development of 
access to credit, lack of which has been identified as one of the key deterrents to the 
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growth and development of SMEs. Indonesia provides a particularly interesting case 
study in this regard, given the early foundations of an indigenous credit system laid by 
the Dutch colonial government and then the evolution of the various SME credit 
schemes introduced after the early 1970s as well as the BRI’s microcredit programme 
that transformed village credit disbursement units to self-sustaining microbanking units 
that mobilised savings and lent to small borrowers from 1984. The periodisation also 
makes it possible to take account of other post-crisis developments, such as the 
restructuring of Bank Rakyat Indonesia in 2000 and its partial privatization in 2003 and 
the Asian Development Bank’s Industrial Competitiveness and Small and Medium 
Enterprise Development Program that closed in 2004.    
One sub-question is which elements of the popular credit system developed by 
the colonial government at the turn of the twentieth century as part of the Ethical 
Policy persisted or evolved and remained relevant to SME finance during the New 
Order period. The main source to track developments of state pawnshops are Bank 
Indonesia’s Annual Reports, which note development on activities such as number of 
offices, total loans extended, loans redeemed and loans outstanding as well as 
repayment period and interest rates. This chapter shows that state pawnshops expanded 
during the twentieth century in terms of geographical coverage and loan volume, and 
that they continued to play an important role in financing small-scale businesses.  
The various schemes introduced by the New Order government which 
specifically targeted SMEs, such as the Small Enterprise Development Programme KIK 
(Kredit Investasi Kecil) / KMKP (Kredit Modal Kerja Permanen) and the Small Enterprises 
Credit Programme KUK (Kredit Usaha Kecil) have been widely criticised in the literature 
on Indonesian SME development as ineffective. However, what appears to be missing 
is an actual assessment of loans dispersed and who benefited from them. Bank 
Indonesia’s Annual Reports provide the baseline data, including number of applications 
approved, value of loans approved and outstanding loans. Using the Economic Census 
data it is possible to identify the number of small firms by province and industry code 
which have received assistance from the respective SME credit programmes as well as 
the microcredit loan product Kupedes. This chapter analyses the incentive structure of 
the rural loan product Kupedes that made the system so successful and its role relative 
to small credit schemes in Indonesia. One aspect that seems to have been overlooked is 
the question of complementarity between different schemes. Do entrepreneurs that 




start with small loans under the Kupedes scheme stay with the units or do they access 
other loan products available at the branch level as their SMEs grow? This chapter also 
discusses the new credit scheme KTA (Kredit Tanpa Agunan) that has been introduced in 
response to the Asian financial crisis, which foregoes collateral requirements but is 
restricted to formally registered SMEs from all sectors.105  
Data on loans provided by district banks, village banks, village paddy banks 
(lumbung desa) and state pawnshops during the late colonial period are collected in the 
Changing Economy in Indonesia (CEI) series, which presents a selection of statistical source 
material on the Dutch East Indies between the early nineteenth century and 1940. The 
data on SME lending was collected from the archives of Bank Indonesia.  From the 
1986 and 1996 Economic Censuses I can identify how many small firms received 
assistance under the various credit programmes. The chapter looks at various schemes 
specifically targeting SMEs, such as the Small Enterprise Development Programme 
KIK (Kredit Investasi Kecil) / KMKP (Kredit Modal Kerja Permanen), which provided 
investment and working capital respectively between 1971 and 1990; its 1990 successor 
the Small Enterprises Credit Programme KUK (Kredit Usaha Kecil), which required all 
commercial banks to extend 20 per cent of their total loans to SMEs as investment and 
working capital until it was suspended during the Asian Financial Crisis; and the new 
credit scheme KTA (Kredit Tanpa Agunan) introduced after the crisis, which forewent 
collateral requirements but was restricted to formally registered SMEs from all sectors.  
In addition to the SME-targeted credit schemes this chapter focuses on the market-
based general rural credit loan product (Kupedes), which had a remarkable repayment 
rate and overall self-sustaining success. The analysis of Kupedes was made possible 
through interviews conducted during the research visit in Jakarta with officials from 
Bank Rakyat Indonesia (BRI) and data generously provided by BRI.  
The conclusion links SME development to the current debate on crisis resilience 
and draws wider conclusions through regional comparative analysis. Discussing the 
resilience Indonesian SMEs demonstrated during the Asian Financial Crisis will link the 
dissertation to the debate on the strength of SMEs and the rationale to provide targeted 
policy support. Lessons will be drawn from the Indonesian experience for future wider 
SME policies. 
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The perceived resilience of SMEs during the 1997/98 crisis resulted in a new 
interest in strengthening SMEs and their contribution to economic stability and 
development. Many authors pointed to the strength the Taiwanese SME-based 
economy displayed relative to the hit taken by the chaebols-dominated Korean 
economy.106 Similarly Indonesian SMEs have also been found to have fared better 
during the crisis than their larger counterparts.107 However, this general assessment 
obscures the actual experience of SMEs during the crisis, which varied considerably 
between locations, industries and other factors.  
 During the crisis, Indonesian SMEs are said to have had the advantage of being 
less reliant on formal markets for credit and were thus less dependent on the increasing 
cost of credit.108 Similarly sourcing mostly local inputs, rather than foreign inputs, SMEs 
were able to take advantage of the devaluation of the rupiah.109 A general argument for 
their crisis resilience is their flexibility to move into new niche markets as well as in 
adapting their production and processing lines. However, in reality, it was only some 
SMEs in some sectors that had an advantage over their larger counterparts during the 
crisis. SMEs geared towards the export market fared better than those who produced 
primarily for the domestic market. Javanese SMEs were hit more severely than in the 
rest of Indonesia and urban SMEs were more affected than those in rural areas.110 
However, these results are of little surprise, given that these trends held true for all 
types of businesses.111 The effects of the crisis offer an opportunity for closer analysis of 
the characteristics of sectors that were particularly affected (e.g. the construction sector) 
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and industries that survived relatively unscathed, as case studies have shown for the 
small-scale furniture industry, pointing to factors such as the usage of domestic inputs 
and clusters with strong interlinkages.112 
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Chapter 2: Indonesian Entrepreneurship in Historical 
Perspective 
The late Dutch colonial period and the Japanese occupation are crucial to 
understanding Indonesia’s indigenous business landscape. Both shaped the 
characteristics of Indonesia’s entrepreneurial class and the challenges the first 
Indonesian independent government inherited when it gained independence in 1945. 
This chapter focuses on the impact of Dutch colonial policies, arguing both for path 
dependence as well as the failure of the Indonesian national government in fostering 
indigenous entrepreneurship and providing a business environment conducive to SME 
growth. This chapter lays the foundation which chapters three and four build upon, by 
highlighting in particular the ways in which not only the colonial period but also the 
period of Japanese rule and the Old Order established the frameworks for 
entrepreneurship.  
An important issue within these developments is the role of Sino-Indonesian 
entrepreneurship. Sino-Indonesian-owned SMEs played a different role during the 
colonial period and were of considerable importance later amongst the leading business 
conglomerates, which had largely grown from smaller firms. Moreover, discontent 
about the perceived success of Sino-Indonesian SMEs and Sino-Indonesian 
entrepreneurs in general has repeatedly escalated in Indonesia. This chapter shows that 
Sino-Indonesians were in fact only a very small minority in Indonesia and hence only a 
very small share of SMEs in Indonesia were owned by Sino-Indonesians. While this 
dissertation as a whole therefore focuses on SMEs in general, rather than controlling for 
ethnicity, building an understanding the role and perception of Sino-Indonesian 
entrepreneurs in the Indonesian economy is necessary to understand the focus on 
indigenous entrepreneurship in Indonesian policy-making in the twentieth century. 
The long time frame and political regime changes that equated with distinctly 
different policy regimes also allows an emphasis on the role of path dependence in the 
formation of the occupational structure in the private sector. Understanding its own 
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past is important for informing policy-making in any country today, as Douglas North 
wrote: ‘Path dependence is the key to an analytical understanding of long-run economic 
change. … The source of incremental change is the gains to be obtained by 
organizations and their entrepreneurs from acquiring skills, knowledge, and information 
that will enhance their objectives. … Reversals of paths (from stagnation to growth or 
vice versa) may come from … path alteration, but will typically occur through changes 
in the polity’.113 Anne Booth analysed the path dependence of the Indonesian economy 
formed by the Dutch colonial state.114 However, looking at the formation of business 
structures in Indonesia, this chapter argues that while the Dutch colonial legacy did 
shape the initial trajectory, path dependence was strongly reinforced during the post-
independence era under the Sukarno government.  
2.1 Historical Legacies of the Late Dutch Colonial Period 
Howard Dick claims that by the 1940s the Dutch colonial state had built institutional 
advantages, which, if they had not been interrupted by the Japanese invasion, could 
have possibly led to the beginning of the “sustained industrial expansion that eventually 
occurred in the 1970s”. These foundations included moving protection from light 
consumer goods industries to heavy industries (upstream industries).115 This stands in 
line with Anne Booth’s observation that “by the early twentieth century, several colonial 
powers in Asia had begun to adopt policies which were much more overtly 
‘developmental’ in their aims”, in particular to improve living standards in their 
colonies. Booth further argues that the most dramatic impact of this could be observed 
in Indonesia during the last 40 years of Dutch rule.116 As will be discussed in greater 
detail in the chapter on access to credit, the colonial Dutch government played an 
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important role in laying the foundations to the development of a credit system for the 
indigenous population. 
In 1830 Governor-General van den Bosch introduced the culture system 
(Cultuurstelsel), which required farmers to dedicate a fifth of their fields to plant crops 
particularly profitable in Europe.117 This diversion of land and labour led to shortfalls in 
rice production, as well as to spikes in rice prices and famines in the 1840s and 1850s.  
With the spread of political liberalism in the Netherlands, colonial policy in Indonesia 
increasingly became the subject of criticism. As a result the culture system was finally 
abandoned in 1870 with the introduction of an Agrarian Law that prohibited the sale of 
indigenous land to foreigners and a Sugar Law that restricted government intervention 
to cane production. The Liberal Period between 1870 and 1900 saw the spread of 
private Dutch enterprise and capital in Indonesia. However, it was the Ethical Policy 
announced in 1901 that brought genuine radical change to political thinking, aiming to 
promote education for the native population, develop a popular credit system to protect 
Indonesians from moneylenders and promote (limited) indigenous political 
representation.118 
In terms of geographical parameters, the Dutch colonial state was “virtually 
confined to Java”, the most populous Indonesian island, until the end of the 19th 
century. In 1930, 69 per cent of the total population of Indonesia lived in Java.119 What 
then constituted the ‘Outer Islands’ (Buitenbezittingen) were only loosely integrated into 
the Netherlands Indies. Many previously independent parts of the archipelago were 
brought under colonial control between 1870 and the beginning of the 20th century.120  
In Aceh, Sumatra, the Dutch colonial government declared war in 1873 and the 
contestation of power led to a bitter struggle that lasted over 30 years; the kingdoms of 
South Bali and Bone were conquered only in 1906.121 The borders of the Dutch East 
                                            
117 Oei Tjong Bo (Huang Tsung Mo),1948, Niederländisch-Indien: Eine Wirtschaftsstudie, Zurich: Orell Füssli 
Verlag, pp. 38-41, 48-51. 
118 Robert J. van Leeuwen, 1970, ‘Indonesia’, in: W. Arthur Lewis (Ed.), Tropical Development 1880-1913 
(pp. 250-282), London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd, pp. 253-5. 
119 Dutch East Indies, 1936, Volkstelling 1930, Deel VIII, Overzicht voor Nederlandsch-Indië/Census of 1930 in 
the Netherlands Indies, Volume VIII, Summary of the Volumes I-VIII, Batavia: Landsdrukkerij/Department van 
Economische Zaken, Tables 1, 3 and 4. 
120 R. E. Elson, 2008, The Idea of Indonesia: A History, Cambridge University Press, p. 4. 
121 Howard W. Dick, 2002, ‘Introduction’, in: Howard W. Dick, Vincent J.H. Houben, J. Thomas 
Lindblad, and Thee Kian Wie(Eds.), The Emergence of a National Economy: The Economic History of Indonesia, 
1800-2000 (pp. 1-8), Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, pp. 2-3. 
Chapter 2: Indonesian Entrepreneurship in Historical Perspective 
49 
 
Indies (see Figure 3) became the borders of modern-day Indonesia in 1969 (see Figure 
4), after the Dutch part of New Guinea was relinquished in 1962 and a referendum 
ceded the province of Papua (former Irian Jaya) to Indonesia.122 
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Figure 3: Map of the Dutch East Indies 
 
Source: G.W. Colton, 1886, ‘Colton’s East Indies’, in: Golton's General Atlas Of The World, New York: G. W & C. B. Colton & Co., No. 182 (edited). 
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Figure 4: Map of Modern Southeast Asia 
 
Source: Norton Ginsburg, 1968, Southeast Asia, Chicago: Denoyer-Geppert Company / UC Berkley, Geography Department.
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2.2 Indonesian Entrepreneurship under Japanese Occupation 
(1942-45) 
Important for the discussion of formation of indigenous entrepreneurship and business 
structure is also the shift that occurred under Japanese rule.  There were new business 
opportunities to work with and in Japanese companies. Furthermore the Japanese 
actively encouraged cooperation between Sino-Indonesians and indigenous 
entrepreneurs in kumiais (business cooperatives producing, selling and controlling prices 
for agricultural and manufactured products).123  While the system may have led to wide 
scale abuses (e.g. the creation of Ali Baba companies, in which Indonesian quasi straw 
men formally managed companies for Chinese businessmen), it also created further 
opportunities for indigenous entrepreneurs to learn from more experienced Sino-
Indonesian businessmen and benefit from knowledge spillovers. Thus this section looks 
at the question of how Japanese rule formed the business structure and environment in 
Indonesia and thus established institutional factors crucial to SME development.  
In 1942 the Japanese invaded Indonesia with little resistance from the 
indigenous population, in some cases Indonesians even turned against the Dutch 
themselves. The Japanese invasion of Indonesia began on 10 January 1942. By 8 March 
1942 the Dutch surrendered Java to the Japanese.124 However, local resistance 
movements against the Japanese in the Outer Islands, such as an uprising in Aceh, 
Sumatra in November 1942, and conspiracies in South and West Kalimantan, were met 
with military force and large-scale arrests.125 With little resistance from the Dutch forces 
much of the infrastructure remained largely intact with few exceptions such as 
petroleum installations.126 The initial policy was to secure the supply of strategic 
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products needed for the war effort, such as oil, rubber and quinine, by supporting the 
producing regions with imports of food and basic needs products.  
Peter Post makes an important argument building upon the work of Peck-Yang 
Twang that appears to have remained understudied. He argues that under Japanese rule, 
indigenous entrepreneurs were given new business opportunities previously closed off 
to them during the Dutch colonial period. (However, it should be noted that under 
Japanese military rule, large pre-war indigenous trading companies were pushed out of 
trade and instead ‘relegated to an economic intermediary position’.127) Indigenous 
entrepreneurs did not just benefit from new business opportunities, but also from 
declining competition as some Sino-Indonesian firms that had previously worked with 
Dutch trading firms and banks found it difficult to survive without this support.128  The 
Japanese also attempted to encourage Chinese and Indonesian entrepreneurial 
cooperation in order to form kumiai.129 In some types of kumiai leadership was reserved 
for Indonesians while members had to form equal shares of Indonesian and Chinese 
descents. It should be noted, however, that these arrangements also produced so-called 
‘Ali Baba’ companies.130 In the area of foreign trade, Indonesian entrepreneurs were 
exposed to knowledge and skills transfers during Japanese rule.131 Furthermore the 
Japanese actively invested into developing the entrepreneurial skillset of the indigenous 
population by setting up a commercial school in 1943 and an economic training centre 
in 1945.132 Thomas Lindblad found that some of the firms established by Indonesian 
entrepreneurs during Japanese occupation performed remarkably well in the early 
independence period. But bar few exceptions (such as Bakrie & Brothers, who were still 
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amongst the top ten largest conglomerates in Indonesia in 2016), most of these 
companies’ performances began to wane with the subsequent regime change.133 
However, the initial policy to secure the supply of strategic products by 
supporting the producing regions was soon abandoned when a shipping shortage in 
1943 caused a reorientation in Japanese policy towards the promotion of regional self-
sufficiency in food and manufactured goods to reduce the dependence on imports. Java 
was chosen to become the main production centre for shipbuilding and other key 
sectors, while the ‘Outer Islands’ “reverted to a subsistence mode of production”.134 
Japan applied its own economic model of a controlled economy to Indonesia and 
organized industries into guilds.135 Restrictions on private rice trade and imports as well 
as forced labour (more than ten per cent of the Javanese working population in late 
1944) led to falling rice production, which with the high procurements by the 
authorities caused acute shortages and widespread hunger.136 To focus production on 
the needs of the war effort tea estates in Java were closed, sugar factories were 
converted to produce alcohol, butanol or to serve other purposes and the strategic 
industries subjected to strict regulation.137  
In August 1945 Japan surrendered and Indonesia’s first president Sukarno and 
his vice president Mohammad Hatto proclaimed Indonesia’s independence on 17 
August 1945. A violent struggle for independence ensued between the Netherlands 
Indies Civilian Administration (NICA) and the nationalist movement and with the 
Renville Agreement reached in January 1948 the country was partitioned into zones 
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under Dutch control and zones under control of the nationalist movement, with most 
of the Outer Islands under Dutch control. On 27 December 1949 Queen Juliana of the 
Netherlands transferred sovereignty over the former Dutch East Indies to Indonesia 
with the exception of West New Guinea. 
An important factor for understanding why Indonesia did not return to the 
Dutch colonial empire after the end of Japanese rule is the politicisation of the wider 
indigenous population that had taken place.138 The Japanese systematically invested into 
the mass mobilisation of Indonesians to advance the interest of the war effort, which 
included establishing schools for training officials and teachers, neighbourhood 
associations, a semi-military youth corps, a vigilance corps for young men and auxiliary 
forces in which youths received basic Japanese military training. This approach closely 
mirrored the policies that were pursued in Japan itself.139 In order to gain popular 
support the Japanese worked with Sjahrir and Hatta, who had been leading figures in 
the pre-war nationalist movement. In July 1942 they were joined in Jakarta by Sukarno. 
In March 1943 the Japanese formed the political organisation PUTERA (Pusat Tenaga 
Rakyat, Center of People’s Power), headed by Sukarno, Hatta, Ki Hadjar Dewantra, 
who had pioneered education for indigenous Indonesians during the Dutch colonial 
period, and Islamic leader Kyai Haji Mas Mansur.140 While the organisation was set up 
by the Japanese authorities in order to promote its war effort, its leaders saw it as an 
opportunity to set up an organised nationalist front.141 
At independence, Indonesia was characterised by an abundance of labour but lack 
of skilled labour, traceable to insufficient investments in education during the colonial 
period. Even the better-off indigenous families often remained unsuccessful in enrolling 
their children in the few and expensive Dutch schools, due to a fear of developing an 
indigenous ‘intellectual proletariat’ on the part of the Dutch colonial authorities. Only 
from the 20th century onwards did the government start investing in the expansion of 
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vernacular language primary schools and village schools (3 years teaching elementary 
literacy and numeracy).142 However, the colonial authorities retained a clear division 
between vernacular language and prestigious Dutch schools. Enrolment rose with the 
expansion of vernacular language and village schools, but remained low overall and 
dropout rates high, which has been traced to high fees for tuition and board.143 Illiteracy 
at independence was widespread; estimates indicate that 67 per cent of the population 
was still illiterate in 1947.144  Not only were the investments made into education 
insufficient, little continued to be done in terms of providing opportunities for even 
educated Indonesians, who were rarely given supervisory responsibilities in Dutch 
firms. Even after 1948, when in preparation for the transfer of national sovereignty it 
became clear that it was necessary to train and advance Indonesians for leading 
positions, little was actually done in practice.145 Along with shortcomings in the Dutch 
colonial government’s efforts to provide schooling, it was unable to foster the 
emergence of a strong indigenous entrepreneurial class despite the investments into 
developing a popular credit system.146 
2.3 Indigenous Entrepreneurship under the Old Order (1949-65) 
Sovereignty was only achieved through compromise, mediated by the United Nations 
Commission for Indonesia (UNCI) and finally reached at the Round Table Conference 
(RTC) in The Hague. The major concessions included four key issues: First, sovereignty 
was not transferred to the Indonesian Republic but to the United States of Indonesia 
(Republik Indonesia Serikat, RIS). The RIS comprised the Republic as well as 15 Dutch 
puppet states, which soon after dissolved themselves and on 17 August 1950 the unitary 
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state of the Republic of Indonesia was born. Second, West New Guinea remained 
under Dutch control as a result of the Dutch arguing Papuans to be racially, culturally 
and linguistically different.147 It was only returned to Indonesia in 31 May 1963. The 
issue of West New Guinea remained a contested issue and finally led to the breakdown 
of all relations between the two countries in 1958. 148 Third, Indonesia guaranteed that 
Dutch businesses could operate in Indonesia without hindrances, including the 
unrestricted transfers of profits and dividends. Finally, Indonesia took over all pre-war 
debts of the Dutch colonial administration, comprising 1 billion guilder domestic debt 
and 3.3 billion guilders external debt, after Indonesia had successfully refused to 
shoulder an additional 2 billion guilders post-war debt incurred by the NICA. This 
meant that for the greater part of the 1950s, Indonesia had achieved political, but not 
economic independence. Most modern sectors were under Dutch ownership and 
control, many senior officials were Dutch, as was a large part of the Board of Directors 
of the Java Bank and other important institutions.149 Thus economic decolonisation was 
only achieved in 1959 with the nationalisation of Dutch enterprises.150  
The main objectives for the new government were to transition from a ‘colonial 
economy to a national economy’ and the rehabilitation of the physical and industrial 
infrastructure that had been destroyed during the Japanese occupation and the 
independence struggle.151 The policy-makers of the early independence period were 
influenced by social democratic ideas.152 Within the first years a shift occurred in 1953 
from a pragmatic moderate approach towards ultranationalism, culminating in the 
transition to Sukarno’s ‘Guided Economy’ and ‘socialism à la Indonesia’ in 1959, which 
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nationalised key sectors of production supplying basic needs.153 A key term coined by 
John O. Sutter to describe the growing nationalism was Indonesianisasi.  Indonesianisasi 
referred to the ‘conscious effort to increase the participation and elevate the role of the 
Indonesian – and more particularly the ‘indigenous Indonesian – in the more complex 
sectors of the economy’.154 In order to foster indigenous entrepreneurship, the 
government introduced the Benteng (Fortress) Programme in April 1950. The 
programme restricted import licenses for certain commodities to indigenous legally 
registered importers. Official eligibility requirements were: working capital of at least 
IDR 100,000, of which 70 per cent had to be in indigenous Indonesian hands and an 
office space large enough for several employees who had previous working 
experience.155 While the programme did not technically exclude Sino-Indonesians, its 
objective has been said to limit the power of Dutch as well as Chinese economic 
interests.156  
The Benteng programme has generally been criticised for its widespread 
corruption and ineffectiveness, given that foreign importers worked through so called 
“briefcase importers” or “Ali Baba companies”, indigenous entrepreneurs that only 
formally acted for Dutch and Chinese entrepreneurs in order to circumvent the 
nationality requirement.157 Furthermore licenses were also distributed to people who 
lacked the necessary business experience and thus had to turn to Chinese traders for 
assistance. Rather than fostering an indigenous business class, the programme had 
strengthened “a group of socially unproductive rent-seekers” by the time it was 
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abandoned in the late 1950s.158 Yet Lindblad showed that during the 1950s many new 
indigenous business firms were founded in the shadow or even despite the Benteng 
policy.159 
It has been argued that the attempt to limit the economic power of foreigners 
by strengthening indigenous entrepreneurship was abandoned with the nationalisation 
of Dutch enterprises after 1958. The ensuing move towards a ‘guided economy’ was 
accompanied by a hostile view of private capitalism, leaving indigenous entrepreneurs 
facing an unconducive business environment.160 Lindblad found that with this shift, 
private enterprises grew increasingly dependent on political connections.161 In the 
context of Benteng, this shift particularly disadvantaged small-scale traders, who tended 
to lack these important political connections. 162 By the mid-1960s inflation was rising, 
output was stagnating and incomes declining except for a small group of rent-seekers. 
At the same time hunger and malnutrition spread due to growing population pressure 
and falling rice production per capita.163  
On 30 September 1965 an alleged coup by the Indonesian Communist Party 
(Partai Kommunis Indonesia, PKI) was suppressed by the military. The bloody power 
struggle that ensued between the army and the PKI led to the effective dissolution of 
the party and compromised the power of President Sukarno while consolidating the 
power of General Suharto. Suharto, who was the Commander of the Army Strategic 
Reserve Command at the time, took over power from Sukarno in March 1966.164 This 
rise of power can only be understood by looking at the role of the military in 
Indonesian society: the military had played an increasing role in entrepreneurial activities 
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since 1945 so that by the late 1950s ‘conducting business and being in the military had 
become two sides of the same coin’ and the army had become part of the ruling elite.165 
2.4 Educational Expansion in Post-Independence Indonesia 
Given the critical assessment that one of major shortcomings of the Dutch authorities 
was the insufficient investment into education for Indonesians, it is important to reflect 
on the educational expansion of Indonesia post-Independence. Increasing school 
enrolment became a priority in newly independent Indonesia as a means to strengthen 
its people but also to promote unity under the nationalist agenda. The 1945 Indonesian 
Constitution enshrined the right to education as well as introduced mandatory basic 
education, putting the onus of funding on the government.166 Law 12/1954 defined 
how this new educational policy was to be implemented. In the preamble of Law 
12/1954, the Indonesian legislator emphasized that this educational policy was to be 
completely different from the educational system established by the Dutch, which they 
felt was “not rooted in Indonesian society” and had largely excluded the average 
Indonesian, and should instead be based on Indonesian culture and national 
character.167 Accordingly the 1950s saw a rapid expansion in educational 
infrastructure.168 
With the change in government in the late 1960s came considerable progress in 
the expansion of education.169 Key policies by the Suharto regime include the 1974 
Presidential Instruction that decreed ‘a primary school [should be built] in every village’ 
(SD INPRES Program), which led to the construction of 60,000 primary school just 
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between 1973-8, and making primary education (six years) compulsory in 1984, which 
was extended to nine years with the 1989 National Education System Law.170 Both 
policies were targeted at children who had not been enrolled in school, hence the SD 
INPRES programme listed how many schools were to be built in each district 
proportional to the 1972 number of school-aged children not yet enrolled (see Table 
6).171   
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JAVA 3,910 3,837 5,880 61.94% 0.17 
DKI Jakarta 200 78 200 2.17% 0.10 
DI Yogyakarta 85 85 150 1.45% 0.13 
East Java 1,415 1,438 1,925 21.72% 0.18 
Central Java 1,050 1,063 1,845 17.99% 0.18 
West Java 1,160 1,173 1,760 18.60% 0.18 
SUMATRA 865 872 2,000 16.99% 0.17 
DI Aceh 135 135 190 2.09% 0.22 
Bengkulu 50 50 45 0.66% 0.25 
Jambi 50 50 130 1.05% 0.21 
Lampung 130 130 255 2.34% 0.16 
Riau 80 80 170 1.50% 0.19 
North Sumatra 180 187 790 5.26% 0.17 
South Sumatra 150 150 210 2.32% 0.14 
West Sumatra 90 90 210 1.77% 0.13 
SULAWESI 420 420 660 6.82% 0.17 
North Sulawesi 85 85 130 1.36% 0.17 
Central Sulawesi 65 65 80 0.95% 0.21 
Southeast Sulawesi 50 50 70 0.77% 0.22 
South Sulawesi 220 220 380 3.73% 0.15 
KALIMANTAN 375 375 675 6.48% 0.26 
East Kalimantan 75 75 60 0.95% 0.25 
Central Kalimantan 85 85 95 1.20% 0.35 
South Kalimantan 95 95 280 2.14% 0.27 
West Kalimantan 120 120 240 2.18% 0.23 
BALI 90 90 230 1.86% 0.19 
EASTERN 
INDONESIA 340 406 555 5.91% 0.19 
East Nusa Tenggara 105 105 115 1.48% 0.14 
West Nusa Tenggara 130 130 305 2.57% 0.24 
Maluku 55 55 60 0.77% 0.15 
Papua 50 116 75 1.10% 0.25 
INDONESIA 6,000 6,000 10,000 100.00% 0.18 
Sources: Data on number of primary schools built from Hussin, 1978, Indonesia: Innovation in the 
Management of Primary School Construction – a Case Study (Educational Building Report 8), Bangkok: 
UNESCO Regional Office for Education in Asia and Oceania, Table 11; Population figures from BPS, 
Population Census (1971, 1980). 
Notes: Per capita figures calculated with population for 1973 extrapolated with 1971 and 1980 
population. 
 
These investments are visible in the overall improvements in highest educational 
attainments, as reflected in Figure 5. By 1988 Indonesia is said to have achieved nearly 
universal primary school enrolment.172 The World Bank called the INPRES primary 
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school construction programme ‘one of the most successful cases of large-scale school 
expansion on record.’173 
On the methodological side it has to be noted that the implication of focusing 
on the age group of 20 to 40 year-olds is that the effects of policy changes can only be 
observed 13 years later, e.g. the primary school expansion from 1973 is only reflected in 
the 1990 census data, as compulsory primary school enrolment age in Indonesia was age 
seven until 2003 when it was lowered to age six with Law on the National Education 
System No. 20/2003. Primary schooling was six years and lower and higher secondary 
school took three years of schooling respectively. The share of 20 to 40 year-olds with 
no formal schooling or less than six years continuously falls from 1980 onwards and the 
share of people with secondary or higher educational qualifications rose over the same 
period, both at the Indonesian average as well as island group level (see Figure 5). Yet 
while the New Order government has managed to improve the quantity of schooling, 
quality of schooling continues to lag behind that of neighbouring countries.174 
The results at the island level show that Java is closest to the Indonesian average 
for every year, which is unsurprising given that it is home to close to two thirds of the 
Indonesian population and hence drives the overall results in Figure 5. At the other end, 
Eastern Indonesia stands out as the worst performer 1980-2010. These results are 
strongly driven by Papua, which is also the only island that moves away from the 
national average more starkly with each census through the entire period. However, 
strong variation is not only observable between islands but at the provincial level the 
differences vary equally within islands (see Figure 6).  Generally the average length of 
education increases for most provinces throughout the entire period; the only 
exceptions are East Nusa Tenggara, Maluku and Papua, all of which manage to return 
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to their high averages of 1976 (in which they are among the four leading provinces) only 
by 2005. This initial drop in average years of schooling between 1976 and 1985 
(capturing people who would have attended school between the early 1940s and around 
1965) corresponds to an increase in the share of 20 to 40 year-olds with no schooling 
between 1971 and 1980 in all three provinces. The Ministry of Education and Culture 
ascribed low enrolment and high dropout rates in Eastern Indonesia to lacking school 
facilities and high teacher absenteeism in remote areas or areas plagued by political 
difficulties, but this fails to explain why these provinces still fared relatively well in 
1976.175  
Jones, using data from the 1971 census, found that in the early years under the 
New Order some regional differences could be accounted for by colonial legacies, in 
particular the strength of Maluku and North Sulawesi on the one hand and the lagging 
performances of Central and East Java, Bali and South Sulawesi on the other.176 
Looking at the percentage of population with completed primary education ranked by 
age group and province in 1971, Maluku and North Sulawesi ranked highest for all age 
groups over 50 and amongst the top four for all younger age groups. Conversely the 
lagging performers ranked at the bottom for all age groups in 1971 for general 
population and proportion of females with completed primary education.177 He ascribes 
the early success of Maluku and North Sulawesi to well established Christian missions 
with a strong interest in education as well as a high ratio of government schools to 
population.178 Jones offers a number of reasons for the high ratio of government 
schools, but the most relevant here is that both regions were under direct rule of the 
colonial government. This also explains the relative weakness of Java (see its 
performance in 1971 in Figure 5), where the Dutch ruled indirectly through local 
rulers.179 South Sulawesi also had a high proportion of Christians, but conversion had 
been relatively late with a large wave during the 1950s and 1960s and hence it did not 
have the same degree of longstanding investment into education by missionaries as did 
other Christian-dominated areas.  Turning to the last weak performer, Bali’s low literacy 
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rates during this period, he argues, could be ascribed to its feudal social structures that 
‘militated against the spread of popular education’.180 But the trends at the provincial 
level further into the New Order period show not just catch-up but some significant 
changes.  
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Figure 5: Shares of Highest Educational Attainment of 20-40 Year-olds by Island Group and for Indonesia Total, 1971-2010 
 
Data source: BPS, Population Censuses (1971, 1980, 1990, 2000, 2010), Microdata from Census Subsamples obtained from Minnesota Population Center, 2015, Integrated Public Use 
Microdata Series, International: Version 6.4 [Machine-readable database], Minneapolis: University of Minnesota. 
Note: The figures here exclude all observations for which the highest educational attainment is unknown. ‘No schooling’ encompasses both, no formal schooling whatsoever as 
well those who have received some schooling but have not completed their primary education; ‘primary education’ here is 6 years; ‘secondary education’ encompasses lower 
secondary general and technical tracks, secondary general and technical tracks, post-secondary technical education and some college completed; ‘tertiary education’ only covers 
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Figure 6: Average Years of Schooling of 20-40 year-olds by Province and Island Groups, 1976-2005 
 
Source: BPS, Intercensal Population Surveys (SUPAS 1976, 1985, 1995, 2005), Microdata from Census Subsamples obtained from Minnesota Population Center, 2015, Integrated 
Public Use Microdata Series, International: Version 6.4 [Machine-readable database], Minneapolis: University of Minnesota. 
Note: Island Groups are in capital letters; no data reported in 1995 for Kalimantan, Maluku and Sulawesi and in 2005 for DI Aceh; using figures from the intercensal population 
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Between 1990 and 2010 both South Sulawesi and Bali had higher shares of 20-40 year 
olds who completed tertiary education than either North Sulawesi or Maluku. By the 
late 20th century, South Sulawesi is listed as one of the ‘major regional centres of higher 
education’.181 The changes in tertiary education in the Outer Islands can be traced to the 
rise of provincial universities. Mackie dates the turning point to around 1958, up to 
which a few national universities dominated, in particular the University of Indonesia, 
which grew out of a medical institute founded in 1849 by the Dutch in Jakarta, and 
Gadjah Mada University, founded in 1949 in Yogyakarta.182 Higher education expanded 
rapidly during the New Order, from 10 institutions in 1950 to 450 in 1970 and 900 in 
1990 and even more rapidly in the post-Sukarno era counting 2,975 institutions by 2009. 
97 per cent of higher education institutions in 2009 were private and covered 42.9 per 
cent of all students enrolled.183  
Teacher qualifications remained an issue throughout the New Order period and 
thereafter.184 During the Old Order only a teacher training programme in junior high 
school was required to become a teacher. In the 1970s this was changed to a senior high 
school degree for primary school teachers and a university degree for secondary school 
teachers.185 Only with Law No. 14/2005 on Teachers and Lecturers were all teachers 
required to hold a Bachelor’s degree. A joint study by the Indonesian government and 
the World Bank found that teacher quality actually declined during the New Order as a 
result of the sudden increase in demand for teachers that came with the rapid expansion 
of primary schools.186 Esther Duflo studied the effects of the SD Inpres School 
Construction Programme 1973-1978 on education and wages of 23-45 year-old men in 
1995. She found that while quality of education, in terms of quality of teaching, may 
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have suffered as a result of the government intervention, overall these losses did not 
offset the gains in quantity of education as it increased education levels as well as 
wages.187 
Research suggests that regional differences in education decreased during the 
New Order period as a result of the government policies described above, which aimed 
at expanding the educational system.188 Jones suggests that part of the catch up was in 
particular the result of more ‘even-handed development’ with considerable 
improvement in female educational attainment, which is in line with the World Bank’s 
findings.189 Gaps in illiteracy also narrowed between urban and rural areas as well as 
between the rich and the poor.190 The World Bank found that between 1978 and 1987 
the poorest 40 per cent of the population made improvements in all education levels, 
but particularly at secondary and even tertiary level given the already high levels of 
primary enrolment in 1978.191 Duflo’s study of the labour market consequences of the 
SD INPRES programme showed that educational advancements were higher in regions 
exposed to the programme and demonstrated that these improvements were causally 
linked to the programme. She also demonstrated that the regional selectivity of the 
programme was based on where enrolment was lowest prior to the programme. From 
this it follows that part of the catch up seen in this section can be attributed to the 
success of New Order government’s policies aimed at expanding the education 
system.192 However, while gaps have narrowed, differences in education remained, in 
particular relative to low performing Eastern Indonesia.  
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2.5 Sino-Indonesian Entrepreneurship  
Sino-Indonesian entrepreneurs played a different role in the Indonesian economy than 
their indigenous Indonesia counterparts during the colonial period and were of 
considerable importance later amongst the leading business conglomerates, which had 
largely grown from smaller firms. Sino-Indonesian-owned SMEs seem to have 
developed more successfully than indigenous SMEs in terms of penetrating export 
markets and growing into successful larger enterprises. Some of the largest business 
conglomerates that were to emerge in the 1980s grew out of Sino-Indonesian SMEs. 
Indigenous SMEs not only rarely seem to have grown into successful conglomerates; so 
few enterprises managed to grow past an apparent ceiling that it has been suggested that 
there is a distinct ‘missing middle’ in the Indonesian business landscape, something that 
will be explored later in this thesis. The root causes for these different trajectories can, 
according to Glassburner, be found in the foundations laid by the Dutch colonial 
state.193  
The colonial government strengthened the position of Sino-Indonesian SMEs 
by encouraging them to take over middlemen functions between Dutch trading 
companies and indigenous farmers, thereby managing the financial and trading 
network.194 In comparison with indigenous Indonesians, Sino-Indonesians also generally 
occupied much higher positions in Dutch companies. Indonesians were largely limited 
to low-skilled positions providing manual labour.195 Another important development 
under the Dutch colonial leadership was the advantage Sino-Indonesians gained in 
terms of education. Even better-off indigenous families often remained unsuccessful in 
enrolling their children in the few and expensive Dutch schools, due to a fear of 
developing an indigenous ‘intellectual proletariat’. In response to this exclusion, the 
Chinese Association (Tiong Hoa Hwee Koan) set up schools modelled after the 
Japanese primary school system in 1901. As a result the colonial government, fearing 
loss of control over the education system, responded by establishing Dutch schools for 
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Sino-Indonesians from 1907 onwards.196 When Indonesia gained independence, the 
average educational level of Sino-Indonesians was considerably higher than that of the 
indigenous population.197 This arguably contributed to the development of a skill 
premium for Sino-Indonesians. 
When analysing the role of Sino-Indonesians, the common distinction between 
Peranakan Tionghua, Indonesians of Chinese descent more integrated in and assimilated 
to Indonesia, and Totok, Indonesians of Chinese descent still primarily oriented towards 
mainland China, has to be acknowledged.198 The change of roles in the economy 
between these two groups occurred during Japanese occupation, when the businesses 
owned by integrated Peranakan Sino-Indonesians struggled. 199 Instead, businesses run by 
young Chinese men, predominantly Hokchia and Hokkien, began to flourish.200 
According to Glassburner, only half of Sino-Indonesians belong to the former, more 
integrated group. But in times of political tension even that distinction tends to be 
ignored.201  
Until the 1970s, most Sino-Indonesian enterprises in Indonesia were SMEs. 
This has been linked to the constricting economic policies during the Dutch colonial era 
and then the unfavourable stance towards non-pribumi (indigeneous) businesses that 
characterised the 1950s and early 1960s.202 Despite the difficulties for Chinese living in 
Indonesia (e.g. violent anti-Chinese movements in the 1960s) the Sino-Indonesian 
business community remained, or grew even stronger.203 However, while the majority 
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continues to be engaged in SMEs, Sino-Indonesian entrepreneurs slowly began playing 
a more important role amongst large enterprises and in one year (1992) the top ten 
largest business conglomerates in Indonesia (measured in sales) had all been founded by 
Sino-Indonesians (see Table 7). However, while Sino-Indonesian conglomerates 
constituted the overwhelming majority, there were also important pribumi-owned 
companies, such as Bimantra, which was in the top 10 in 1993.204 Almost all of these 
Sino-Indonesian conglomerates had developed out of SMEs, which leads to the 
question as to why Sino-Indonesian SMEs seem to have been able to grow past the 
ceiling that seems to have constrained pribumi-owned businesses.205 Many point to 
access to finance as the main distinguishing factor, but the role of networks seems to 
play a role of at least equal importance. Closely tied with this issue is the observation 
that the majority of these Sino-Indonesian-owned business groups were in the hands of 
Totok Chinese (the distinction used to describe less integrated, first or second generation 
Sino-Indonesians, as noted above).206  
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Table 7: Top 10 Business Conglomerates in Indonesia, 1992 
Ranking Business Group Principal activities Founder (Chinese name) Established No of affiliated 
companies in 
1990 
Total sales (in 
billion IDR) 
Share of sales of 100 
largest business 
groups (%) 
1 Salim Cement, finance, auto-
motives, agro-industry 
Soedono Salim  
(Chinese name: Liem Sioe Liong) 
Late 1950s 427 20,000 18.5 
2 Sinar Mas Agro-industry, pulp and 
paper, finance 
Eka Tjiptu Widjaja  
(Chinese name: Oey Ek Tjhong) 
1962 153 6,700 6.2 
3 Astra Automotives, estates William Soeryadjaya  
(Chinese name: Tjia Kian Liong) 
1957 285 6,564 6.1 
4 Lippo Finance Mochtar Riady  
(Chinese name: Lee Mo Tie) 
1950s 70 4,241 3.9 
5 Gudang Garam Kretek (clove) cigarettes Rachman Halim 
(Chinese name: Tjoa To Hing) 
1958 11 3,290 3.0 
6 Djarum Kretek cigarettes Robert Budi Hartono  
(Chinese name: Oei Hwie Tjhong 
1951 21 2,600 2.4 
7 Dharmala Agro-industry, real estate Suhargo Gondokusumo  
(Chinese name: Go Ka Him) 
1954 77 2,300 2.1 
8 Bob Hasan Timber, estates Mohamad Hasan  
(Chinese name: The Kian Seng) 
1970 25 2,196 2.0 
9 Barito Pacific Timber Prajogo Pangestu  
(Chinese name: Phang Djung Phin) 
1979 32 2,050 1.9 
10 Argo Manunggal Textiles The Ning King  1977 50 2,040 1.9 
Total 51,981 48.2 
Sources: Table adapted from Yuri Sato, 1993, ‘The Salim Group in Indonesia: The Development and Behavior of the Largest Conglomerate in Southeast Asia’, The Developing 
Economies, 31(4): 408-441, p. 409, Table 1; principal activities from Hal Hill, 2000, The Indonesian Economy (Second Edition), Cambridge University Press, p. 113; data on date of 
establishment from Hainan Jinhai Pulp & Paper CO., LTD (n.d.),  ‘Group Introduction’, Retrieved March 9 2015 from: http://www.appjh.com.cn/en/corp2.html; Indonesia-
Investments (n.d.), ‘Astra International’, Retrieved March 9 2015 from: http://www.indonesia-investments.com/business/indonesian-companies/astra-
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To understand the role of the Chinese in the Indonesian economy, it is important to 
consider the share of the population they constituted. In 1800 the total number of 
Chinese living in Indonesia was estimated to have been around 100,000 and to have 
changed little until 1850.207 However, Table 8 shows the sudden growth that occurred 
during the late Dutch colonial period, so that between 1860 and 1930 the ethnic 
Chinese constituted the largest non-indigenous Ethnic group in Indonesia. By 1930, 
Sino-Indonesians constituted 1.4 per cent of the total population of Java and Madura. 
However, they constituted an even larger share (3.4%) of the population of the Outer 
Islands, particularly concentrating along the East Coast of Sumatra, West Borneo, Riau 
and Bangka, in the latter of which they made up almost 45%.208  
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Europeana Chinese Others Total 
Java & Madura       
1860 12,514,262 n/a 149,424 6,133b   
1880 19,540,813 n/a 206,931 10,506b   
1885 21,190,626 n/a 221,959 11,429b   
1890 23,609,312 54,511 242,111 14,293b 23,920,227 
1895 25,370,545 61,299 256,055 16,238b 25,704,137 
1900 28,386,121 71,893 277,265 18,051b 28,753,330 
1905 29,978,558 72,919 295,193 19,148b 30,365,818 
1920 34,428,711 133,743 383,614 31,022c 34,977,090 
1930 40,891,093 192,571 582,431 52,269d 41,718,364 
Outer Islands       
1860 n/a n/a 72,014 2,446b   
1880 n/a n/a 136,862 5,519b   
1885 n/a n/a 159,793 5,821b   
1890 n/a 18,779 218,978 7,347b   
1895 n/a 19,994 213,469 8,172b   
1900 n/a 19,209 260,051 9,348b   
1905 n/a 21,178 268,256 10,440b   
1920 13,870,973 34,371 425,425 34,736c 14,365,505 
1930 18,246,974 47,846 650,783 63,266e 19,008,869 
Netherlands Indies 
(Total) 
     
1930 59,138,067 240,417 1,233,214 115,535 60,727,233 
Notes: a ‘Europeans’ in the 1930 census includes Westerners, e.g. Americans and other foreigners 
considered “on a parity” with Europeans, e.g. Japanese, Egyptians (but not Chinese).
209
 The figures 
presented here are thus an overestimation of actual European presence;  
b Figure only includes Arabs 
c Figure only includes Arabs and Indians;  
d Out of this total, 41,730 people were of Arab and 5,536 people of Indian origin;  
e Out of this total, 29,605 people were of Arab and 24,482 people of Indian origin. 
Sources: Dutch East Indies, 1936, Volkstelling 1930, Deel VIII, Overzicht voor Nederlandsch-Indië/Census of 1930 
in the Netherlands Indies, Volume VIII, Summary of the Volumes I-VIII, Batavia: Landsdrukkerij/Department 
van Economische Zaken, Tables 1, 3 and 4. 
 
The only censuses to ask about ethnic background were the 1930 Population Census 
and then the 2000 and 2010 Population Censuses. It is difficult to estimate how many 
ethnic Chinese lived in post-colonial Indonesia. While official statistics are almost 
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certainly significantly underestimated, the ethnic Chinese remained only a small ethnic 
minority in Indonesia as the following estimates show. The 2000 Population Census 
asked about ethnicity but only reported the eight respective largest groups, which meant 
that the national statistics did not contain information on how many ethnic Chinese 
lived in Indonesia. In 11 Indonesian provinces the ethnic Chinese constituted one of 
the eight largest ethnic groups, Suryadinata et al have analysed provincial reports and 
estimated the share of ethnic Chinese in the remaining 19 provinces, coming to the 
conclusion that the census data indicated that 1.05 to 1.10 per cent of Indonesian 
citizens self-identified as ethnic Chinese, with an additional 0.05 per cent of foreigners 
in Indonesia identifying as Chinese.210  
The main issue with this data is that it relies on self-identification. Relying on 
self-identification is difficult given the incentives to deny Chinese origins, best 
illustrated by the violent outbreaks against the Chinese during Indonesia’s struggle for 
independence, during the anti-Communist purges between 1965-66 and the anti-
Chinese riots of May 1998, as well as persistent widespread anti-Chinese sentiments. It 
is particularly important to note that the 1998 riots happened only two years before the 
2000 Population Census enumeration. The other issue is that the question posed by 
enumerators only allowed respondents to provide one ethnicity, posing a challenge to 
all Indonesian nationals with mixed ethnic heritage. Suryadinata et al estimate that when 
adjusting for under-reporting in self-identification the true share of ethnic Chinese in 
the Indonesian population in 2000 was somewhere between 1.45 and 2.04 per cent.211 
Mackie discusses Suryadinata et al’s estimates and the 2000 Population Census data 
collection, acknowledging Suryadinata et al’s contribution Mackie points to a number of 
overlooked reasons which further bias against self-identifying as Chinese. Mackie also 
emphasizes issues in relying on census data, given that assumptions for the remaining 
19 provinces could only be made using 11 provinces where the Chinese were part of the 
eight largest ethnic groups.212 Mackie concludes it would be delusional to assume “that 
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figures of this kind can ever be much more than well-informed guesses” and suggests a 
rough working estimate of 2.5 to 3 per cent.213 
2.6 Conclusion 
The general industrial and specific SME policies of the political regimes governing 
Indonesia through the 20th century were distinctly different across time. The late 
colonial regime (1900-1945) saw the need to strengthen the indigenous entrepreneurial 
class but provided little opportunity for Indonesians to gain business experience within 
Dutch firms, in which they rarely occupied managerial positions. Despite the 
investments into developing a popular credit system from 1901 onwards, the Dutch 
colonial government was unable to foster the emergence of a strong indigenous 
entrepreneurial class.   
While the investments made under Japanese rule to strengthen and create 
opportunities for indigenous entrepreneurs may have been insufficient or of too short 
duration to develop a flourishing indigenous entrepreneurial class, little has been done 
to actually understand the impact of Japanese rule in this area. More research is required 
in the contribution of the Japanese to indigenous entrepreneurship as well as to 
structural changes in sectoral employment and the general business landscape. One of 
the few exceptions is the work of Lindblad, who linked some firms which flourished 
during the Sukarno period to the business opportunities they managed to take 
advantage of during Japanese occupation.214 
The Sukarno regime sought to promote indigenous entrepreneurship to limit 
the economic power wielded by foreigners, in particular the Dutch and the Chinese, 
through measures requiring shares of capital or seats on the managerial boards of firms 
in selected industries to be in the hands of indigenous Indonesians. In reality however 
these measures remained largely ineffective, were plagued by corruption, and rather 
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than strengthening the Indonesian entrepreneurial class fostered the growth of a small 
group of rent-seekers. By 1958 the regime therefore abandoned its attempts to 
strengthen indigenous entrepreneurs and instead focussed on nationalising foreign 
enterprises and bringing key sectors under the control of state-owned enterprises, 
thereby creating an unfavourable environment for private business. A small indigenous 
business elite did emerge during the 1950s, but largely depended on political and 
military connections.215 During  the Sukarno period the main limitation for private 
enterprises and industrial development in general was not just access to finance or the 
limited opportunities for technology transfers, but the inability to take advantage of 
technology transfer or knowledge spillover programmes designed to develop indigenous 
entrepreneurship offered (e.g. the Benteng programme) because of the shortcomings in 
education and vocational training.  
SMEs owned by Sino-Indonesian entrepreneurs have been argued to have fared 
comparatively better than indigenous firms.216 It may be suggested that the 
opportunities for knowledge spillovers, or for constructing backward and forward 
linkages, were very different for Sino-Indonesians and indigenous Indonesians. The 
underlying importance is reflected in the role these concepts have played in the East 
Asian industrialisation model in general, as well as in SME development in particular 
(e.g. see the vertical and horizontal subcontracting system in Taiwan that encouraged 
coordinated technical spillovers that resulted in highly competitive SMEs).217 The 
supposed success of Sino-Indonesian entrepreneurship has motivated this research.  
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Chapter 3: A New Order of the Indonesian Business 
Landscape? Finding and Understanding the Missing 
Middle, 1966-1998 
Indonesia is counted as one of the Southeast Asian Tigers, yet its similarities and 
distinguishing characteristics relative to the Tiger economies remain understudied. In 
the World Bank’s East Asian Miracle Report Indonesia was grouped together with 
Malaysia and Thailand into the ‘Southeast Asian Tiger economies’ club for having 
followed similar industrialisation strategies as the East Asian Tiger economies.218 The 
East Asian industrialisation model is characterised by state-led industrialisation that 
moves from import substitution towards export oriented growth, employing a number 
of policy tools, most prominently the promotion of selected industries by providing 
infant industry protection. In the case of Indonesia, Suharto and his New Order 
government began to restructure the economy after he came to power in 1966. The 
government’s development objectives were published in a series of five-year economic 
development plans since 1969, which included setting out economic growth targets and 
industrial policy goals.219 While the rise of business conglomerates, similar to Korea, and 
the strength of state-owned enterprises, similar to Taiwan, have both become key 
features of the Indonesian business landscape, it is less clear how these changes have 
affected the overall business landscape. Addressing the questions of how firm size 
distribution changed, how the role of SMEs developed and the role government policies 
played in these processes helps to understand the wider structural changes that the 
Indonesian economy underwent during the New Order period and its interventionist 
policies.  
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This chapter looks at the developments within the New Order period (1966-
1998), during which Indonesia underwent rapid industrial transformation.  The value 
added by industry outgrew the value added of agriculture in 1975 and continued its 
relative increase thereafter, reflecting the rapid rise of the industrial sector and the slow 
decline of agriculture (see Table 9). Industrial policy under the New Order regime can 
be grouped into three episodes: (1) The first phase of import substitution from 1967 
until the mid-1970s, during which the import of consumer goods was discouraged with 
the help of non-tariff barriers and replaced with domestic goods. (2) The second phase 
of import substitution from the late 1970s until the end of the oil boom in 1982, during 
which the government focussed on providing infant industry protection to selected 
basic capital-intensive upstream industries, thus placing “the burden of 
industrialization” on the government. (3) The fall of oil prices in 1982 severely limited 
government revenues; in response the policy regime transitioned from import-
substitution to export-oriented industrialisation and introduced tax reforms, trade 
liberalisation and financial sector deregulation.220 Until this point the government’s 
strategy was to drive industrialisation by promoting state-owned enterprises and 
providing subsidized targeted credit, but with the cuts in government revenue the 
government began to promote a competitive private sector. Prominently, the 1980s saw 
the rise of large business conglomerates. However, it is less clear how overall firm size 
distribution was affected.  
 
Table 9: Value Added by Economic Sector (share of GDP) 
 1966 1975 1986 1996 2006 
Agriculture 50.8 30.2 24.2 16.7 13.0 
Industry (Manufacturing) 11.9 (9.3) 33.5 (9.8) 33.7 (16.7) 43.5 (25.6) 46.9 (27.5) 
Services 37.3 36.3 42.0 39.9 40.1 
Source: The World Bank, 2017, World Development Indicators, Washington, D.C.: The World Bank, 
http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/world-development-indicators  
 
It is commonly argued that Indonesia’s small firms stay small and large firms are born 
large.221 Such a gap in firm-size distribution is generally referred to as a ‘missing 
                                            
220 Thee Kian Wie, 2012, Indonesia’s Economy since Independence, Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian 
Studies, pp. 149-158. 
221 Thee Kian Wie, 1994, ‘Indonesia’, in: Saha Dhevan Meyanathan (Ed), Industrial Structures and the 
Development of Small and Medium Enterprise Linkages: Examples from East Asia (pp. 95-122), Washington D.C.: 
The World Bank (Economic Development Institute of the World Bank Seminar Series), pp. 98-99; Albert 





middle’.222 Indonesia’s ‘missing middle’ and the perceived inability of indigenous 
Indonesian-owned firms to grow, especially vis-à-vis Sino-Indonesian businesses, has 
been highly politicised and subject to recurring heated public discourse since the Dutch 
colonial period and is still an issue today. The narrative of Sino-Indonesian owned firms 
being able to grow, surpassing a glass ceiling that limits the growth and potential of 
indigenous Indonesian-owned firms, is seemingly supported by the dominance of Sino-
Indonesian ownership among Indonesia’s largest conglomerates which evolved during 
the New Order period. However, in reality the ethnic Chinese only constituted a very 
small share of the Indonesian population, far too small for it to be statistically possible 
that all successful enterprises were under ethnic Chinese ownership.223  
How did the overall firm-size distribution and role of SMEs in the Indonesian 
manufacturing sector really evolve during the industrial transformation Indonesia 
underwent during the New Order period? To address this larger question this chapter is 
broken down into four research questions. The first question is whether the Indonesian 
manufacturing sector really suffered from a missing middle during the New Order 
period. To empirically establish the existence of a missing middle this chapter uses 
provincial data on number of manufacturing firms and workers by firm-size category 
from the Industrial Census 1974/75 and decadal Economic Censuses (1986-2006). I 
then compare Indonesia with South Korea and Taiwan, two economies pursuing similar 
industrial developmental models to Indonesia with distinct firm-size distributions. The 
second research question is what role SMEs played in the Indonesian economy, how it 
changed during the New Order period and how it varied between regions by looking at 
value-added per worker, share of exports and industrial subsectors. Using the same 
                                                                                                                           
Berry and Brian Levy, 1999, ‘Technical, Marketing and Financial Support for Indonesia’s Small and 
Medium Industrial Exporters’, in: Levy, Berry and Nugent (Eds.), Fulfilling the Export Potential of Small and 
Medium Firms (pp. 31-72), New York: Springer Science+Business Media, p. 31; OECD, 2012, OECD 
Economic Surveys: Indonesia 2012, Paris: OECD Publishing, pp. 81-82; Chris Hall, 2002, Profile of SMEs and 
SME Issues in APEC, 1990-2000, for the APEC Small and Medium Enterprises Working Group in 
cooperation with PECC (Pacific Economic Cooperation; Council), Singapore: World Scientific Publishing 
(on behalf of the APEC Secretariat), p. 33. 
222 Alex Coad and Jagannadha Tamvada, 2008, ‘The Growth and Decline of Small firms in Developing 
Countries’, Papers on Economics and Evolution, 2008(#0808):1-33, pp. 2-3; James Tybout, 2000, 
Manufacturing Firms in Developing Countries: How Well Do They Do, and Why?, Journal of Economic 
Literature, 38(1):11-44, pp. 15-17; Leo Sleuwaegen and Micheline Goedhuys, 2002, Growth of firms in 
developing countries, evidence from Côte d’Ivoire, Journal of Developing Economies, 68(1): 117-135, p. 118. 
223 For a discussion of issues with official census figures and the reasoning behind this estimate see: Jamie 
Mackie, 2005, ‘How many Chinese Indonesians?’, Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies, 41(1):97-101, p. 
101. 





census data I constructed the first regional database measuring value added per worker 
for the New Order period. This step takes the supposed advantages attributed to 
Chinese entrepreneurship in Indonesia, able to form dynamic SMEs which grow past an 
apparent glass ceiling, as a starting point to analyse the role of SMEs more broadly. The 
third research question identifies the main barriers to growth and looks at how 
government schemes have addressed these. Finally, the fourth research question looks 
at the impact of the Asian financial crisis. The perceived resilience of SMEs during the 
1997/8 crisis resulted in a new interest in strengthening SMEs and their contribution to 
economic stability and development. Many authors pointed to the strength the 
Taiwanese SME-based economy displayed relative to the hit taken by the chaebols-
dominated Korean economy.224 Similarly Indonesian SMEs have also been found to 
have fared better during the crisis than their larger counterparts.225 However, this 
general assessment obscures the actual experience of SMEs during the crisis, which 
varied considerably between locations, industries and other factors. By using the 2006 
census, this chapter looks at the crisis resilience of SMEs and identifies groups that have 
fared well and others that have suffered. 
A case study of the manufacturing sector suggests itself for two reasons. The 
industrial transformation Indonesia underwent under Suharto’s leadership may be 
assumed to have led to large-scale structural changes in the business landscape of 
manufacturing firms. The second reason is of a more practical nature: for the New 
Order period the data on the non-agricultural economy is best for the manufacturing 
sector: the Economic Censuses have been conducted every ten years since 1986 and 
were preceded by the Industrial Census (1964 and 1975/5). The Economic Censuses 
have been surprisingly underutilised in existing work on Indonesian SMEs or other 
firm-size groupings, in particular their potential for a regionally disaggregated analysis 
has barely been exploited. Most research instead uses the annually published Industrial 
Statistics (Statistik Industri), which only provide information on medium and large 
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enterprises. Furthermore, the manufacturing sector was the only sector for which the 
definition of firm size did not change between censuses, but was based on number of 
employees throughout the period 1974-2006 (small enterprises were defined as 
establishments with 5-19 employees and medium enterprises as establishments with 20-
99 employees). The 1986 Economic Census provides information on number of 
establishments according to firm-size category for the manufacturing sector; for the 
other non-agricultural sectors the number of establishments is neither disaggregated by 
firm-size measured by number of workers or annual turnover (both of which are 
available for all sectors in the 1996 census). This means that a meaningful country-level 
analysis of changes in firm-size distribution during the New Order is only possible for 
the manufacturing sector. 
This study contributes to the larger debate on the missing middle in firm-size 
distribution, which was sparked by Tybout’s seminal work on the missing middle in 
developing countries. Tybout found that many developing countries’ manufacturing 
sectors exhibit a missing middle, with many informal microenterprises and cottage 
industries on the one end and the strength of a few large modern firms on the other.226  
Hsieh and Olken subsequently wrote about the missing “missing middle”, calling 
Tybout’s findings into question and instead observing a missing top.227 A missing top 
describes a firm-size distribution skewed towards very many very small firms. 
Underlying this debate are both different working definitions of the missing middle as 
well as differences in measuring firm-size distribution. Here the case of Indonesia is of 
particular interest, given that it is widely acknowledged that the vast majority of its 
manufacturing firms are microenterprises and cottage industries. Yet this chapter shows 
that medium and large firms contribute the vast majority of the manufacturing sector’s 
value added during the New Order period.  The tension in the current debate is 
between studies that find a missing middle and those that argue that developing 
countries, including Indonesia, suffer from a missing top.228 To contextualise the 
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Indonesian data, this dissertation compares Indonesia to South Korea and Taiwan, two 
developed countries which, while pursing similar industrialisation strategies, represent 
two archetypes in terms of the structural composition of industry: Korea has been 
dominated by large business conglomerates (chaebols), whereas Taiwan’s economy has 
been SME-based. 
3.1 Industrial Policy under the New Order 
If we accept that Indonesia is a Southeast Asian Tiger we would expect a move from 
import-substitution towards export orientation, increased income equality and 
therefore, arguably, a stronger role of SMEs. All the Tiger economies, with the 
exception of Hong Kong, moved from import-substituting policies towards export-
orientation. The Southeast Asian Tigers used different policy instruments and focused 
on more general reductions of import protection and providing export credit rather 
than the ‘highly selective interventions’ that characterised the East Asian Tiger 
economies’ approaches. Yet the general shift from import-substitution towards export 
orientation was still observable in the policies of the Southeast Asian Tigers in the late 
twentieth century. In the East Asian growth model rapid economic growth was 
accompanied by increased income equality as well as building a business-friendly 
environment.229 According to the World Bank’s East Asian Miracle report, one of the 
features of the East Asian growth model was the ‘principle of shared growth’. Wealth 
was shared with the middle and poor classes through land or other agricultural reforms, 
but also by encouraging SME development through targeted support-policies. 
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The New Order government’s policies fall into several policy sub-periods, the 
different industrial policy regimes go hand in hand with the evolution of Indonesia’s 
regional development policies. In his first years of power (1966-1969) Suharto focussed 
on rehabilitation and stabilisation; during this period regional development objectives 
were catered to only in so far as they strengthened national unity. The period from the 
1970s to the end of the second oil boom in 1982 were marked by import substitution in 
terms of industrial strategy, which was accompanied by an increase in regulation and the 
emergence of the strong developmental state. This translated into regional development 
policies which aimed at promoting income equality and equitable distribution of welfare 
gains as well as the increase of presidential instructions to expand regional development 
programmes to ensure access to basic education and healthcare for all. The fall in oil 
prices in the early 1980s severely limited Indonesian government revenues, to which the 
government responded with trade liberalisation, deregulation and export orientation to 
encourage private business growth. This cut in government revenues was reflected in 
spending on regional development programmes and a shift in economic development 
goals towards achieving self-reliance, in terms of financing and resource needs, and 
reducing the country’s dependence on oil. From the fourth economic development plan 
onwards (Repelita IV, 1984-89) investments into health and education were linked to 
the goal of increasing human capital to have a skilled and more productive workforce.230 
3.2 Government Support for SMEs 
Most governments provide policy support to SMEs based on the perception that they 
are important economic actors, who can further harness their potential to contribute to 
economic development through targeted support, highlighting efficiency considerations. 
By contrast, many observers argue that Indonesian SME policy was instead motivated 
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by welfare and equity considerations.231 Strengthening SMEs, it is argued, fosters 
indigenous entrepreneurship, which has been a continuing concern ever since 
independence.232 This was based on the assumption that specifically small enterprises 
were owned by economically weak Indonesians and supporting this sector would 
weaken the economic dominance of foreigners, including and in particular the strength 
of Sino-Indonesians.233  
The New Order regime was much friendlier towards private business 
development than its predecessors. It had inherited some tough challenges from its 
predecessors, such as a weak economy, high currency volatility, low overall education 
and mass malnourishment - and its view was that indigenous entrepreneurship and 
MSMEs should be strengthened based on welfare and equity.234 This stance was in part 
a product of its past and thus part of its institutional path dependence. It was also 
sought as a means to address inequality in income and opportunities and create 
employment in a country that was characterised by large socio-economic disparities and 
faced increasing population pressure.  
The first policy initiatives of the New Order aimed at small-scale businesses 
were made in the early 1970s, after the first years of the regime had focused on 
rehabilitation and securing economic, social and political stability with a strong sectoral 
focus on agriculture.235 SME policies throughout the New Order period were clearly 
motivated by welfare considerations and their employment creation potential, the latter 
being a general concern, in particular in light of the rising population pressure in some 
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areas (Java and Bali in particular) and uneven regional development, which meant lack 
of opportunities in many remote areas. A further key motive behind the Indonesian 
government’s SME support was to support indigenous entrepreneurship. The idea of 
the weak indigenous enterprise in need of government support had already motivated 
the Old Order government to introduce the (largely unsuccessful) Benteng (Fortress) 
Programme in 1950, which restricted import licenses for certain commodities to legally 
registered indigenous importers. “Indigenous enterprise” and “indigenous 
entrepreneurship” is used in Indonesian policy discourse to draw an implicit distinction 
with other private Indonesian enterprises and entrepreneurship, in particular those 
owned by Indonesians of Chinese descent, a historically small but economically active 
minority in Indonesia.  
The narrative of the weak indigenous enterprise resurfaced in the New Order’s 
second five-year development plan (Repelita II, 1974/75-1978/79) and remained a 
recurring theme in the New Order’s subsequent development plans. In these five-year 
development plans support for SMEs was justified as a measure to aid weak economic 
groups, in particular indigenous groups. Repelita III (1979-84) for example foresaw the 
introduction of lending programmes for small businesses in government banks, which 
are to ‘actively seek and nurture small businesses owned by economically weak 
groups.236 The rapid expansion in volume and number of these programmes is 
summarised in Appendix Table 45, the most important of which are analysed in detail 
in Chapter 4. The third five-year development plan argued for the support of small 
business because of their labour intensive nature; strengthening small businesses was 
expected to contribute to regional development.237 Repelita IV (1984-89) was the first 
five-year development plan that proposed measures to improve the processing 
capability of small businesses to increase the role of indigenous Indonesians through 
skill development and thereby increase the value added of small businesses. Repelita IV 
also introduced measures to encourage subcontracting between small, medium and large 
enterprises.238 Repelita V (1989-94) announced that the Indonesian economy had 
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arrived at the last stage before take-off; for this the development plan foresaw the need 
to invest into skill development of the Indonesian labour force to meet the economy’s 
need for a highly- and semi-skilled labour force.239 To strengthen small businesses the 
government announced increased cooperation between state-owned enterprises and 
small businesses. Repelita VI (1994-1999) focused on measures to encourage a more 
productive labour force. SMEs were to be strengthened, in part to address the persistent 
issue of un- and underemployment.240 
These motives stand in stark contrast to efficiency goals often cited as reasons 
why governments should support SMEs. The motivation behind SME support policies 
matters in so far as it had direct implications for the target groups defined by the 
policies. SME promotion can intend to foster a dynamic and innovative SME sector, 
but then the target group rarely includes cottage and household industries and 
programmes often screen for SMEs with growth potential. However, in the case of 
Indonesia policies were in effect aimed to support entrepreneurs selected on grounds of 
hardship and welfare rather than on promise of entrepreneurial success. 
There is a rich history of the various government schemes that have been 
introduced in Indonesia to support SMEs. Credit schemes such as the Small Enterprise 
Development Programmes KIK/KMKP provided investment and working capital 
respectively between 1971 and 1990, as did the Small Enterprises Credit Programme 
KUK, which replaced the previous programme in 1990 and required all commercial 
banks to extend 20 per cent of their total loans to SMEs as investment and working 
capital. The specific aim of all three programmes to strengthen indigenous 
entrepreneurship was reflected in the eligibility requirement that either 75 per cent of 
the firm’s capital should be owned by pribumi Indonesians or that they should hold 50 
per cent of the seats on the management board.241 The Department of Industry’s Small 
Industries Development Programme BIPIK (Program Pembinaan dan Pengembanganan) was 
set up in 1980 to provide extension services to SMEs. In the Small Industry Estates 
Programme LIK (Lingkungan Industri Kecil) small enterprise clusters were supported 
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through education and training from the late 1970s. The various SME support schemes 
are generally found to have been ineffective, for various reasons, ranging from SMEs 
not taking advantage of the support offered, the reluctance or inability of banks to 
provide loans to SME owners solely for business purposes, or insufficient funding. 
However, it seems likely that these assessments require some qualification: one 
assessment of the KUK programme, for example, showed that 67 per cent of the SMEs 
that benefitted from the programme were located in Java (Java’s share of the Indonesian 
population was roughly 60 per cent in 1990).242  
One issue for the implementation of SME policies is the absence of a common 
definition of SMEs amongst different government bodies.243 Thee Kian Wie highlights a 
number of issues that arise as a consequence: (a) the lack of a clear distinction between 
cottage/household enterprises, which usually have little growth potential and constitute 
the vast majority of enterprises in Indonesia, and small enterprises. Grouping these two 
together means that the target group becomes “unmanageably large” and prevents the 
ability to focus on the SME sector that is associated with economic potential; (b) by 
grouping cottage/household, small and medium enterprises, interventions are unable to 
meet the different specific requirements each of these groups has and (c) using different 
definitions means that agencies do not have the same target group, which complicates 
possible coordination of SME support programmes.244  
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Table 10: Indonesian SME Support Schemes 
Type Name & 
Duration 
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Source: Thee Kian Wie, 2006, ‘Policies for Private Sector Development in Indonesia, 
ADB Institute Discussion Paper, 46: 1-46. 
 
In South Korea and Taiwan the differences in firm size distribution can be largely 
attributed to government policy. Despite their facing similar historical, geopolitical and 
institutional contexts, there were several factors which may help explain first the 
divergence, and eventually a certain convergence in SME policy and development. 
Government policy played an important role in the development of SMEs in both 





countries. In its early industrialization the South Korean government discriminated 
against SMEs by restricting its industry promotion to chaebols. It was only in the late 
1970s that it shifted towards a more SME-favourable approach, pursuing strong 
interventionist SME policies to offset the impact of earlier neglect. There had been no 
such bias against SMEs in Taiwan’s early stages of development as industry promotional 
measures were not restricted by firm size. During the 1970s its policy focused on 
helping SMEs to overcome their disadvantages in obtaining access to finance, 
overcoming information asymmetries, making investments in human resource 
development, and research and development (R&D). South Korea and Taiwan may be 
considered two different archetypes, but over time their SME policies have led to a 
trend of convergence in the share of their SMEs of the manufacturing industry in terms 
of numbers of firms, employment, value-added and exports.  
3.3 Theoretical Framework and Existing Literature 
This chapter complements existing studies on Indonesian firm-size distribution in three 
ways: first, by zoning in on the SME segment and attempting to disentangle its 
development from the smaller cottage industries and microenterprises on the one hand 
and large firms on the other. Second, by expanding the time frame to the entire New 
Order period (1966-1998); policy shifts that occurred in Indonesia within the New 
Order period are taken into account, both in terms of SME and private business 
policies. The third major contribution of this chapter to the existing literature is the in-
depth analysis of these policies in relation to the regional differences in SME 
development. It thereby contributes to our understanding of the considerable regional 
variation in SME development as much as the SME and SME policy context. It is well 
established that the Indonesian economy moved from import-substitution towards 
export orientation during the New Order period. However, it is less clear which other 
traits of the Asian model it shares. According to the East Asian development model, we 
would expect increased income equality and therefore, arguably, a stronger role of 
SMEs. A core question behind this research is whether Indonesia shares these features 
of the model. 





3.3.1 Defining SMEs 
Given the absence of a universal definition of SMEs, a working definition is needed. 
For the purpose of this dissertation, the Indonesian Central Statistical Office’s (BPS) 
definition of manufacturing firm-size groups used in the Indonesian Economic 
Censuses will be followed. Small enterprises are defined as establishments with 5 to 19 
workers and medium enterprises as establishments with 20 to 99 workers. While there is 
no standard definition of SMEs and even categories employed vary (most commonly 
used are number of workers, assets and turnover), the Indonesian worker-based 
definition of SMEs was on the small side compared to its neighbours. To put this size 
category into perspective, Table 11 provides an overview of some of the definitions 
used in the Tiger economies during this period. Similar to Indonesia, in many of these 
countries different government agencies and ministries use different definitions, but to 
maintain consistency the overview uses definitions from censuses wherever possible. 
This comparison illustrates that many of the enterprises falling into Indonesia’s 
definition of medium enterprises would be small enterprises by other countries’ 
definitions. This issue will be addressed in the analysis of Indonesian SME trends. For 
the purposes of comparing Indonesia to South Korea and Taiwan, this dissertation uses 
the Indonesian firm-size category of 5-99 workers for SMEs.  
 
  

















Indonesia (1974/75 Industrial Census, 1986, 1996 and 2006 Economic Censuses) 
 Employment 1-4 5-19 20-99 ≥100 
Hong Kong (1994 Government Definition) 
     ≥100 
Malaysia (2005 Census of Establishments and Enterprises) 





RM10-25 m >RM25 m 
Philippines (1991 Government Act) 





Singapore (2007 Government Act) 
 Assets     ≥S$15 
million 
      
South Korea (1978 Manufacturing Census, 1983, 1988 and 1993 Industrial Censuses) 
 Employment 1-4 5-19 20-299 ≥300 
Taiwan (1991 Ministry of Economic Affairs Order) 
 Employment    ≥300 
 Capital    ≥NT$40 m 
 Assets    ≥NT$120 m 
Thailand (1997 Industrial Census)  
 
 Employment 1-9 10-49 50-199 ≥200 
Vietnam (2001 Government Decree) 
 Employment 1-199 ≥300 
 Equity capital <VND10 bio ≥ VND10 bn 
Sources: BPS, Industrial Census (1964, 1974/5), Jakarta: BPS; BPS, Economic Census (1986, 1996, 2006), 
Jakarta: BPS; Legislative Council of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, 2012), Press Release: 
LCQ3: Measures to assist micro-enterprises and small and medium-sized enterprises (立法会三题：帮助微型企业
和中小型企业的措施), May 30, 2012, Hong Kong: GovHK; Department of Statistics Malaysia, 2007, 
Banci pertubuhan dan enterpris, 2005: Profil enterpris kecil dan sederhana (Census of Establishments and Enterprises, 
2005: Profile of Small and Medium Enterprise), Putrajaya: Jabatan Perangkaan Malaysia; Republic of the 
Philippines, 1991, Magna Carta for Small Enterprises, Republic Act No. 6977; Competition Commission 
of Singapore, 2007, Competition Act (CCS/100/210/06; AG/LEG/SL/50B/2005/8 Vol. 1); Republic 
of Korea (ROK), Economic Planning Board (EPB), 1978, Report on Mining and Manufacturing Census, Seoul; 
Republic of Korea (ROK), National Statistical Office (NSO), 1983, 1988, 1993, Report on Industrial Census, 
Seoul; Ministry of Economic Affairs, R.O.C., 1991, Order Jing (80) Chi Tzu #059364 on November 25, 1991; 
NSO Thailand, 1999, Report of the 1997 Industrial Census, Whole Kingdom, Bangkok: National Statistical 










The development of SMEs between 1966 and 2006 is traced using the 1974/1975 
Industrial Census and the 1986, 1996 and 2006 Economic Censuses. The vast majority 
of work on Indonesian business development relies on the Large and Medium-scale 
Manufacturing Survey, however little analysis exists of the much more comprehensive 
Economic Census. Making use of this previously largely unused data is therefore a key 
contribution of this dissertation. In the economic censuses, the number of 
establishments is broken down by business scale, region, range of employees, range of 
assets and sales. By comparison, Taiwan began carrying out industrial censuses in 1954 
and Korea in 1958. At first taken at irregular intervals, Korea conducted industrial 
censuses in five year intervals since 1968 and Taiwan since 1961.  
It should be noted that there is a difference in basic units used: the Indonesian 
and South Korean censuses’ enumeration unit is establishments (individual physical 
units engaging in industrial activities), whereas the Taiwanese censuses mainly use 
enterprises as the basic unit, which means that they can comprise multiple premises and 
economic activities.245 However, for the census years analysed here, the Taiwanese 
censuses provide some data for both establishments and enterprises (but report fewer 
variables on establishments, hence the use of enterprise-based data here). Table 12 
compares shares by firm-size category when using enterprise instead of establishment-
based data and shows that the difference is quite small. The difference in relative shares 
of firm-size categories is small enough to not impede comparison with the Indonesian 
and South Korean establishment-based data. 
  
                                            
245 The definition of establishment used by the National Statistics Office in the Indonesian censuses is as 
“an economic activity unit which provides goods or services in an identifiable location has administrative 
records and at least one person as risk taker”, the definition of establishments used by the Economic 
Planning Board in the Korean censuses is “a physical unit engaging in industrial activities, such as a 
factory, workshop, office, or mine”. 





Table 12: Enterprise-based versus Establishment-based Data in Taiwanese 
Censuses by Firm-Size Category  
Year & Firm-Size Enterprise-based figures Establishment-based figures 
 
No of Basic Units Shares No of Basic Units Shares 
1961 51,567 100.00% 51,909 100.00% 
1-3 34,695 67.28% 38,368 73.91% 
4-19 14,208 27.55% 11,485 22.13% 
20-99 2,277 4.42% 1,697 3.27% 
≥100 387 0.75% 359 0.69% 
1971 42,636 100.00% 44,092 100.00% 
1-3 15,195 35.64% 15,495 35.14% 
4-19 19,740 46.30% 20,511 46.52% 
20-99 5,752 13.49% 6,011 13.63% 
≥100 1,949 4.57% 2,075 4.71% 
1981 91,499 100.00% 94,546 100.00% 
1-4 44,631 48.78% 45,411 48.03% 
5-19 30,527 33.36% 31,839 33.68% 
20-99 12,620 13.79% 13,297 14.06% 
≥100  3,721 4.07% 3,999 4.23% 
Sources: Republic of China (ROC), Executive Yuan, 1962, General Report 1961 Industry & Commerce Census 
of Taiwan, Republic of China (Volume III Manufacturing), Taipei: Executive Group of the I.C.C.T., Tables 8 
and 9; ROC, Executive Yuan, Directorate-General of Budget, Accounting and Statistics (DGBAS), 1973, 
The 1971 Industrial & Commercial Censuses of Taiwan and Fukien Area, Volume III: Manufacturing (Taiwan Area), 
Taipei: Executive Yuan, Tables 9 and 38; ROC, Executive Yuan, Directorate-General of Budget, 
Accounting and Statistics (DGBAS), 1983, The 1981 Industrial & Commercial Censuses of Taiwan-Fukien Area, 
Volume III: Manufacturing, Taipei: Executive Yuan, Tables 30 and 70. 
 
The value added database constructed for this chapter forms a significant contribution 
to the literature on Indonesian economic development and the process of industrial 
transformation. This is the first database that constructs a provincial or even regional 
comparison of manufacturing value added over the New Order period. It is also the 
first database to break down the comparison of value added of different firm-size 
categories by province. This regional component permits an analysis of the great 
diversity within Indonesian industrial development and business landscapes, with the 
great differences in the role SMEs play in the different provinces. Most work on 
Indonesia either works with the country total or focuses exclusively on Java, which 
obscures these large regional differences. 
The value added and number of workers figures were mainly calculated from 
the Economic Census data.246 However, there were significant gaps in the medium and 
large manufacturing value added data in 1986 and 1996. For 1986 it was not possible to 
                                            
246 Number of workers here includes unpaid workers. 





source the provincial economic census statistics for all provinces of Java, Sumatra with 
the exception of Aceh, Southeast and South Sulawesi, all of Kalimantan, Bali, Maluku 
and Papua. To bridge the gap I applied the provincial shares provided by the 
Indonesian Regional Science Association to the Indonesia medium and large enterprise 
value added total figure from the Indonesian Central Statistical Office’s industrial 
statistics.247 The 1996 Economic Census did not publish any data on value added and 
number of workers of medium and large manufacturing enterprises. These 1996 figures 
were taken from provincial statistical reports, except for West Java, Jambi, Lampung, 
Riau, North, South and West Sumatra, Central, Southeast and South Sulawesi, East, 
Central and West Kalimantan, West Nusa Tenggara, Maluku and Papua, for which 
provincial statistical reports covering 1996 were not available. Instead these remaining 
provinces were interpolated from Frederik Sjöholm’s calculations of provincial shares 
based on unpublished data from the Indonesian Central Statistical Office used in 
conjunction with the Indonesia medium and large enterprise manufacturing value added 
and number of workers from Indonesia’s Statistical Yearbook. The interpolation 
exercise also confirmed the figures for the provinces for which provincial statistical 
reports were available.248 Finally, I converted the value added data series for the entire 
period into constant prices with the GDP deflator used throughout this dissertation.249 
An aggregate analysis of Indonesia might return misleading results that obscure 
important regional differences. In order to account for these spatial differences the 
results are here summarised at island level for Indonesia’s five main islands, while East 
Nusa Tenggara, West Nusa Tenggara, Maluku and Papua are grouped under ‘Eastern 
Indonesia’. To ensure comparability over time the country and provincial boundaries 
have been standardised in the use and representation of the data. There was only one 
change to the country borders during this period (Papua became part of the national 
                                            
247 1986 provincial shares in Budy Resosudarmo, Armida Alisjahbana and Bambang Brodjonegoro (Eds.), 
2002, Indonesia's Sustainable Development in a Decentralization Era, Jakarta: Indonesian Regional Science 
Association, p. 353, Table 3; 1986 Indonesia total in BPS, Statistik Industri 1986, Hasil Pengolahan Data 
Perusahaan Industri Besar Dan Sedang (Bagian I) / Industrial Statistics 1986: Survey of Manufacturing Industries 
Large and Medium (Volume I), Jakarta: BPS. 
248 Frederik Sjöholm, 2002, 'The challenge of combining FDI and regional development in Indonesia', 
Journal of Contemporary Asia, 32(3):381-393, Table 1 used in conjunction with the 1996 Indonesia medium 
and large enterprise manufacturing number of workers and value added total found in BPS, 1998 Statistik 
Indonesia / Statistical Yearbook, Jakarta: BPS. 
249 Deflator used was calculated from the GDP deflator reported in The World Bank, 2017, World 
Development Indicators, Washington, D.C.: The World Bank, GDP deflator (base year varies by country) 
[Data file] Retrieved from https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.DEFL.ZS?locations=ID  





territory in 1963)250: East Timor, which was occupied by Indonesia in 1975, formally 
annexed in 1976, left Indonesia in 1999 and gained its formal independence in 2000. 
The data here generally leave out East Timor, and in the few cases where the datasets 
do not allow for separation (e.g. summaries by industrial code rather than by province), 
this is clearly indicated. However, while this was the only change to Indonesia’s national 
borders, provincial borders have changed numerous times during the New Order 
Period. In this thesis the provinces are standardised throughout to the provincial 
borders between 1976 and 1998 (25 provinces, excluding East Timor). The economic 
census data is further disaggregated into the provincial level, thus provincial outliers will 
be discussed where applicable and of relevance. 
3.3.3. Missing Middle or Missing Top? 
Interestingly, despite the large body of literature discussing the ‘missing middle’ in the 
firm-size distribution of developing countries, there seems to be little clarity, much less 
consensus, on what it looks like, how to measure it and what the underlying causes are. 
Nowhere is this more evident than in Hsieh and Olken’s (2014) refutation of Tybout’s 
(2000) seminal article on the existence of a missing middle in developing countries on 
the basis that the firm-size distribution of developing countries exhibits a unimodal 
rather than bimodal pattern and Tybout’s (2016) subsequent reply arguing that 
unimodality does not inherently reflect a missing middle given the assumptions about 
what a undistorted firm-size distribution looks like.251 In this section we first dissect 
these three questions (what does a firm-size distribution with a missing middle look like; 
how to measure a missing middle; and what are the theories on the underlying causes of 
a missing middle), before establishing how this chapter complements existing studies on 
the missing middle in Indonesia.  
In terms of measuring the missing middle, Hsieh and Olken proposed 
comparing firm-size categories, using number of firms rather than share of employment 
                                            
250 Note that Papua joined in 1963, then called Irian Barat, renamed in 1973 to Irian Jaya and 2000 Papua 
– it is referred to only as Papua in this thesis. 
251 Chang-Tai Hsieh and Benjamin Olken, 2014, ‘The Missing “Missing Middle”’, Journal of Economic 
Perspectives, 28(3): 89-108; James Tybout, 2000, ‘Manufacturing Firms in Developing Countries: How Well 
Do They Do, and Why?’, Journal of Economic Literature, 38(1):11-44; James Tybout, 2014, 
‘Correspondence: The Missing Middle’, Journal of Economic Perspectives, 28(4): 235–236. 





to establish a crude empirical measure of the existence of a missing middle.252 Here we 
look at both share of number of firms and share of employment in each category. The 
issue of comparison between countries is further aggravated by the absence of a 
common definition of firm-size categories – as noted earlier definitions of a medium-
sized firm (if based on number of workers) vary widely, e.g. 20-99 workers in Indonesia 
and 20-299 workers in South Korea. The solution is to standardise the datasets by 
number of worker brackets (as done in Hsieh and Olken). 
Equally a point of contention is what causes a missing middle, an important 
issue that requires clarification if one is to provide policy advice on how to bridge it. 
One major point of disagreement is whether it is really small firms that are generally 
disadvantaged in developing countries or larger firms. Hsieh and Olken argue that the 
issue is not a bimodal distribution but rather a missing middle and top as a result of 
“differential constraints faced by large firms”.253 Tybout links the missing middle in the 
firm-size distribution of developing countries to various factors: the tendency of 
industrial policies to favour large enterprises, easier access to credit for large enterprises 
and that they fare better under protectionist regimes. According to Tybout, “it never 
pays to be just large enough to attract enforcement”, particularly in heavily regulated 
countries.254 Coad and Tamvada found that reasons for firms in developing economies 
to stay small can be their lack of access to credit and suitable management resources, 
high transport costs, and poor infrastructure acting as barriers, as well as the ability to 
avoid taxes whilst being part of the informal sector.255 Dasgupta finds that the missing 
middle disappears as a country develops and links this to the decline of the traditional 
                                            
252 Chang-Tai Hsieh and Benjamin A. Olken, 2014, ‘The Missing “Missing Middle”’, Journal of Economic 
Perspectives, 28(3): 89-108, p. 90. 
253 Chang-Tai Hsieh and Benjamin A. Olken, 2014, ‘The Missing “Missing Middle”’, Journal of Economic 
Perspectives, 28(3): 89-108, pp. 89-91. 
254 James Tybout, 2000, Manufacturing Firms in Developing Countries: How Well Do They Do, and 
Why?, Journal of Economic Literature, 38(1):11-44, p. 12, 16-17 [Italics added]. 
255 Alex Coad and Jagannadha Tamvada, 2008, ‘The Growth and Decline of Small firms in Developing 
Countries’, Papers on Economics and Evolution, 2008(#0808):1-33, pp. 3-4; 
See the study on Cameroon on the subject where an inverted U-shape relation between size and tax 
exemption and evasion in Cameroon was found, with small business being “relative likely” to evade taxes 
and large business to receive tax exemptions, thus leaving medium-sized enterprises with the highest tax 
burden (relative to their sales): Bernard Gauthier and Mark Gersovitz, 1997, Revenue erosion through 
exemption and evasion on Cameroon, 1993, Journal of Public Economics, 64(1): 407-424, pp. 410-411; 416-
417. 





sector.256 Similarly Tybout found that this drop-off in the middle is uncommon in 
industrialized countries.257 
Coming back to the question of what a missing middle looks like, this 
dissertation takes the same view as Tybout - a missing middle does not require 
bimodality. A unimodal firm-size distribution can exhibit a missing middle. Hsieh and 
Olken make a strong point that one needs to distinguish between a missing middle and 
a missing top. This chapter follows Tybout’s argument that a missing middle occurs 
when “policies and market conditions [. . .] have discouraged production at mid-sized 
firms, as opposed to small or large firms”, whereas in a missing top, as found by Hsieh 
and Olken, large firms are constrained and small firms stay small because growth would 
increase their marginal costs.258 
Tybout points to the fact that developing countries can have predominantly 
small firms for reasons other than economic inefficiency, such as the Engel effect or 
low urbanisation, both of which can lead to local demand being best met by local 
cottage industry production. Instead, this chapter takes a comparative view, setting the 
analysis of Indonesian SME development and changes in wider firm-size distribution 
against the cases of Korea and Taiwan – the former known for the dominance of its 
chaebols and the latter for the strength of its SMEs. Korea and Taiwan represent two 
archetypical cases of firm-size distribution which pursued similar industrial 
developmental models to that of Indonesia. Most of the government initiatives 
introduced by the New Order to strengthen SMEs had already been implemented in 
Korea and/or Taiwan before (such as Bapak Angka, the Foster Parent Programme 
which linked large to smaller firms, industrial zones and various initiatives to encourage 
subcontracting and clustering). Therefore this comparison not only facilitates the 
empirical analysis of the existence of a missing middle, but also the analysis of the 
reasons for it, and government efforts to address these issues. 
                                            
256 Kunal Dasgupta, 2016, ‘The missing middle in developing countries revisited’, Indian Growth and 
Development Review, 9(1): 32-52. 
257 James Tybout, 2000, Manufacturing Firms in Developing Countries: How Well Do They Do, and 
Why?, Journal of Economic Literature, 38(1):11-44, pp. 15-16. 
258 James Tybout, 2014, ‘Correspondence: The Missing Middle’, Journal of Economic Perspectives, 28(4): 235–
236, p. 235; Chang-Tai Hsieh and Benjamin Olken, 2014, ‘The Missing “Missing Middle”’, Journal of 
Economic Perspectives, 28(3): 89-108, pp. 106-7. 





The first step is to identify suitable benchmark years for comparison by lining 
up Indonesia’s against Korea’s and Taiwan’s GDP using the Maddison data. The 
second step is to compare the firm-size distribution and establish whether the firm-size 
distribution of the Indonesian manufacturing sector exhibits a missing middle. The 
third step is to analyse the barriers to growth that Indonesian SMEs face and determine 
whether these are particular to the Indonesian case or can also be found in the Korean 
and Taiwanese cases.  
3.3.4 Benchmark Years to compare Indonesia to South Korea and 
Taiwan 
While Indonesia is one of the Southeast Asian Tiger economies, following some similar 
industrialisation strategies and patterns to the East Asian Tigers, there are also 
important differences, both in characteristics as well as timing. These differences in the 
Southeast Tigers compared to the East Asian Tigers included a stronger role of special 
interest groups and hence weaker developmental state, relative abundance of natural 
resources, weaker educational attainment as well as higher income inequality.259 The 
implication of these differences will be discussed in detail within the analysis comparing 
Indonesia to Korea and Taiwan. Here we focus on the question of timing. In the Tiger 
economies literature there are varying indications of a lag of about twenty years in 
economic development between Indonesia versus South Korea and Taiwan. The World 
Bank’s Miracle Report merely observed that the Southeast Asian Tigers achieved higher 
accelerated growth rates between 1975 and 1985 than between 1960 and 1970, whereas 
the East Asian Tigers were the highest performers during both periods.260 Hal Hill 
                                            
259 For a discussion of the role of special interest groups in the SEA versus the EA Tigers see Andrew 
Macintyre, 1994, ‘Business, Government and Development: Northeast Asian and Southeast Asian 
Comparisons’ in: Business and Government in Industrialising Asia, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, p.10;  
For a discussion of the relevance of the differences in availability of natural resources see Alice Amsden, 
1989, Asia’s Next Giant: South Korea and Late Industrialization, New York: Oxford University Press, p. 794;  
On differences in education and inequality see Martin Andersson and Tobias Axelsson, 2016, ’Relative 
Economic Backwardness and Catching up: Lessons from History, Implications for Development 
Thinking’, in: Martin Andersson and Tobias Axelsson (Eds.), Diverse Development Paths and Structural 
Transformation in the Escape from Poverty (pp. 267-276), Oxford University Press, p. 274. 
260 The World Bank’s Miracle Report groups Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand under the term “newly 
industrialising economies” (NIEs), which with the four Tiger economies (South Korea, Taiwan, Hong 
Kong and Singapore form the “high-performing Asian economies” (HPAEs) – for the purpose of this 
dissertation, the term NIEs is used interchangeably with Southeast Asian Tigers. 





argues that Indonesia can only really be referred to as a Tiger economy from the late 
1980s onwards, and Ha-Joon Chang dates this even later, to the early 1990s.261 Some of 
this variation, in particular Hal Hill’s periodisation, can be explained by the definition 
used – whereas the World Bank referred to GDP growth rates, Hal Hill focused on the 
shift towards export-orientation. It is heavily contested whether the East Asian Miracle 
is primarily characterised by state-led export orientation or whether the first period of 
import-substitution that allows building up selected industries under infant industry 
protection is also a key part to the story. In any case, to establish benchmark years for 
comparison between Indonesia and South Korea and Taiwan it is essential to compare 
stages of economic development.  
Here the first step is to simply compare GDP per capita using the Maddison 
GDP data. Figure 7 shows the GDP per capita comparison of Indonesia to South 
Korea and Taiwan. The Maddison data shows that the lag of Indonesian GDP per 
capita relative to South Korea and Taiwan grew during the New Order period. 
Indonesian GDP per capita was only about ten years behind Taiwan and South Korea 
in 1971. By 1980 the lag had grown to 15 years and by 1990 to 20 years – in 2006 
Indonesian GDP per capita was about at the level South Korea and Taiwan were at in 
the mid-1970s. This growing lag is unsurprising, given that despite Indonesia having 
been “one of only three economies [out of 119 in total] to move from the bottom to 
the top of the distribution of growth rates between [1960-1970 and 1970-85]”, South 
Korea and Taiwan were two of only 11 economies to achieve sustained high growth 
rates in both periods.262 Unlike South Korea and Taiwan, Indonesia did not manage the 
transition from developing to developed country. The World Bank has classified South 
Korea as a high-income economy since 1995, and Taiwan since the beginning of the 
Bank’s analytical history in 1987, whereas Indonesia only moved from being a low-
income to a lower middle income country in 1993.263  
 
                                            
261 Hal Hill, 2000, The Indonesian Economy (Second Edition), Cambridge University Press, p.154; Ha-Joon 
Chang, 2003, ‘Trade and Industrial Policy Issues’, in: ‘Rethinking Development Economics’ (pp. 257-276), 
London: Anthem Press, p. 108. 
262 World Bank, 1993, The East Asian Miracle: Economic Growth and Public Policy, New York: Oxford 
University Press, pp. 28-29. 
263 The World Bank, n.d., Historical classifications by income, Retrieved June 19, 2018, from: 
http://databank.worldbank.org/data/download/site-content/OGHIST.xls   





Figure 7: GDP per Capita of South Korea, Taiwan and Indonesia compared, 
1960-2010 (Int. GK$) 
 
Source: Data from Maddison Project Database (version 2013); Jutta Bolt and Jan Luiten van Zanden, 
2014, ‘The Maddison Project: collaborative research on historical national accounts’, The Economic History 
Review, 67 (3): 627–651. 
Notes: Markers show year and country for which SME data from economic and industrial censuses is 
available; underlying data in the Appendix (Table 31). 
 
Given the increase in Indonesia’s lag behind South Korea and Taiwan in GDP per 
capita, further analysis is needed to establish stronger benchmark years of comparison. 
The second step is to compare timing of industrial policy episodes. The focus of the 
South Korean government in the late 1950s was on rehabilitation and reconstruction 
after the Korean War; Taiwan had almost recovered from wartime destruction by 
1955.264 This compares to the Indonesian government’s priority of rehabilitation and 
stabilisation in the early days of the New Order, completed by the early 1970s. The late 
1950s saw the rise of import substitution policies and infant industry protection in 
South Korea and Taiwan, which Indonesia pursued in two stages from the early 1970s 
until the oil boom came to an abrupt end in 1982. South Korea and Taiwan shifted 
                                            
264 Note the military coup in May 1961, which brought South Korea under the leadership of General Park 
Chung Hee, see Lee-Jay Cho and Yoon Hyung Kim, 1991, ‘Major Economic Policies of the Park 
Administration’, in: Lee-Jay Cho and Yoon Hyung Kim (Eds.), Economic Development in the Republic of Korea: 
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towards export promotion in the mid-1960s.265 In Indonesia the shift towards export 
orientation happened much later as part of a general shift towards market-liberalisation 
and privatisation in the early 1980s after falling oil prices led to decreasing government 
revenues. In the 1970s the South Korean and, to a lesser extent, the Taiwanese 
governments began promoting heavy and chemical industries as part of industrial 
deepening strategies; similarly the fourth Indonesian Economic Development Plan 
(1984-1989) set the objective of expanding heavy and key chemical industries “to 
deepen and broaden the industrial structures”.266  
Bringing together the GDP per capita comparison of step one and the analysis 
of industrial policy episodes of step two, shows that for the purposes of this chapter 
Indonesia lags behind South Korea and Taiwan with something like a fifteen year lag. 
The discussion of step one showed that the lag in economic development measured in 
GDP per capita varied from ten years at the start of the Indonesian New Order period 
to 20 before the beginning of the Asian Financial Crisis and end of the New Order 
period. Given the focus on manufacturing firms, further analysis of the timing of 
industrial policy episodes helps to establish when the Indonesian manufacturing sector 
was in a comparable situation to South Korean and Taiwanese industry. When 
comparing Indonesia to South Korea and Taiwan the analysis will discuss trends of 
changes in firm-size distribution over time, but with a roughly fifteen year gap. 
However, the fifteen year gap cannot be maintained for comparison of the post-New 
Order period, given the different trajectory of economic development Indonesia went 
on after the Asian Financial Crisis. By 2006 the gap between Indonesia on the one side 
and South Korea and Taiwan on the other had grown to thirty years.   
Table 13 provides an overview which censuses are used as benchmark years.  
The Indonesian 1974/75 Industrial Census will be compared to the South Korean 1963 
Mining and Manufacturing Census and the Taiwanese 1961 Industrial and Commercial Census. 
The Indonesian 1986 Economic Census will be compared to the South Korean 1973 
Mining and Manufacturing Census and the Taiwanese 1971 Industrial and Commercial Census. 
                                            
265 Complementarity of ISI to EOI in South Korea and Taiwan – see Alice Amsden, 1989, Asia’s Next 
Giant: South Korea and Late Industrialization, New York: Oxford University Press, p. 12 and Republic of 
Korea, 1971, Third Economic Development Plan 1972-1976 . 
266 Percetakan Negara Republic of Indonesia, 1984, Policies and Prospects for Sustained Development Under 
Challenging Conditions: REPELITV IV – The Fourth Five-Year Development Plan of Indonesia, 1984/85 – 
1988/89 (A Summary), Jakarta: National Development Planning Agency (Bappenas), p. 74. 





The Indonesian 1996 Economic Census will be compared to the South Korean 1983 
Industrial Census and the Taiwanese 1981 Industrial and Commercial Census. By 2006 the gap 
in Indonesian economic development relative to South Korea and Taiwan had grown 
too large to compare to later censuses. In terms of stage of economic development, 
Indonesia at the time of its 2006 Economic Census is still comparable to the South 
Korean 1983 and Taiwanese 1981 figures. However, given the severe impact of the 
Asian Financial Crisis on all three countries, this last comparison has to be made with 
caution. 
Table 13: Benchmark Census Years for Comparison 
Indonesia South Korea Taiwan 
1974/75 1963 1961 
1986 1973 1971 
1996 1983 1981 
2006 - - 
 
3.4 Finding the Missing Middle 
With industrialisation we would expect structural changes in the firm-size distribution 
of the manufacturing sector. First, we would expect a trend towards increasing firm size 
as the Indonesian economy grew. In developing countries, microenterprises typically 
dominate manufacturing business landscapes, but with economic development firm size 
distribution changes towards increasing firm size, bringing first the rise of small firms 
and then larger firms.267 Snodgrass and Biggs found that the size of ‘the average 
manufacturing establishment is two to three times as large in high-income countries as 
in low-income countries’.268 Yet while there is a trend towards increasing firm-size with 
economic development, smaller firms do not disappear from the business landscape; 
instead their role changes.  Snodgrass and Biggs found that as a country develops the 
                                            
267 Dennis Anderson, 1982, ‘Small Industry in Developing Countries: A Discussion of Issues’, World 
Development, 10(11): 913-948, pp. 914-926; Eugene Staley and Richard Morse, 1965, Modern Small Industry 
for Developing Countries, New York: McGraw-Hill, p. 16; Ian M.D. Little, Dipak Mazumdar and John Page, 
1987, Small Manufacturing Enterprises: A Comparative Analysis of India and Other Economies. New York: Oxford 
University Press for the World Bank, pp. 13-18. 
268 Donald Snodgrass and Tyler Biggs, 1996, Industrialization and the Small Firm: Patterns and Policies, San 
Francisco: International Centre for Economic Growth and the Harvard Institute for International 
Development, p. 51. 





typical manufacturing establishment changes from traditional household industry to a 
modern factory SME with more complex production lines.269 The second expectation 
would therefore be to not only see a growth in average firm size but also evidence of 
industrial upgrading of SMEs. Industrial upgrading can be measured through factors 
such as increased use of electric power and higher value added. Furthermore, increased 
production linkages with other firms as well as having a higher share of exports would 
reflect a change in the role of SMEs within the economy, in particular a development 
toward a dynamic, innovative and more competitive SME sector.  
As noted earlier, many of the enterprises defined as medium enterprises in 
Indonesia would have been small enterprises by its regional neighbours’ definitions. 
Therefore, the question arises whether firm-size distribution in the Indonesian 
manufacturing sector was skewed towards microenterprises and small enterprises and 
thus was an indication of a ‘missing middle’ in the Indonesian manufacturing sector. 
Data on the evolution of firm size in Indonesia are shown in Tables 14 and 15. 
Looking at the evidence for Indonesia from the industrial and economic censuses 
confirms the first set of expectations: the share of microenterprises in manufacturing 
establishments and employment continuously declined during the New Order and post-
Asian Financial Crisis periods. The overall trend of the declining share of 
microenterprises in number of establishments and employment was to be expected as 
the country industrialised and developed. But the data show that beyond this 
observation at the aggregate national level, there was considerable regional variation. 
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Francisco: International Centre for Economic Growth and the Harvard Institute for International 
Development, p. 51; Eugene Staley and Richard Morse, 1965, Modern Small Industry for Developing Countries, 
New York: McGraw-Hill, pp. 5-8, 14-25. 





Table 14: Share of Establishments by Firm-Size Group and Region in 
Indonesian Manufacturing, 1974-2006 
Region 1974/5 1986 1996 2006 








Micro (1-4) 95.95% 91.99% 89.42% 89.13% 
Small (5-19) 3.44% 7.00% 9.25% 9.75% 
Medium (20-99) 0.50% 0.82% 1.03% 0.85% 
Large (≥100) 0.11% 0.19% 0.30% 0.28% 








Micro (1-4) 92.56% 92.38% 91.07% 88.70% 
Small (5-19) 6.92% 6.72% 8.09% 10.58% 
Medium (20-99) 0.39% 0.67% 0.62% 0.48% 
Large (≥100) 0.12% 0.23% 0.22% 0.24% 








Micro (1-4) 96.20% 95.36% 93.14% 91.89% 
Small (5-19) 3.63% 4.36% 6.55% 7.79% 
Medium (20-99) 0.15% 0.24% 0.26% 0.25% 
Large (≥100) 0.02% 0.04% 0.05% 0.07% 








Micro (1-4) 96.06% 95.43% 93.55% 91.78% 
Small (5-19) 3.52% 3.95% 5.88% 7.81% 
Medium (20-99) 0.32% 0.35% 0.37% 0.24% 









Micro (1-4) 96.55% 93.78% 92.92% 88.16% 
Small (5-19) 3.17% 5.49% 6.55% 11.20% 
Medium (20-99) 0.22% 0.63% 0.46% 0.56% 
Large (≥100) 0.06% 0.10% 0.07% 0.08% 








Micro (1-4) 96.66% 97.27% 95.61% 92.83% 
Small (5-19) 3.04% 2.54% 4.21% 6.98% 
Medium (20-99) 0.26% 0.16% 0.15% 0.17% 
Large (≥100) 0.04% 0.04% 0.02% 0.02% 








Micro (1-4) 95.71% 92.75% 90.64% 89.61% 
Small (5-19) 3.74% 6.37% 8.31% 9.48% 
Medium (20-99) 0.45% 0.70% 0.81% 0.68% 
Large (≥100) 0.10% 0.17% 0.24% 0.23% 
Sources: BPS, Industrial Census 1974/75, Jakarta: BPS; BPS, Economic Census (1986, 1996, 2006), Jakarta: 
BPS. 
Notes: See Appendix Table 32, Table 33, Table 34 and Table 35 for underlying provincial data.  





Table 15: Share of Employees by Firm-Size Groups and Region in Indonesian 
Manufacturing, 1974-2006 
Region 1974/5 1986 1996 2006 








Micro (1-4) 78.61% 52.09% 38.79% 
57.57% 






Large (≥100) 25.01% 34.98% 








Micro (1-4) 74.72% 48.70% 48.27% 
63.89% 






Large (≥100) 29.88% 31.23% 








Micro (1-4) 90.61% 74.51% 71.54% 
87.51% 






Large (≥100) 7.83% 8.67% 








Micro (1-4) 83.16% 43.84% 49.39% 
68.33% 















Micro (1-4) 84.92% 64.78% 64.72% 
85.91% 






Large (≥100) 9.72% 6.96% 








Micro (1-4) 87.10% 83.41% 70.63% 
93.24% 






Large (≥100) 3.25% 4.14% 








Micro (1-4) 79.51% 53.51% 43.75% 42.57% 
Small (5-19) 7.00% 14.69% 17.31% 19.60% 
Medium (20-99) 3.96% 7.26% 5.76% 6.60% 
Large (≥100) 9.52% 24.53% 33.18% 31.22% 
Sources:  
1974/75: BPS, 1974-5 Industrial Census, Household and Cottage Industries Vol. I, Jakarta: BPS; BPS, 1974-5 
Industrial Census, SSE Manufacturing: DKI Jakarta, Jakarta: BPS; BPS, 1974-5 Industrial Census, SSE 
Manufacturing: East Java, Jakarta: BPS; BPS, 1974-5 Industrial Census, SSE Manufacturing: DI Yogyakarta, 





Jakarta: BPS; BPS, 1974-5 Industrial Census. SSE Manufacturing: Kalimantan, Irian Jaya, Bali, NYY & NTB, 
Jakarta: BPS; BPS, 1974-5 Industrial Census, SSE Manufacturing: Sulawesi, Jakarta: BPS; BPS, 1974-5 Industrial 
Census, SSE Manufacturing: Sumatra, Jakarta: BPS; BPS, 1974-5 Industrial Census, MLE Manufacturing: 
Indonesia, Jakarta: BPS; 1974/5 Indonesian total relative shares of medium and large enterprises calculated 
from Albert Berry, Edgard Rodriguez and Henry Sandee, 2001, ‘Small and Medium Enterprise Dynamics 
in Indonesia’, Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies, 37(3): 363-384, Table 1. 
1986: BPS, 1986 Economic Census, Results of Establishment Listing (Final Figures) (various provinces), Jakarta: 
BPS. 
1996: BPS, 1996 EC Household/Cottage Industry Statistics, Jakarta: BPS; 1996 Medium and Large 
Manufacturing Worker Data from Medium & Large Enterprise Worker Data from more precise 
provincial sources: BPS Kantor Statistik Propinsi Bengkulu, 1997, Statistik Industri Besar dan Sedang Propinsi 
Bengkulu 1996, Bengkulu: BPS Kantor Statistik Propinsi Bengkulu; BPS Propinsi Sumatera Selatan, 1997, 
Statistik Industri Besar dan Sedang Propinsi Sumatera Selatan 1996, Palembangan: BPS Kantor Statistik 
Propinsi Sumatera Selatan; BPS Propinsi Jawa Tengah, 1998, Indikator Industri Besar dan Sedang Jawa Tengah 
/ Large and Medium Manufacturing Industry Indicators [Central Java], Semarang: BPS Propinsi Jawa Tengah; 
BPS Kantor Statistik Propinsi NTT, 1997, Indikator Ekonomi Nusa Tenggara Timur 1996, Kupang: Kantor 
Statistik Propinsi Nusa Tenggara Timur; BPS Propinsi Kalimantan Selatan, 1999, Kalimantan Selatan Dalam 
Angka / Kalimantan Selatan in Figures 1999, Banjarbaru: BPS Propinsi Kalimantan Selatan; BPS Propinsi 
Irian Jaya, 1999, Irian Jaya Dalam Angka / Irian Jaya in Figures 1998, Jayapura: BPS Propinsi Irian Jaya; BPS 
Propinsi Bali, 2001, Bali Dalam Angka/Bali in Figures 2000, Denpasar: BPS Propinsi Bali; BPS Propinsi 
D.I. Yogyakarta, 2001, Daerah Istimewa Yogyakarta Dalam Angka/Daerah Istimewa Yogyakarta in Figures 2000, 
Yogyakarta: BPS Propinsi D.I. Yogyakarta; BPS Propinsi Riau, 2000, Riau Dalam Angka / Riau in Figures 
2000, Pekanbaru: BPS Propinsi Riau; BPS Propinsi DKI Jakarta, 2001, Jakarta Dalam Angka / Jakarta in 
Figures 2000, Jakarta: BPS Propinsi DKI Jakarta, Table 6.1.6; BPS Propinsi Kalimantan Tengah, 2001, 
Kalimantan Tengah Dalam Angka (Kalimantan Tengah in Figures) 2000, Palangka Raya: BPS Propinsi 
Kalimantan Tengah, Table 6.1.5; For West Java, Jambi, Lampung, Riau, North, South and West Sumatra, 
Central, Southeast and South Sulawesi, East, Central and West Kalimantan, West Nusa Tenggara, Maluku 
and Irian Jaya provincial shares in medium and large manufacturing employment were taken from 
Frederik Sjöholm, 2002, 'The challenge of combining FDI and regional development in Indonesia', Journal 
of Contemporary Asia, 32(3):381-393, Table 1 and used in conjunction with the Indonesia medium and large 
enterprise manufacturing number of workers total found in BPS, 1998 Statistik Indonesia / Statistical 
Yearbook, Jakarta: BPS; 1996 relative medium and large manufacturing Indonesian total employment 
shares calculated from Robert Rice and Irfan Abdullah, 2000, A Comparison of Small and Medium/Large 
Indonesian Manufacturing Enterprises from 1986 and 1996 by Sector, Jakarta: Partnership for Economic Growth 
Project, USAID, (mimeo), Table 5.  
2006: BPS, 2006 Economic Census MSE Manufacturing, Jakarta: BPS; BPS, 2006 Economic Census MLE 
Manufacturing Part 1, Jakarta: BPS; relative shares for microenterprises and small enterprises in 2006 
calculated from BPS, 2009 Statistik Indonesia Statistical Yearbook, Jakarta: BPS, Table 7.2.2. 
Notes: See Appendix Table 32, Table 33, Table 34 and Table 35 for underlying provincial data. 
 
  





Looking at changes in the distribution by number of establishments in each firm-size 
category in Table 14 it is clear that while the share of microenterprises declined 
everywhere in Indonesia, even in the aftermath of the Asian Financial Crisis, the largest 
advances in firm-size distribution over this period were notable for small enterprises, 
whereas medium and large enterprises continued to have only small shares in total 
establishments. This development is in line with Snodgrass and Biggs’ observations on 
changing firm size distribution as a country develops: the growing share of small firms 
corresponds to an industrialising economy. However, the developments in the shares of 
medium and large firms reveal a more mixed picture: the share of medium-sized firms 
doubled and that of large firms nearly tripled in Java during the New Order period. 
Both also showed substantial increases in Sumatra. Conversely, Eastern Indonesia was 
the only region to see a fall in the share of medium and large firms during the New 
Order period. The changes and growing divergence are more pronounced when looking 
at employment shares. 
Table 15 shows the dramatic changes Indonesian manufacturing firm-size 
distribution underwent during the New Order as measured in employment shares. 
Employment shares of microenterprises nearly halved in Java and substantially 
decreased in Sumatra and Kalimantan during the New Order period. In Eastern 
Indonesia the share actually increased between 1974 and 1986 and only fell slightly by 
1996. Again, relative employment in small firms rose everywhere, especially in Bali. 
Unfortunately, the 1974/75 Industrial Census and 1996 Economic Census only provide 
regional data for medium and large enterprise development combined. Medium and 
large enterprise employment reflect divergent trajectories: Java experienced the highest 
increase during the New Order period, followed by Sumatra with the second highest 
increase in medium and large manufacturing enterprise employment. With the 
exception of Eastern Indonesia the sharpest increase in medium and large 
manufacturing employment occurred between 1974/75 and 1986 throughout Indonesia. 
This is consistent with the observation in the literature on Indonesian economic 
development that the early 1980s saw the rise of private businesses due to the New 
Order government’s tax reforms, trade liberalisation and financial sector deregulation. 
Between 1996 and 2006 the share of medium and large manufacturing establishments 
only changed very little; in respect to this indicator progress stalled after the Asian 
Financial Crisis. 





These findings stand in line with the general image of the respective regions: 
Java, the main island and most developed region, had the smallest share of 
microenterprises and the largest shares of medium and large enterprises in terms of 
both number of enterprises and employment at the end of the New Order period. 
Eastern Indonesia and Sulawesi, the poorest regions, had the largest shares of 
microenterprise employment. Bali’s advances were mainly in the rise of small enterprise 
employment; this can be explained by the specialisation of Balinese manufacturing in 
traditional handicraft industry. These results show how uneven the industrial 
development process was in Indonesia, when taking rising average firm-size as an 
indicator.270 
Returning to the question about the existence of a missing middle in Indonesia, 
the difference between the establishment and employment-based figures shows that it is 
not sufficient to just look at establishment figures, as argued by Hsieh and Olken. The 
establishment-based figures only show little change, with microenterprises constituting 
the vast majority of the Indonesian manufacturing sector throughout the New Order 
period and in the country as a whole. However, the employment-based figures reveal 
much more detail and variation. The employment-based figures are particularly 
important given the differences in range of the firm-size brackets (i.e. microenterprises 
encompass firms between 1-4 workers, whereas firms with 20 all the way to 99 workers 
fall into the medium-sized category).  
 In the results for Indonesia overall during the New Order period there was a 
large drop in the employment share of microenterprises (by nearly half), considerable 
increases in small enterprise employment shares and large increases in the employment 
share of large enterprises. But surprisingly medium-sized enterprise employment shares 
peaked in 1986, despite continued – albeit small – growth in establishment shares from 
1974 throughout to 2006. The 1974/75 Industrial Census shows that the vast majority of 
manufacturing employment was in microenterprises (at least 75 per cent everywhere). 
However, from then onwards the comparison showed different regional trajectories 
during the New Order period and in the aftermath of the Asian Financial Crisis. Java, 
Sumatra and Kalimantan (in descending order) moved towards a missing middle, with 
considerable gains in large enterprise development but a persistent gap in medium-sized 
                                            
270 See Table 36 in the Appendix for an overview regional average firm-size.  





firm employment. Sulawesi and Eastern Indonesia, at the other end of the spectrum, 
shared the small share of medium-sized firm employment with the rest of the country, 
but did not see much growth in the large enterprise segment. Their firm-size 
distribution remained heavily skewed towards microenterprises in terms of employment 
as well as establishment shares. Despite the decline in the microenterprise segment and 
rise of all other firm-size category shares, there is no evidence of a closing of the middle 
gap anywhere in Indonesia during this period. This could be an indicator for the 
emergence and then persistence of a missing middle. Similarly, despite the relative 
decreases, the large presence of cottage firm and household industries was reflective of 
the fact that Indonesia was still a developing country at the end of the New Order 
period. The next step is to analyse how Indonesia’s firm-size distribution compared to 
other countries at similar stages of economic development.  
Figure 8 and Figure 9 compare the Indonesian firm-size distribution to the 
South Korean and Taiwanese cases at comparable stages of economic development 
(measured in GDP per capita). First, a number of caveats have to be addressed. In the 
Indonesian censuses the smallest category are microenterprises with 1-4 workers, 
whereas the Taiwanese census data has 1-3 workers in its smallest bracket. In Indonesia, 
the next category is small enterprises with 5-19 workers; the Taiwanese data has been 
aggregated into 4-19 workers in the second category. This means that the Taiwanese 
figures slightly under-emphasize the importance of microenterprises and overemphasize 
the importance of small enterprises relative to each other (the medium and large 
enterprise brackets are the same) compared to Indonesia. The South Korean 1963 
census excludes establishments with less than five workers, therefore the following 
figures comparing Indonesia to South Korea and Taiwan have been replicated in the 
appendix excluding microenterprises.271 These caveats have to be borne in mind in the 
comparison of these datasets.  
Figure 8 compares Indonesia to South Korea and Taiwan by shares of number 
of establishments in each firm-size category. A perhaps surprising finding, given 
Taiwan’s reputation of an SME-based economy, is that the share of firms with at least 
100 workers was larger than in Indonesia during the entire period not just in South 
Korea but also in Taiwan. The gap between the latter two countries even grew, so much 
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so that the share of large enterprises in total establishments in Taiwan became larger 
than in South Korea. Both South Korea and Taiwan had much larger increases in the 
medium firm-size bracket of 20-99 workers than Indonesia. The comparison of 
employment shares without microenterprises in the appendix (Figure 31) shows that 
relative to small and large firms, the share of medium-sized establishments actually fell 
in Indonesia between 1974/75 and 2006, while the same firm-size bracket grew in 
South Korea and Taiwan between the 1960s and 1980s. When comparing the 
development of firm-size distributions without microenterprises Indonesia’s middle 
actually grew smaller, while it expanded in South Korea and Taiwan.  
A comparison based on employment shares of Indonesia to South Korea and 
Taiwan in Figure 9 makes a stronger case for arguing for a missing middle in 
Indonesia, rather than for a missing top – at least when adhering to Indonesia’s 
definition of an SME, which was relatively small compared to its regional neighbours. 
Indonesia’s average firm-size grew continuously during the New Order period; the 
share of employment in microenterprises dropped by half, there was a more than 
threefold growth of large enterprises, the share of small enterprises grew, but there was 
not much movement in the medium-sized bracket, which indicates a missing middle. 
Again, when comparing the firm-size distribution in employment shares without 
microenterprises in Figure 32 (in the Appendix) the share of small and medium-sized 
enterprise employment actually declined during the New Order and only marginally 
increased in the aftermath of the Asian Financial Crisis. However, a surprising 
observation from the comparison without microenterprises is that the respective shares 
of small, medium and large-sized enterprise employment in Indonesia in 1974/75 were 
relatively similar to those in South Korea in 1963 and Taiwan in 1961, when they were 
at comparable stages of economic development. But whereas the share of small firms 
dropped considerably in South Korea between 1963 and 1983 and Taiwan between 
1961 and 1981, the Indonesian share fluctuated only marginally between 1974 and 2006. 
Returning to the comparison of employment shares including microenterprises shown 
in Figure 9, Taiwan had an even smaller share in the microenterprise category than 
South Korea. Despite the considerable drop in microenterprise employment in 
Indonesia between 1974 and 1996, Indonesia’s employment share in this category 
remained much higher – roughly five times that of South Korea between 1973 and 1983 
(there is no data on firms with fewer than five employees in the South Korean 1963 





census). Medium-sized firms with 20-99 workers constituted a much higher share of 
manufacturing employment in Taiwan and South Korea between the 1960s and 1980s 







Indonesia: Calculated from BPS, 1974/75 Industrial Census, Jakarta: BPS; BPS, Economic Census (1986, 
1996), Jakarta: BPS. 
South Korea: Calculated from Economic Planning Board (EPB), Report and Mining and Manufacturing 
Census (1963, 1973, 1983), Seoul: EPB. 
Taiwan: Calculated from ROC, Executive Yuan, Directorate-General of Budget, Accounting and 
Statistics (DGBAS), 1973, The 1971 Industrial & Commercial Censuses of Taiwan and Fukien Area, Volume III, 
Taipei: Executive Yuan; 1961 and 1981 calculated from Republic of China, 1961-1981 in Makoto Abe 
and Momoko Kawakami, 1997, ‘A Distributive Comparison of Enterprise Size in Korea and Taiwan’, The 
Developing Economies, 35(4): 382-400, p. 386. 
Notes: 
* No data on the number manufacturing establishments with 1-4 workers in the South Korean 1963 
census (South Korea 1963 approximation based on relative ratios of small/medium/large 1963to 1973 & 
growth of number of establishments by firm-size category 63-73 and 73-83) 
* For Taiwan 1961&1971 the smallest category encompasses 1-3 workers and the second smallest 4-19 
workers instead of 1-4 and 5-19 workers respectively 
For a comparison excluding microenterprises see Appendix Figure 31.  
1974/75 1986 1996 1963** 1973 1983 1961* 1971* 1981
1-4 workers 5-19 workers 20-99 workers ≤100 workers 

















Indonesia: Calculated from BPS, 1974/75 Industrial Census, Jakarta: BPS; BPS, Economic Census (1986, 
1996, 2006), Jakarta: BPS; relative shares of medium and large enterprises for 1974/75 and 1986 
calculated from Albert Berry, Edgard Rodriguez and Henry Sandee, 2001, ‘Small and Medium Enterprise 
Dynamics in Indonesia’, Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies, 37(3): 363-384, Table 1, relative medium and 
large manufacturing Indonesian employment shares for 1996 calculated from Robert Rice and Irfan 
Abdullah, 2000, A Comparison of Small and Medium/Large Indonesian Manufacturing Enterprises from 1986 and 
1996 by Sector, Jakarta: Partnership for Economic Growth Project, USAID, (mimeo), Table 5. 
South Korea: Calculated from Economic Planning Board (EPB), Report and Mining and Manufacturing 
Census (1963, 1973, 1983), Seoul: EPB. 
Taiwan: ROC, Executive Yuan, Industrial & Commercial Censuses of Taiwan and Fukien Area (1961, 1971, 
1981), Taipei: Executive Yuan. 
Notes: 
* No data on the number manufacturing establishments with 1-4 workers in the South Korean 1963 
census (South Korea 1963 approximation based on relative ratios of small/medium/large 1963to 1973 & 
growth of number of establishments by firm-size category 63-73 and 73-83) 
* For Taiwan 1961&1971 the smallest category encompasses 1-3 workers and the second smallest 4-19 
workers instead of 1-4 and 5-19 workers respectively and have been recalculated here based on known 
shares of 1-9, 10-29 and 29-100 & average firm-sizes in 1971 and 1991  
** For Taiwan in 1981 the smallest categories are 1-9, 10-29 and 29-100 workers instead of 1-4, 5-19, and 
20-99 respectively 
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The comparison shows that both in terms of establishment as well as employment 
shares Indonesia had a very small middle and this did not change during the New Order 
period. However, the missing middle literature gives no clear definition of relative firm-
size ratios that constitute a missing middle. When looking at establishment shares 
Indonesia has a unimodal firm-size distribution, as does South Korea – despite its 
reputation for the strength of its large firms and conglomerates. Only Taiwan’s firm-size 
distribution differed, developing from a unimodal pattern towards a bloated middle. 
This observation is in line with Taiwan’s reputation of being an SME-based economy. 
When looking at employment shares, Indonesia’s firm-size distribution changed from a 
unimodal to a bimodal pattern between 1986 and 1996 when microenterprise 
employment continued to fall and large enterprise employment grew but the share of 
medium-sized employment remained roughly equal. It could be argued that this was to 
be expected as Indonesia was still a developing country at the time. Many developing 
countries have very many very small firms and few large firms.272 However, the 
comparison with South Korea and Taiwan at similar stages of economic development 
(using a fifteen year lag) did not support this argument. Both South Korea and Taiwan 
had a much larger average firm-size and faster growth in average firm-size as well as a 
greater decline in micro and small enterprise employment. The share of medium sized 
firms in employment and establishments in Indonesia was not just smaller than in 
Taiwan, known for the strength of its SMEs, but also those of South Korea. Indonesian 
average firm-size grew during the New Order period, but the data suggest that as it 
grew a missing middle emerged, which persisted in the aftermath of the Asian Financial 
Crisis. 
3.5 Role of SMEs in the Manufacturing Sector 
An analysis of SME development has to invariably delve deeper than just considering 
changes in number of establishments and share of employment. Their contribution to 
value added is a useful indicator to understand the importance of the respective firm-
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Institute for International Development, p. 31 and James Tybout, 2000, Manufacturing Firms in 
Developing Countries: How Well Do They Do, and Why?, Journal of Economic Literature, 38(1):11-44, p. 15. 





size category to the manufacturing sector and the economy as a whole. If what we 
expect to see from Snodgrass and Biggs’s findings happens, which is that as a country 
develops the typical manufacturing establishment changes from traditional household 
industry to a modern factory SME with more complex production lines, we would 
expect to see this reflected in increases in value added.273 
Figure 10 illustrates the absolute value added by firm-size group, summarised at 
the regional level. The data show that between 1974-1996 the absolute value added of 
household and cottage industries at constant prices was higher than the value added of 
small enterprises for Indonesia overall and in all regions (with the exception of Java in 
1996, when the value added contribution of household and cottage industries was only 
90 per cent of that of small enterprises).  However, the ratio between these two 
categories varied over time and between regions so that no clear trend is discernible. 
The only year for which the economic census data was disaggregated between medium 
and large enterprises was 2006, which shows that medium-sized manufacturing 
establishments constituted only a small share of total value added. However, these 
trends within the household, cottage and small industry and medium and large industry 
categories respectively are easily explained if we take into account the number of firms 
in each category.  
  
                                            
273 Donald R. Snodgrass and Tyler Biggs, 1996, Industrialization and the Small Firm: Patterns and Policies, San 
Francisco: International Centre for Economic Growth and the Harvard Institute for International 
Development, p. 51; Eugene Staley and Richard Morse, 1965, Modern Small Industry for Developing Countries, 
New York: McGraw-Hill, pp. 5-8, 14-25. 





Figure 10: Regional Manufacturing Value Added by Firm-Size Group and 
Region (billion IDR, 2006 prices), 1975-2006 
 
Sources: BPS, 1974/75 Industrial Census, Household & Cottage Industries, Jakarta: BPS; BPS, 1974/75 
Industrial Census, SSE Manufacturing (various provinces), Jakarta: BPS; 1986 Cottage industries and 
microenterprise VA calculated from BPS, 1986 Economic Census, Home Industry Statistics, Jakarta: BPS , 
Tables 24.1 & 24.2; BPS, 1986 Economic Census, Small Scale Manufacturing Industry Statistics, Jakarta: BPS; 
Medium and large enterprise VA from: BPS, 1974/75 Industrial Census, M&LE, Jakarta: BPS; BPS, 1996 
Economic Census, Household /Cottage Industry Statistics, Jakarta: BPS; BPS, 1996 Economic Census, Small Scale 
Manufacturing Industry Statistics, Jakarta: BPS; 
2006 own calculations using data from BPS, 2006 Economic Census, Micro and Smallscale Establishment: 
Manufacturing, Table 2.2 and from BPS, 2006 Economic Census, MLE Manufacturing Part 1, Tables 6 & 7. 
Notes: 2006 was the only year for which cottage industry and small enterprise could not be 
disaggregated;  
Deflator used was calculated from the GDP deflator reported in The World Bank, 2017, World 
Development Indicators, Washington, D.C.: The World Bank, GDP deflator (base year varies by country) 
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Breaking down the data to value added per worker for each firm-size category allows 
for an even more meaningful analysis of SME development and how their role in the 
economy changed. This step makes it possible to assess not only how the relative 
productivity of different firm-size categories changed over time but also how 
productivity varied for the same firm-size category between provinces.  When looking 
at the value added per worker in Figure 11 it is clear that the value added increased with 
increasing firm-size category for all Indonesian regions throughout the entire period 
from 1974 to 1996, meaning the larger the firm the higher the labour productivity. 
However, in the case of Bali during the entire period the value added per worker of its 
small enterprises lagged only marginally behind large enterprise productivity. This can 
be explained by the aforementioned strength of the Balinese artisan handicraft industry. 
The 2006 data, which disaggregates between medium and large enterprise value added, 
shows an unexpected exception to this pattern: medium and large enterprises 
performed almost equally well.274 The low productivity of micro and small enterprises 
relative to the starkly increasing value added of medium and large firms (with the 
exception of Bali) could be indicative of Arthur Lewis’ dual economy model, in which 
the modern (“capitalist”) sector, “which uses reproducible capital, and pays capitalists 
for the use thereof” is separate from the traditional (“subsistence”) sector, with lower 
worker productivity and characterised by not using reproducible capital. According to 
Lewis, as the country develops the modern sector expands and absorbs labour from the 
traditional sector until the labour surplus characteristic of underdeveloped economies 
disappears and wages increase above subsistence levels.275 Rotenberg et al argue that in 
this scenario the persistence of any kind of missing middle can be explained through 
Engel’s law. According to Rothenberg et al, this means that the low income traditional 
sector workers purchase the inferior goods produced by the traditional sector and only 
with rising incomes through economic development do preferences shift towards higher 
quality products produced by the modern sector. Demand then increases the size of the 
formal sector and labour shifts from the former to the latter.276 Rothengerg et al argue 
                                            
274 Own calculations based on BPS, 2006 Economic Census, MLE Manufacturing Part 1, Jakarta: BPS, Tables 
6 & 7. 
275 Arthur Lewis, 1954, ‘Economic Development with Unlimited Supplies of Labour’, Manchester School, 
22: 139-191, pp. 146-147, 152, 190. 
276Alexander Rothenberg, Arya Gaduh, Nicholas Burger, Charina Chazali, Indrasari Tjandraningsih, Rini 
Radikun, Cole Sutera and Sarah Weilant, 2016, ‘Rethinking Indonesia’s Informal Sector’, World 
Development, 80: 96-113, p. 98. 





that this exit of the informal sector signifies a shift from negative income elasticities of 
demand towards equilibrium.277  
  
                                            
277 Alexander Rothenberg, Arya Gaduh, Nicholas Burger, Charina Chazali, Indrasari Tjandraningsih, Rini 
Radikun, Cole Sutera and Sarah Weilant, 2016, ‘Rethinking Indonesia’s Informal Sector’, World 
Development, 80: 96-113, p. 111 (Note 6). 





Figure 11: Value Added per Employee by Region and Firm-Size Category, 1975-
2006 (million IDR, 2006 prices) 
 
Sources:  
1974/75: Own calculations based on data from BPS, 1974/75 Industrial Census, Household & Cottage 
Industries, Vol. I, Jakarta: BPS; BPS, 1975/75 Industrial Census, SSE Manufacturing (various provinces), 
Jakarta: BPS; BPS, 1974/75 Industrial Census, M&LE, Jakarta: BPS. 
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1986: Own calculations based on data from BPS, 1986 Economic Census, Home Industry Statistics, Jakarta: 
BPS, Tables 24.1 & 24.2; BPS, 1986 Economic Census, Small Scale Manufacturing Industry Statistics, Jakarta: 
BPS; BPS, 1986 Economic Census, Results of Establishment Listing (Final Figures) (various provinces) , Jakarta: 
BPS; BPS, 1986 Economic Census in Graphs, Jakarta: BPS, Table 3.1. 
1996: BPS, 1996 Economic Census, Household /Cottage Industry Statistics, Jakarta: BPS; BPS, 1996 Economic 
Census, Small Scale Manufacturing Industry Statistics, Jakarta: BPS; medium and large enterprise VA 
sources: BPS Kantor Statistik Propinsi Bengkulu, 1997, Statistik Industri Besar dan Sedang Propinsi Bengkulu 
1996, Bengkulu: BPS Kantor Statistik Propinsi Bengkulu; BPS Propinsi Sumatera Selatan, 1997, Statistik 
Industri Besar dan Sedang Propinsi Sumatera Selatan 1996, Palembangan: BPS Kantor Statistik Propinsi 
Sumatera Selatan; BPS Propinsi Jawa Tengah, 1998, Indikator Industri Besar dan Sedang Jawa Tengah / Large 
and Medium Manufacturing Industry Indicators [Central Java], Semarang: BPS Propinsi Jawa Tengah; BPS 
Kantor Statistik Propinsi NTT, 1997, Indikator Ekonomi Nusa Tenggara Timur 1996, Kupang: Kantor 
Statistik Propinsi Nusa Tenggara Timur, Table 6.3.2; BPS Propinsi Jambi, 2000, Jambi Dalam Angka/Jambi 
in Figures 1999, Jambi: BPS Propinsi Jambi, Tables VI.1.6&7; BPS Propinsi Kalimantan Selatan, 1999, 
Kalimantan Selatan Dalam Angka / Kalimantan Selatan in Figures 1999, Banjarbaru: BPS Propinsi Kalimantan 
Selatan, Tables 6.1.7&9; BPS Propinsi Irian Jaya, 1999, Irian Jaya Dalam Angka / Irian Jaya in Figures 1998, 
Jayapura: BPS Propinsi Irian Jaya, Table 6.1.4; BPS Propinsi Bali, 2001, Bali Dalam Angka/Bali in Figures 
2000, Denpasar: BPS Propinsi Bali, Table 6.1.7; BPS Propinsi D.I. Yogyakarta, 2001, Daerah Istimewa 
Yogyakarta Dalam Angka/Daerah Istimewa Yogyakarta in Figures 2000, Yogyakarta: BPS Propinsi D.I. 
Yogyakarta, Table 6.1.6; BPS Propinsi Riau, 2000, Riau Dalam Angka / Riau in Figures 2000, Pekanbaru: 
BPS Propinsi Riau, Table 6.1.8; BPS Propinsi DKI Jakarta, 2001, Jakarta Dalam Angka / Jakarta in Figures 
2000, Jakarta: BPS Propinsi DKI Jakarta, Table 6.1.6; BPS Propinsi Kalimantan Tengah, 2001, Kalimantan 
Tengah Dalam Angka (Kalimantan Tengah in Figures) 2000, Palangka Raya: BPS Propinsi Kalimantan Tengah, 
Table 6.1.5; BPS Propinsi Sulawesi Tengah, 2001, Sulawesi Tengah Dalam Angka (Sulawesi Tengah in Figures) 
2001, Palu: BPS Propinsi Sulawesi Tengah, Table VI.1.1; For Central Java,  Riau, West Sumatra, 
Southeast Sulawesi, East Kalimantan West Kalimantan, West Nusa Tenggara and Maluku, provincial 
shares in manufacturing value added were taken from Frederik Sjöholm, 2002, 'The challenge of 
combining FDI and regional development in Indonesia', Journal of Contemporary Asia, 32(3):381-393, 
Table 1 and used in conjunction with the Indonesia medium and large enterprise manufacturing value 
added total found in BPS, 1998 Statistik Indonesia / Statistical Yearbook, Jakarta: BPS; Southeast Sulawesi 
could only be roughly approximated based on performance in 1986, 2006 and relative to Household, 
Cottage and Small Industry Manufacturing as its share in VA was listed as 0.0% in Sjöholm.  
2006: Own calculations using data from BPS, 2006 Economic Census, Micro and Smallscale Establishment: 
Manufacturing, Jakarta: BPS, Table 2.2 and from BPS, 2006 Economic Census, MLE Manufacturing Part 1, 
Jakarta: BPS, Tables 6 & 7. 
Notes: Only year for which cottage industry and small enterprise could not be disaggregated; 
The exceptional performance of medium and large enterprise VA in Eastern Indonesia in 2006 was solely 









Figure 12 shows the relative shares of each firm-size bracket in total manufacturing 
value added in Indonesia compared to South Korea and Taiwan at a similar stage of 
economic development as Indonesia during the New Order period. The data show an 
overall decline in the contribution of large enterprises in South Korea and Taiwan, 
whereas their share increased in Indonesia, with the exception of 2006. Figure 13, 
Figure 14 and Figure 15 show the value added per worker by firm-size category in each 
country. It is in the value added per worker that the strength of Taiwanese SMEs 
becomes apparent; it is the only country out of the three in which micro and small 
enterprises had a value added per worker that is higher than that of medium enterprises. 
But also in South Korea micro and small enterprises had a higher value added per 
worker relative to large enterprises than in Indonesia. However, the value added per 
worker of medium relative to large enterprises was comparable between the three 
countries. This could be indicative of the existence of some kind of dual economy, in 
which Indonesian micro and small enterprises operated at subsistence level with low 
worker productivity and medium and large enterprises were part of the modern 
industrial sector.  
 
  





Figure 12: Comparison of Value Added by Firm-Size Category (in per cent) 
 
Sources:  
Indonesia: Calculated from BPS, 1974/75 Industrial Census Jakarta: BPS; BPS, Economic Census (1986, 
1996, 2006) Jakarta: BPS; relative shares of medium and large enterprises for 1974/75 and 1986 calculated 
from Albert Berry, Edgard Rodriguez and Henry Sandee, 2001, ‘Small and Medium Enterprise Dynamics 
in Indonesia’, Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies, 37(3): 363-384, Table 1; relative medium and large 
manufacturing Indonesian shares for 1996 calculated from Robert Rice and Irfan Abdullah, 2000, A 
Comparison of Small and Medium/Large Indonesian Manufacturing Enterprises from 1986 and 1996 by Sector, 
Jakarta: Partnership for Economic Growth Project, USAID, (mimeo), Table 5); relative shares for 
microenterprises and small enterprises in 2006 calculated from BPS, 2009 Statistik Indonesia Statistical 
Yearbook, Jakarta: BPS, Table 7.2.2. 
South Korea: Calculated from ROK, EPB, Report and Mining and Manufacturing Census (1963, 1973, 1983), 
Seoul: EPB. 
Taiwan: ROC, Executive Yuan, Directorate-General of Budget, Accounting and Statistics (DGBAS), 
1973, The 1971 Industrial & Commercial Censuses of Taiwan and Fukien Area, Taipei: Executive Yuan; 1981 
calculated from Republic of China, 1961-1981 in  Makoto Abe and Momoko Kawakami, 1997, ‘A 
Distributive Comparison of Enterprise Size in Korea and Taiwan’, The Developing Economies, 35(4): 382-
400, p. 386. 
Notes: 
* No data on the number of manufacturing establishments with 1-4 workers in the South Korean 1963 
census 
* For Taiwan in 1961 no data is available 
*For Taiwan in 1971 census the smallest category encompasses 1-3 workers and the second smallest 4-19 
workers instead of 1-4 and 5-19 workers respectively. 
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Figure 13: Value Added per Employee by Firm-Size Category in Indonesian 
Manufacturing, 1975-2006 (million IDR, 2006 prices) 
 
 
Sources: Calculated from BPS, 1974/75 Industrial Census, Jakarta: BPS; BPS, Economic Census (1986, 1996, 
2006), Jakarta: BPS; relative shares of medium and large enterprises for 1974/75 and 1986 calculated 
from Albert Berry, Edgard Rodriguez and Henry Sandee, 2001, ‘Small and Medium Enterprise Dynamics 
in Indonesia’, Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies, 37(3): 363-384, Table 1; relative medium and large 
manufacturing Indonesian shares for 1996 calculated from Robert Rice and Irfan Abdullah, 2000, A 
Comparison of Small and Medium/Large Indonesian Manufacturing Enterprises from 1986 and 1996 by Sector, 
Jakarta: Partnership for Economic Growth Project, USAID, (mimeo), Table 5; relative shares for 
microenterprises and small enterprises in 2006 calculated from BPS, 2009 Statistik Indonesia Statistical 
Yearbook, Jakarta: BPS, Table 7.2.2. 
 
Figure 14: Value Added per Employee by Firm-Size Category in Korean 
Manufacturing, 1963-83 (million won, 2010 constant prices) 
 
Sources: Calculated from Economic Planning Board (EPB), Report and Mining and Manufacturing Census 
(1963, 1973, 1983); Price deflator calculated from Bank of Korea, National Accounts from OECD Stats 
2018. 
Notes: *No data on the number manufacturing establishments with 1-4 workers in the South Korean 
1963. 






















Figure 15: Value Added per Employee by Firm-Size Category in Taiwanese 
Manufacturing, 1971 (thousand New Taiwan Dollars, 1971 current prices) 
 
Source: Calculated from The Committee of Industrial and Commercial Censuses of Taiwan and Fukien 
Area, 1973, The 1971 Industrial & Commercial Census Volume III, Taipei: Executive Yuan. 
Notes: For Taiwan the smallest category encompasses 1-3 workers and the second smallest 4-19 workers 




The next question that naturally emerges is whether the low value added of micro and 
small enterprises in Indonesia is a result of operating in different industrial subsectors. 
Figure 16 and Figure 17 show the Indonesian establishment and employment shares 
by firm-size group and industrial sub-sector respectively. The figures show that the 
majority of Indonesian manufacturing microenterprises were in light labour-intensive 
industries (food and tobacco, textiles, and wood products), while small enterprises were 
concentrated in the same three sectors with the addition of a stronger share in non-
metallic mineral products. The majority of medium-sized firms were in the same three 
sectors as micro and small enterprises. However, the presence of medium-sized firms in 
other sectors (with the exception of heavy industry) was much stronger. Amongst large 
firms nearly two thirds were in these light industries and a third in heavy and chemical 
industries, which naturally favours large enterprises because of their capital-intensity and 
economies of scale. It is notable that the relative shares of industrial sub-sectors did not 
change much for any firm-size category between 1986 and 2006.   
 Figure 18 shows the value added by firm-size group and industrial sub-sector 
and Table 16 the value added per worker. These results show that the previous finding, 
that value added per worker increases with each firm-size category, is not just the result 
of different-sized firms being concentrated in different industrial sub-sectors. The main 
caveat here is that the firm-size categories are very broad, however the broad 
categorisation of heavy versus light industries still holds. Table 16 clearly shows that the 
value added per worker increases with each firm-size category for every industrial sub-
sector. The only exception to this shown in the data here is the value added per worker 
in the basic metal industries (industrial classification major group 37) in 1996,  when 











medium-sized firms outperformed large firms in terms of value added per worker. A 
further breakdown of industrial subsectors (not shown here) revealed that this was due 
to the high value added that medium-sized firms had in 1996 in iron and steel basic 
industries.  Hidden by the broader categories is also the fact that in 2006 medium-sized 
firms had a higher value added per worker in two sub-categories of the fabricated metal 
products, machinery and equipment (38) sector as well as in recycling, summarised 
under “others” (39).278 This could be an indication that at least some medium-sized 
firms were beginning to exploit their advantages, i.e. breaking into niche markets. In 
general, however, these results show that the low productivity in smaller firm-size 
categories cannot be explained through concentration in different sub-sectors with 
inherent higher value added.  
  
                                            
278 The two sub-sectors were (1) Radio, television and communication equipment apparatus and (2) 
Medical, precision and optical instruments, watches and clocks. 





Figure 16: Industrial Sub-sector Shares of Establishment by Firm-Size Category 
and Industrial Classification Major Groups in Indonesia, 1986-2006 
 
Sources: BPS, Economic Census (1986, 1996, 2006), Jakarta: BPS. 
Notes: Based on old major industrial groups used in the 1986 and 1996 economic censuses. 
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Figure 17: Industrial Sub-sector Shares of Employment by Firm-Size Category in 
Indonesia, 1986-2006 
 
Sources: BPS, Economic Census (1986, 1996, 2006), Jakarta: BPS. 
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Sources: BPS, Economic Census (1986, 1996, 2006), Jakarta: BPS. 
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Table 16: Value Added per Worker by Firm-Size Group and Industrial Major Group in Indonesia, 1986-2006 (thousand IDR, 2006 prices) 
 
  1986 1996 2006 
Code Description Small MLE Micro Small Medium Large Micro Small Medium Large 
31 
Manufacture of food, beverages and 
tobacco 
11,808 62,121 5,487 9,236 37,048 123,978 7,045 18,179 44,121 138,833 
32 
Textile, wearing apparel and leather 
industry 
13,003 33,062 5,270 19,887 22,854 61,376 6,602 16,502 23,900 52,041 
33 
Manufacture of Wood and Wood 
Products, incl. furniture 
13,713 51,194 5,438 19,264 30,362 65,025 8,382 19,459 33,717 47,432 
34 
Manufacture of paper and paper 
products, printing and publishing 
29,413 55,516 14,178 23,067 44,106 164,673 14,859 30,440 96,116 221,166 
35 
Manufacture of chemicals and 
chemical, petroleum, coal, rubber 
and plastic products 
27,179 81,398 6,988 19,999 70,221 131,596 10,483 176,863 146,859 169,204 
36 
Manufacture of non-metallic mineral 
products (except petroleum and coal) 
8,887 66,689 6,240 9,604 32,583 127,782 8,748 16,693 30,784 132,079 
37 Basic Metal Industries - 442,567 16,336 18,784 1,668,456 900,533 18,246 51,017 244,268 317,266 
38 
Manufacture of fabricated metal 
products, machinery and equipment 
17,244 81,980 12,834 20,291 57,858 224,993 18,047 53,716 96,735 202,669 
39 Other manufacturing industries 13,145 34,124 10,766 15,334 28,002 49,959 16,457 33,941 102,448 82,894 
  TOTAL  13,177 62,672 5,934 14,176 48,619 119,023 8,126 22,534 56,375 119,104 
Sources: BPS, Economic Census (1986, 1996, 2006), Jakarta: BPS. 





3.6 Constraints faced by SMEs 
In the missing middle literature there are competing theories on which firm-size 
segments are disadvantaged in developing countries. The data collected from the 
Indonesian Economic Censuses helps shed light on what small enterprises identified as 
their main constraints and allow for an analysis of how these issues changed over time. 
Unfortunately, only the 2006 Economic Census contains comparable information on 
medium enterprises, but given the gap in medium-sized enterprises it is important to 
understand why small enterprises in Indonesia generally did not grow larger and into 
medium and eventually large enterprises. Table 17 shows how many small enterprises 
experienced difficulties in running their businesses and, if so, identified the main reason 
(listing each option as a share of the total number of establishments in each province 
and year). There are two caveats: the 1986 census permitted more than one answer for 
type of difficulty experienced, whereas the 1996 and 2006 census allowed for only one; 
second, the 2006 census reported the small enterprise results together with those for 
microenterprises. Both will be borne in mind in the interpretation of the results. 
The first clear trend in the data is that the number of small firms reporting 
difficulties steadily decreased between 1986 and 2006 everywhere in Indonesia.  One 
explanation could have been changing survey design, but looking at the questionnaires 
for each of the censuses reveals that the question asking about difficulties experienced 
remained quite similar. The 1986 Economic Census asked about “difficulties 
experienced by the entrepreneur/owner/business in running the establishment”.279 The 
1996 Economic Census changed the phrasing to “main obstacle experienced by the 
business over the past year”.280 The 2006 Economic Census asked “whether the 
                                            
279 BPS, 1986 Economic Census Small Industry Questionnaire (SE 86 32), Jakarta: BPS, Section X (Other 
Information), Question 6 (“Apakah perusahaan ini mengalami kesulitan dalam menjalankan usaha?”). 
280 BPS, 1996 Economic Census Small Scale Industry and Cottage Industries Questionnaire (SE 96-S03), Jakarta: 
BPS, Section IX (Constraints and Business Prospects), Question 3 (“Kendala utama yang dialami usaha 
ini selama setahun yang lalu (Oktober 1995 – September 1996)?”). 





business experienced any difficulties that year”.281 Possibly the relative decrease of type 
of difficulty reported holds the answer. 
The second noteworthy trend in the dataset is that there is a change in the type 
of main difficulty reported. As might be expected, lack of capital is the most often cited 
constraint. However, when comparing provinces over time the number of provinces 
reporting marketing difficulties as their main issue increased with each census. In 1986 
the majority of small firms in only four out of 26 provinces identified marketing issues 
as their main constraint, more significant than lack of capital. In 1996 this increased to 
six provinces and by 2006 there were 8 reporting marketing difficulties as their main 
problem. The latter is likely an underestimation because the 2006 data combines the 
results for micro and small enterprises; a comparison of the 1986 and 1996 small 
enterprise figures in Table 17 with the issues reported by microenterprises shown in 
Table 37 (Appendix) indicates that the 2006 results combining both firm-size 
categories are likely biased towards a stronger emphasis on lack of capital and 
underemphasize the lack of skill as a major constraint. This further strengthens the 
point that lack of capital, whilst remaining the most often identified main constraint, 
became increasingly second to the concern about lack of skills between 1986 and 2006. 
Particularly remarkable were the regional trends in Java and Kalimantan. Both islands 
showed a clear trend towards an increasing number of provinces in which the majority 
of small firms reported marketing difficulties as their main issue. Both islands also had 
the smallest share of firms highlighting problems due to a lack of capital in 1986 to 
2006. At first glance one could assume that firms on both islands had particular 
difficulty marketing their products, but that seems unlikely, at least in the case of Java, 
where population density was highest, and which also had the best developed 
infrastructure and communication networks. A deficit in these same factors, however, 
could account for marketing being particularly difficult for small firms in Kalimantan, 
which was the region with the lowest population density in all of Indonesia and was 
characterised by poor infrastructure. At least for Java it is conceivable that this trend 
was instead driven through improvements in access to capital. 
                                            
281 BPS, 2006 Economic Census Micro and Small Enterprise Questionnaire (SE06-UMK Produksi), Jakarta: BPS, 
Section VIII (Constraints and Business Prospects), Question 1(“Apakah usaha ini mengalami kesulitan 
selama tahun 2006?”). 





Table 18 reports constraints faced by medium-sized firms in 2006, the only year 
for which data on medium-sized firms are available. For medium-sized firms in 
Indonesia the main constraint was reported as marketing issues, followed by lack of 
capital. However, grouped into “other reasons” was a shortage of raw material, which 
was the most frequently reported main difficulty in Kalimantan and Sulawesi.  
 
Table 17: Main Difficulty faced by Small Firms as Share of Total Number of 
Establishments in that Firm-size Category and Province, 1986-2006 (in per cent) 












1986       
Java 22.2 77.8 29.4 27.6 7.3 13.5 
Sumatra 16.8 83.3 35.1 24.7 4.9 18.5 
Sulawesi 19.5 80.5 42.5 17.8 9.3 11.0 
Kalimantan 16.7 83.3 32.8 20.7 6.3 23.6 
Bali 19.6 80.4 32.2 20.1 6.9 21.2 
Eastern Indonesia 15.1 84.9 39.6 20.3 12.5 12.5 
INDONESIA 21.1 78.9 31.1 26.3 7.2 14.3 
1996       
Java 36.6 63.5 19.1 23.0 2.2 19.3 
Sumatra 27.9 72.1 30.8 24.6 2.1 14.6 
Sulawesi 39.2 60.8 32.9 14.1 2.6 11.3 
Kalimantan 35.3 64.7 23.4 19.8 2.4 19.2 
Bali 35.5 64.5 29.6 22.9 2.4 9.5 
Eastern Indonesia 33.4 66.6 35.1 13.2 2.8 15.4 
INDONESIA 35.3 64.7 22.5 22.2 2.2 17.8 
2006       
Java 49.2 50.8 14.6 17.0 0.9 18.4 
Sumatra 44.4 55.6 21.8 15.0 0.7 18.2 
Sulawesi 44.6 55.5 24.3 12.1 0.7 18.3 
Kalimantan 47.4 52.6 14.9 16.4 0.7 20.7 
Bali 43.8 56.2 17.1 25.7 0.6 12.9 
Eastern Indonesia 41.0 59.0 28.4 14.2 1.0 15.5 
INDONESIA 47.4 52.6 17.2 16.4 0.9 18.1 
Sources: BPS, 1986 Economic Census: Small Scale Manufacturing Industry Statistics, Jakarta: BPS; BPS, 1996 
Economic Census: Small Scale Manufacturing Industry Statistics, Jakarta: BPS; BPS, The 2006 Economic Census 
Results: Micro and Smallscale Establishments, Jakarta: BPS. 
Notes: Only one difficulty per enterprise in 1996 and 2006, multiple answers possible in 1986 (25,741 out 
of 69,114 enterprises reporting difficulty had named more than difficulty); the 2006 Economic Census 
figures are for both small-scale enterprises and microenterprises, small-scale enterprises constitute 9.57% 
of this joint group in all of Indonesia in 2006. 
  



















Java 54.9 45.1 8.3 11.2 1.4 8.8 
Sumatra 53.8 46.2 9.2 7.6 0.8 10.8 
Sulawesi 66.3 33.7 8.5 5.9 0.7 17.5 
Kalimantan 59.3 40.7 5.2 6.2 0.4 29.7 
Bali 61.1 39.0 10.3 13.9 2.4 7.9 
Eastern Indonesia 60.6 39.4 7.9 10.3 0.7 8.2 
INDONESIA 55.4 44.6 8.4 10.7 1.3 9.5 
Source: Calculated from BPS, The 2006 Economic Census Results: Medium and Large Establishment 
(Manufacturing), Jakarta: BPS, Table 10. 
Notes: The actual totals of type of difficulty are considerably lower than the total of firms which have 
experienced difficulties, it is not clear from the census why that is the case. 
 
3.7 Concluding Remarks 
The empirical analysis of Indonesia’s missing middle showed that it emerged and 
persisted during the New Order period while the country underwent a rapid industrial 
transformation. Indonesia’s economic development during this period is clearly visible 
in the drastic fall in relative number and employment shares of microenterprises and 
overall increasing average firm-size. However, the share of medium-sized firms 
increased only marginally. While small the share of small enterprises grew considerably. 
This indicates that the core issue is really the development of medium-sized firms. The 
large expansion of employment in large enterprises shows that Indonesia’s firm-size 
distribution during the New Order changed from being heavily skewed towards 
microenterprises to a missing middle. The comparison of Indonesia to South Korea and 
Taiwan at similar levels of economic development showed that both had a much higher 
share of medium-sized firms in terms of establishments as well as employment 
throughout the period of comparison. This suggests that Indonesia’s missing middle 
cannot be explained just by its economic development stage. 
However, this change at the national aggregate level did not occur everywhere in 
Indonesia. Java, Sumatra and Kalimantan clearly exhibit this pattern, moving towards a 
missing middle between 1975 and 1986, which then persisted. However, while Eastern 
Indonesia, Bali and Sulawesi experienced growth in average firm-size, their overall firm-





size distribution remained skewed towards microenterprises – with a weak middle (as 
the rest of the country), but combined with a much smaller presence of large 
enterprises. These latter three regions also contributed considerably less to the value 
added of the manufacturing sector in Indonesia than the former three throughout this 
period. This reflects how uneven industrial development was throughout Indonesia. 
Considering the question of the role SMEs played in the Indonesian economy, 
the comparison of value added per worker showed that productivity was considerably 
lower for smaller firms. This trend held when comparing value added per worker of 
different firm-size categories by industrial sub-sectors. In comparison, South Korean 
micro and small enterprises had a higher ratio of value added per worker relative to 
medium and large firms. In Taiwan micro, small and medium enterprises even had 
relatively similar value added per worker. The gap in Indonesia in medium-sized firms 
and low value added per worker of small firms could also be indicative of a dual 
economy, in which the domestic traditional sector and the modern larger firms produce 
different goods and serve different markets. The analysis of main constraints identified 
by small enterprises indicates that the main barriers to growth identified were lack of 
marketing opportunities and access to credit. Interestingly, access to credit as a main 
constraint for small enterprises decreased over time. The next chapter looks into this 
development, given that lack of capital is one of the most commonly assumed 
constraints to SME development.  
Extending the period of analysis to 2006 allowed an assessment of how the 
Indonesian manufacturing sector evolved in the aftermath of the Asian Financial Crisis. 
The comparison of Indonesian GDP per capita to South Korea and Taiwan showed 
that in 1996, at the end of the New Order period, Indonesia was roughly at the level of 
South Korea and Taiwan in the mid-1970s. In 2006 that was still the case and 
Indonesia’s gap behind these two Tiger economies had widened from twenty to thirty 
years. The firm-distribution reflected this stagnation, with little change between 1996 
and 2006. The total value added of large enterprises actually declined between 1996 and 
2006; large enterprises’ value added per worker remained at close to the same levels, 
while the value added per worker in micro, small and medium enterprises continued to 





grow.282 This shows that smaller firms weathered the crisis better than their larger 
counterparts. However, this conclusion comes with the caveat that these aggregates do 
not take net exits and entries into account. 
Placing the issue of Indonesia’s missing middle with medium-sized firms (rather 
than missing small and medium-sized firms) has important implications, given that most 
research on Indonesia’s small and medium enterprises actually focuses on small 
enterprises. This is understandable, given the difficulty of separating medium from large 
enterprise data in many official Indonesian government statistics, where they are 
grouped together, as well as the level of detail available in the Indonesian economic 
censuses for small manufacturing industry (for example surveys on difficulties faced in 
running businesses or which government programme they have received support from).  
                                            
282 The analysis of the changes of value added by industrial subsectors showed that the largest contributor 








Chapter 4: Access to Credit for Indonesian SMEs in the 20th 
Century: Bridging the Gap towards Financial Inclusion 
Lack of access to credit is one of the most commonly identified barriers to growth for 
SMEs worldwide, in particular in developing countries.283 The previous chapter on 
Indonesian manufacturing SMEs showed that lack of capital was the most commonly 
identified constraint to business development between 1986 and 2006. The findings also 
revealed that the share of firms identifying lack of capital as their main constraint 
declined during this period. This is likely to have several causes, among which the most 
obvious may be that access to finance improved for SMEs. Much has been written 
about microfinance in Indonesia.284 However, while SMEs face similar issues in terms of 
being unable to offer suitable collateral and fulfilling other requirements, SMEs tend to 
need larger loans than microenterprises, and hence require separate analysis.285 This 
chapter explores the development of access to credit for Indonesian SMEs. Little has 
been written about how the facilitation of access to credit has influenced SME 
development. There are ad hoc assessments of the importance of informal finance for 
SMEs, but what appears to be missing is a structural analysis of how access to credit for 
SMEs developed and how this shaped SME development.  
The first section analyses the development of general access to credit in the 
twentieth century and the share of small business credit therein. The evolution of small 
                                            
283 International Finance Corporation (IFC), 2013, Closing the Credit Gap for Formal and Informal 
Micro, Small, and Medium Enterprises, Washington, DC: IFC, p. 11 ; Alex Coad and Jagannadha P. 
Tamvada,  2008, ‘The Growth and Decline of Small firms in Developing Countries’, Papers on Economics 
and Evolution, 2008(#0808):1-33, pp. 3-4; Dennis Anderson, 1982, ‘Small Industry in Developing 
Countries: A Discussion of Issues’, World Development, 10(11): 913-948, p. 933; Bert Hoselitz, 1959, ‘Small 
Industry in Underdeveloped Countries’, The Journal of Economic History, 19(4):600-618, p. 614; Jong-Il You, 
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business credit in Indonesia can be traced back to the foundations laid by the Dutch in 
the late colonial period. In the early twentieth century, the Dutch government invested 
in developing a credit system for the indigenous population. District banks, village 
banks, village paddy banks and state pawnshops persisted and evolved during the 
twentieth century, continuing to provide financial services. It needs to be established to 
what extent the SME sector benefitted from these institutions. From the beginning of 
the New Order period in 1966 until the fall of oil prices in 1982 the Indonesian banking 
sector and credit market were tightly regulated, with state banks as the main actors. 
Thee Kian Wie described this fall in oil prices as “the post-oil boom shock”, to which 
the government responded with adjustment measures and policy reforms to restore 
macroeconomic stability and reduce the country’s dependence on oil and gas exports.286 
The section shows that financial sector deregulation of the 1980s led to a significant 
increase in private sector lending and a rise in small-scale business credit. However, 
when the majority of subsidised directed credit programmes for SMEs were phased out 
in 1990, the ratio of small-scale business to total credit continued to fall until the 
outbreak of the Asian Financial Crisis.  
The second section delves into the various credit schemes the Indonesian 
government introduced from the early 1970s to facilitate access to finance for small 
businesses. The general consensus in the literature is that these generally showed – at 
best – mixed results. Major issues across various schemes were low repayment rates, 
misuse of loans (for personal rather than business use) and overall ineffectiveness.287 
However, in stark contrast to the issues faced by these subsided credit schemes stands 
the success of the credit facility Kupedes (Kredit Umum Pedesaan, General Rural Credit), 
introduced through the Indonesian People’s Bank (BRI, Bank Rakyat Indonesia) in 
February 1984 as a market-based rural credit product. In comparison to subsidised 
programmes, Kupedes became financially viable within three years. Self-financed 
through deposits at attractive interest rates, it grew consistently and maintained its high 
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repayment rate even during the Asian Financial Crisis. The question here is how 
relevant was Kupedes for SMEs. This section discusses and compares the objectives, 
conditions, credit volume dispersed of the most important small business credit 
schemes, as well as more specific details regarding credit use by distinguishing between 
working and investment capital loans and sectoral distribution of credit allocation.  
 McLeod has shown that informal finance not only plays an important role in 
the early stages of economic development, but continues to evolve and take on a 
complementary role to formal financial institutions as the economy evolves.288 In a case 
study of Yogyakarta, McLeod demonstrated how small firms in particular rely on both 
forms of finance.289 However, the development of informal finance has already been 
extensively researched.290 In contrast, the role of state pawnshops in providing access to 
credit for small-scale businesses, which developed in the pre-Independence period and 
continued to evolve over the course of the twentieth century, has received very little 
attention. The third section therefore focuses on state pawnshops, which played an 
important role in Indonesia, very different from in Western countries. The Dutch 
colonial authorities declared a state monopoly on pawnshops in the early twentieth 
century to limit the influence of Chinese moneylenders whose interest rates and 
business practices were perceived as exploitative.291 Beyond their common role as a 
lender in times of need, state pawnshops also constituted a source for working and 
investment capital for many entrepreneurs.292 This section builds on the work of van 
Laanen, who analysed the emergence of the people’s credit system in colonial Indonesia 
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in great detail, and expands the dataset to cover the entire twentieth century.293 By 
expanding the dataset this chapter shows how long it took for some of these institutions 
established under the Dutch to recover and regain their pre-independence levels of 
lending in real terms. For state pawnshops recovery to 1938-levels of outstanding loans 
took until 1960; village banks only reached the same levels in the early 1990s. 
The subsequent section on financing and access to credit of Indonesian 
manufacturing SMEs ties this chapter with the preceding chapter; using the same 
economic census data I analyse how many firms actually accessed these different credit 
schemes and how this has evolved over time. Finally, the analysis of access to credit for 
Indonesian SMEs is put into context by taking a comparative perspective on credit 
access in South Korea and Taiwan.  
Methodologically this chapter traces the development of overall credit volume 
and small credit programmes using the Indonesian Central Statistical Office’s Annual 
Statistical Yearbooks and Bank Indonesia’s Annual Reports. BRI is the main source for the 
Kupedes data. In section three this chapter links the evolution of small business credit 
to the findings of the preceding chapter, by using Economic Census data to investigate 
how manufacturing SMEs were financed and how many actually accessed the various 
SME credit schemes. The main sources to track the development of state pawnshops 
are the Central Statistical Office’s Statistical Yearbooks and Bank Indonesia’s Annual 
Reports, which note development on activities such as number of offices, total loans 
extended, loans redeemed and loans outstanding as well as repayment period and 
interest rates. 
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4.1 General Access to Credit 
4.1.1 Credit during the Late Colonial Period 
A key development in providing general access to credit in Indonesia dates back to the 
early twentieth century; one of the important colonial legacies of the Dutch was 
establishing a credit system geared towards the indigenous population with the goal to 
provide cheap credit by minimising costs, which was developed from the 1900s 
onwards. The ethical colonial policy proclaimed by Queen Wilhelmina in 1901 
identified the development of a low-cost popular credit system that provided cheap 
credit as a main objective, at the same time minimising the costs of doing so.294  The 
formal credit market that initially formed under Dutch colonial rule mainly served 
European clients. The formal credit market was also readily available for larger Chinese 
trading firms, whilst other non-Europeans and the indigenous population relied mostly 
on the informal credit market.295 One of the institutions introduced as part of this 
development was state pawnshops. These pawnshops are particularly interesting here, 
given that beyond their common role as a lender in times of need, they were a source of 
start-up capital for many entrepreneurs. 
There were two important sources for informal credit: traders who provided 
credit under the ijon system and itinerant travelling credit providers, the mindering Chinees 
(literally, instalment Chinese).296 Under the ijon system traders would extend credit up to 
the expected value of the harvest (traditionally rice). Repayment would not only be in 
agricultural produce, but also in commodities such as processed food products and 
handicrafts or even labour. In particular in its latter form the system could lead to debt 
bondage and thus was met with strong criticism and government regulations outlawing 
the practice (though there is evidence of its continued practice well into the 1970s).297 
The majority of these traders were small shopkeepers, many of whom were Chinese, 
                                            
294 Heiko Schrader, 1997, Changing Financial Landscapes in India and Indonesia: Sociological Aspects of 
Monetization and Market Integration, Hamburg: LIT, p. 213. 
295 Alexander Claver, 2014, Dutch Commerce and Chinese Merchants in Java: Colonial Relationships in Trade and 
Finance, 1800-1942, Leiden: Brill, p. 264. 
296 Anne Booth, 1998, The Indonesian Economy in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries: A History of Missed 
Opportunities, Basingstoke: Macmillan and New York: St. Martin’s Press, pp. 301-2. 
297 Ace Partadireja, 1974, ‘Rural Credit: The Ijon System’, Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies, 10(3): 54-
71, pp. 54-5, 63. 
Chapter 4: Access to Credit for Indonesian SMEs in the 20th Century 
 
 144 
who often worked with indigenous middlemen. The traders borrowed their working 
capital from importers and wholesale dealers in commercial areas and ports. The 
mindering Chinees travelled to villages and market places to collect their capital and 
interest in small instalments. These mindering Chinees usually lent out very small sums at 
high nominal interest rates and in turn drew their own capital borrowing from affluent 
Chinese.298 This business practice was later forbidden during Japanese rule and thus 
“virtually disappeared”.299 This reflects the important historic role Sino-Indonesians 
played in the supply of credit to the indigenous population.  
The movement to establish a popular credit system at the turn of the nineteenth 
to the twentieth century was in part motivated by the aim of limiting the growing 
economic power of the Chinese.300  The growth of the credit volume supplied by the 
different institutions of the popular credit system established by the Dutch colonial 
government is illustrated in Figure 19. By 1903, the system worked as follows: priyayi 
banks, which were later to become the volksbanken or afdeelingsbanken (district banks), 
oversaw both lumbung desa (village paddy banks) and bank desa (village money banks). 
The district banks primarily lent to officials, merchants, wealthier farmers and also 
Europeans in areas to which the existing colonial credit system had not yet been 
extended. The district banks received generous initial support from the state. They also 
soon started attracting funds from the first local cash credit institutions (e.g. the village 
banks, which provided credit in the form of currency, unlike the village paddy banks), as 
well as deposits from European settlers. The village paddy banks lent in kind to 
cultivators, who used the rice either for consumption or as seed and repaid in kind after 
the next harvest. The village banks evolved after 1904, providing small short-term 
credit, often to be repaid in ten instalments. Their primary customers were small traders 
and craftsmen looking for working capital credit.301 By 1912 this system had grown to 
comprise 75 district banks, 12,424 paddy banks and 1,336 village banks.302  
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Figure 19 shows a decline in lending after 1929 and an accelerating drop in loans 
outstanding after 1931. This pattern corresponds to Boomgard’s analysis of the 
depression in Southeast Asia, which shows that while Indonesia was affected by the 
spread of the Great Depression in late 1929, which coincided with a severe drought, 
initially this was “little more than a traditional slump” and that in fiscal terms “1931 was 
Indonesia’s first depression year”.303 However, not all popular credit institutions were 
affected the same way. Sumitro’s PhD thesis on the impact of the depression on the 
popular credit system shows that village paddy banks were affected far less by this credit 
slump, because they received repayments in kind.304  
  
                                                                                                                           
Subsidy and Market: Adjustment of Village Units of Bank Rakyat Indonesia in Sociological Perspective, Leiden: 
Faculty of Social Sciences, Leiden University, p. 46; Jan T.M. van Laanen, 1990, ‘Between the Java Bank 
and the Chinese Moneylender: banking and Credit in Colonial Indonesia’, in: Anne Booth, W.J. O’Malley 
and Anna Weidemann (Eds.), Indonesian Economic History in the Dutch Colonial Era (pp. 244-266), New 
Haven: Yale University Southeast Asia Studies, p. 259; Anne Booth, 1998, The Indonesian Economy in the 
Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries: A History of Missed Opportunities, Basingstoke: Macmillan and New York: 
St. Martin’s Press, p. 303. 
302 Leo Schmit, 1994, A History of the “Volkscredietwezen” (Popular Credit System) in Indonesia (1895-1935), The 
Hague: Development Cooperation Information Department of Foreign Affairs, p. 7. 
303 Peter Boomgaard, 2000, ‘Surviving the Slump: Developments in Real Income During the Depression 
of the 1930s in Indonesia, Particularly Java’, in: Peter Boomgaard and Ian Brown (Eds.), Weathering the 
Storm: The Economies of Southeast Asia in the 1930s Depression, Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 
pp. 24-26. 
304 Sumitro Djojohadikusumo, 1943, Het volkscredietwezen in de Depressie [The People’s Credit System in the 
Depression], Haarlem: Bohn, pp. 122-125. 
Chapter 4: Access to Credit for Indonesian SMEs in the 20th Century 
 
 146 
Figure 19: Credit Volume of the People's Credit System in Colonial Indonesia, 
1910-40 (in million guilders) 
Source: Data from CEI, Volume 6, 1980, Changing Economy in Indonesia: A Selection of Statistical Source 
Material from the Early 19th Century up to 1940, Volume 6, Money and Banking 1816-1940 (edited by Peter 
Boomgaard and Jan T.M. van Laanen), The Hague: Nijhoff; Village paddy bank data from Jan T.M. van 
Laanen, 1990, ‘Between the Java Bank and the Chinese Moneylender: banking and Credit in Colonial 
Indonesia’, in: Anne Booth, W.J. O’Malley and Anna Weidemann (Eds.), Indonesian Economic History in the 
Dutch Colonial Era (pp. 244-266), New Haven: Yale University Southeast Asia Studies, p. 260. 
Notes: See Appendix Table 38 for underlying data. 
 
Another credit institution established under the Ethical Policy that requires a closer 
look is state pawnshops.305 Figure 19 illustrates the role of state pawnshops in 
providing domestic credit. The comparison shows that total loans outstanding of state 
pawnshops were larger than those of district banks, village paddy banks and village 
money banks combined in the entire late colonial period. Concluding that the interest 
rates and general business practices of Sino-Indonesian moneylenders were ‘exploiting’ 
the credit needs of the indigenous population, the Dutch colonial government began 
establishing state pawnshops in 1901. These pawnshops provided credit not only in 
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times of hardship but also for working capital and investment.306 The growth of 
pawnshops as well as their profitability (and thus financial self-sufficiency) is highlighted 
in Table 19. In 1903 the government declared a state monopoly on pawnshops in Java 
and Madura, but only extended this to the Outer Islands in 1921.307  
 
Table 19: State Pawnshops in the Netherland Indies, 1901-1930 






1901 1,000 .04 .08 n/a 
1905 23,000 1.79 2.96 2.47 
1910 165,000 15.16 20.78 20.88 
1915 313,000 34.64 75.90 66.22 
1920 360,000 35.79 136.52 124.43 
1925 398,000 47.92 166.25 149.06 
1930 453,000 51.55 194.14 174.75 
Source: John S Furnivall, 1934, ‘State pawnshops in Netherlands India’, in: Studies in the Social and 
Economic Development of the Netherlands East Indies, III, University of Rangoon, p. 12 (Appendix);  
‘Loans repaid’ from CEI, Volume 6, 1980, Changing Economy in Indonesia: A Selection of Statistical Source 
Material from the Early 19th Century up to 1940, Volume 6, Money and Banking 1816-1940 (edited by Peter 
Boomgaard and Jan T.M. van Laanen), The Hague: Nijhoff, Table 7. 
Notes: Transactions refers to number of pawns (million pawns); advances refer to sums lent (million 
guilders): loans repaid. 
 
The credit volume of all these popular credit institutions dropped in the post-colonial 
period.  However, state pawnshops, village and paddy banks did continue to play a role 
in rural credit supply well into the late twentieth century, as shown in this chapter.  
4.1.2 Access to Credit during the Early Post-Independence Years 
Under President Sukarno (1945-1967) Indonesia’s first independent government 
embarked on the task of transforming the former Dutch colony into a national 
economy. Within this process two major shifts in government policy occurred, which 
                                            
306 Anne Booth, 1998, The Indonesian Economy in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries: A History of Missed 
Opportunities, Basingstoke: Macmillan and New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1998, pp. 302-4; Leonardus T. 
Schmit, 1991, Rural Credit Between Subsidy and Market: Adjustment of Village Units of Bank Rakyat Indonesia in 
Sociological Perspective, Leiden: Faculty of Social Sciences, Leiden University, p. 56; George McTurnan 
Kahin, 2003, Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia, Ithaca, NY: Cornell Southeast Asia Program, p. 2; CEI, 
Volume 6, 1980, Changing Economy in Indonesia: A Selection of Statistical Source Material from the Early 19th 
Century up to 1940, Volume 6, Money and Banking 1816-1940 (edited by Peter Boomgaard and Jan T.M. van 
Laanen), The Hague: Nijhoff, p. 42. 
307 Heiko Schrader, 1997, Changing Financial Landscapes in India and Indonesia: Sociological Aspects of 
Monetization and Market Integration, Hamburg: LIT, p. 218. 
Chapter 4: Access to Credit for Indonesian SMEs in the 20th Century 
 
 148 
had a large impact on general credit allocation. The first was a shift towards increasing 
nationalism and the second a growing hostility towards private capitalism. The 
culmination of both was the nationalisation of Dutch enterprises and banks.308 The 
takeover of Dutch enterprises began in December 1957, though legal ownership was 
transferred only in 1959. De Javaasche Bank (the Java Bank) was nationalised in 1951, and 
in 1953 renamed Bank Indonesia – Indonesia’s central bank. By 1957 the Dutch lost 
their dominance in Indonesian commercial banking, and in early 1960s the remaining 
Dutch banks were all nationalised.309 This had a more general impact on credit 
allocation in terms of favouring public over private and national over foreign 
enterprises. As the banking system became increasingly dependent on central bank 
finance, and with the growing role of political influence over credit allocation, these 
preferences became significant determinants.310 
The shift towards growing nationalism also found expression in attempts to 
foster indigenous entrepreneurship. In a 1951 memorandum Bank Indonesia 
emphasized the need to promote Indonesian economic emancipation and support weak 
indigenous entrepreneurship. The number of loan applications by indigenous 
Indonesian private entrepreneurs quickly rose.311 In April 1950 the Government 
introduced the Benteng (Fortress) Programme, which restricted import licenses for 
certain commodities to indigenous importers. As part of these efforts, indigenous 
importers were given cheap access to easy credit.312 The share of foreign-exchange 
credit distributed through the Benteng programme was initially quite substantial: Benteng 
importers received 37 per cent in 1953, which more than doubled to 76 per cent in 
1954.313 After the end of the Korean War boom Indonesian foreign-exchange reserves 
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declined sharply.314 However, the programme became renowned for widespread 
corruption, rent-seeking and its general ineffectiveness. Rather than fostering a strong 
indigenous business class, the programme had strengthened “a group of socially 
unproductive rent-seekers” by the time it was abandoned in the late 1950s.315 Robison 
found that small-scale traders were at a particular disadvantage because they usually 
lacked the political connections to those in charge of allocating credit (and licenses), as 
well as a growing reluctance of the Government to grant subsided loans, which they 
needed to meet the working capital requirement of at least IDR100,000 to qualify for 
Benteng.316 
From independence Indonesia suffered from rampant inflation, but by the early 
1960s prices began to grow faster than the expansion of money supply and by 1965 
accelerated into hyperinflation.317 Little statistical information exists on banking during 
the early post-independence period. Arndt ascribed this situation to “one of the by-
products of monetary mismanagement, the almost complete suppression after 1960 of 
official financial statistics and accounts”.318 Moreover, Higgins was already discussing 
the unreliability of official statistics of the Indonesian economy in the mid-1950s as a 
widely acknowledged issue.319  However, Arndt has published extensively on banking 
during this period using unpublished central bank data.320 He found that hyperinflation 
reinforced two trends: first, Indonesia had inherited a characteristically colonial banking 
system, geared towards providing short-term credit for trade. Second was the 
aforementioned increasing role of political influence, with a preference for public over 
private and national over foreign enterprise. Hyperinflation reinforced both, 
strengthening the power of “political controllers of the central bank” while increasing 
the cost of credit. As a result private sector credit was increasingly diverted to 
speculative activities. 321 This left the majority of private firms starved of formal credit 
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(those without personal connections to bank officials and thus access to subsidised 
credit).322 Much like under colonial rule, most domestic industry continued to depend 
on informal finance.323 
4.1.3 General Access to Credit during the New Order Period  
Commercial banking during the New Order period can be grouped into three policy 
phases. The first phase from 1966-1982 was characterised by a tightly regulated credit 
market with state banks as the main actors. The 1966 Credit Policy stipulated how much 
credit was to be allocated to specific sectors as well as the minimum share of all credit 
that was to be given to the public sector (including cooperatives).324 In the early 1970s 
the government introduced 32 liquidity credit programmes. In 1982 state banks held 80 
per cent of total bank assets while the share of private domestic banks in total bank 
assets had fallen from 25 per cent in 1968 to 12 per cent in 1982.325 Figure 20 shows 
that credit to the private non-financial sector as a share of GDP decreased during this 
first phase and only started to increase with the deregulation following the falling oil 
prices in 1982. The shift towards export orientation and liberalisation of the early 1980s 
was accompanied by financial sector reforms, which removed credit ceilings and interest 
rate controls.326 This second phase from 1983-1989 was characterised by financial sector 
deregulation and the rise of private sector lending. Issuing new banking licenses had 
been suspended since the early 1970s and was only reopened with the deregulation 
policy package known as Pakto 88 (Paket Oktober 1988, Policy Package October 1988). 
With Pakto 88 a commercial bank could be set up with a minimum start-up capital of 
IDR 10 billion (USD 6 million) and a private rural bank with a start-up capital of IDR 
50 million (USD 30,000).327 The objective of the deregulation package was to expand 
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Report for The Years 1960-1965, Jakarta: Bank Indonesia, pp. 281-2. 
325 Detlev Holloh, 2001, ProFI Microfinance Institutions Study, Denpasar: Bank Indonesia & German 
Technical Cooperation (GTZ), p. 40. 
326 Bank Indonesia, 1983, Annual Report 1983/1983, Jakarta: BI, p. 9. 
327 USD equivalents in this chapter are calculated with the annual average exchange rate in Appendix 
Figure 33. 
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banking services and encourage competition between banks generally, but particularly to 
modernise and improve the outreach of the rural financial system.328 However, directed 
credit programmes still played a major role in this phase. It was not until the third 
phase, beginning in 1990, that we see the end of subsidised directed credit programmes. 
In 1990 the government phased out all but four subsidised directed credit lending 
programmes.329 The restructuring of the banking sector during this period has been 
referred to as ‘a watershed in the relationship between the state and private banking 
sectors’.330  With the 1992 Banking Law, banking legislation was simplified and became 
more standardised: it reduced the type of banks from four to two: commercial banks 
(bank umum) and rural banks or, more correctly, people’s credit banks (bank perkreditan 
rakyat). Indonesia’s seven state-owned banks were brought under a single set of 
legislation and turned into state-owned liability companies, while Bank Indonesia 
focused its efforts on strengthening its supervisory capacities.331 Between March 1988 
and December 1996 the number of private national banks increased from 67 to 164 
(145 per cent increase) and their number of branches from 546 to 3,964 (626 per cent 
increase), compared to state banks, which remained seven and expanded their branches 
from 835 to 1,379, by only 65 per cent.332 Figure 20 shows that with these changes 
credit dispersed by domestic banks to the private non-financial sector relative to GDP 
accelerated until the Asian Financial Crisis hit Indonesia in late 1997. 
                                            
328 Bank Indonesia, 2007, Sejarah Bank Indonesia, Bagian Tiga: Perbankan - Sejarah Perbankan Periode 1983-
1997, Jakarta: Unit Khusus Museum Bank Indonesia, pp. 2-3, 6. 
329 Bank Indonesia, 1990, Report for the Financial Year 1989/1990, Jakarta: Bank Indonesia, p. 16. 
330 Detlev Holloh, 2001, ProFI Microfinance Institutions Study, Denpasar: Bank Indonesia & German 
Technical Cooperation (GTZ), p. 41. 
331  Act No. 7 of 1992 concerning Banking (State Gazette of the Republic of Indonesia Year 1992 
Number 31, Supplementary to State Gazette of Republic of Indonesia Number 3472), Article 5(1); 
Michael Bennett, 1995, ‘Banking Deregulation in Indonesia’, University of Pennsylvania Journal of Business 
Law, 16(3):443-481, pp. 450-451; Bank Indonesia, 1993, Report for the Financial Year 1992/93, Jakarta: 
Bank Indonesia, p. 9. 
332 For underlying data from bank Indonesia’s Monthly Statistics see Detlev Holloh, 2001, ProFI 
Microfinance Institutions Study, Denpasar: Bank Indonesia & German Technical Cooperation (GTZ), p. 41. 
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Figure 20: Credit by Domestic Banks to Private vs Public Sector, 1976-2006 
(share of GDP) 
 
Sources: Data on credit to private non-financial sector from Bank for International Settlements, Total 
Credit to Private Non-Financial Sector, Adjusted for Breaks, for Indonesia [QIDPAM770A], retrieved from 
FRED, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis; https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/QIDPAM770A, February 7, 
2019; Data on credit to government and SOEs from World Bank, Credit to Government and State-Owned 
Enterprises to GDP for Indonesia [DDEI08IDA156NWDB], retrieved from FRED, Federal Reserve Bank of 
St. Louis; https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/DDEI08IDA156NWDB, February 7, 2019. 
Notes: Share of GDP, not seasonally adjusted. 
 
However, the question remains as to how far this credit expansion benefitted SMEs. 
Figure 21 illustrates the volume of credit small-scale businesses received relative to total 
credit dispersed. Between 1974 and 1995 Bank Indonesia’s Annual Reports included 
‘credits to economically weak groups’, which included various small-scale business 
lending schemes. Credit to this group began to fall in 1990, when the majority of these 
programmes were phased out and replaced by a 20 per cent lending quota of banks to 
small-scale businesses (small-scale credit in the figure). While total credit was expanding 
drastically in the 1990s up until the Asian Financial Crisis, small-scale business credit 
remained relatively stable. Figure 22 shows that the ratio of small-scale business credit 
relative to total credit actually fell between 1990 and 1998. In the aftermath of the Asian 
Financial Crisis, the banking crisis led to a severe credit crunch. However, credit to 
small-scale businesses continued to rise in the period of post-crisis economic recovery, 
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(with Bank Indonesia Regulation 3/2/PBI/2001). This was in part due first to the 
continued strength of the BRI microbanking units and of the People’s Credit Banks 
(BPR), and next to the transformation of BRI, after its restructuring in 2000, into an 
SME bank, including micro, small commercial and medium enterprise divisions.  
Figure 21 shows the dramatic effect of the Asian Financial Crisis, with small-scale 
credit returning to pre-crisis levels in 2003, while total credit only returned to the level 
of the late 1980s. Therefore the increasing ratio of small-scale and MSME to total credit 
after the crisis is only partly driven by small-scale business credit expansion but also by 
the fall in overall credit. 
 
Figure 21: Small-scale and Total Credit Outstanding, 1973-2006 (trillion IDR, 
2006 prices) 
 
Source: Calculated from data from Bank Indonesia, Annual Reports (various years), Jakarta: BI. 
Notes: MSME stands for micro, small and medium-sized credit, encompassing loans up to IDR 5 billion 
No data for small-scale credit lending in 2004;  
“Credit to economically weak group” is a term used in Bank Indonesia’s Annual Reports between 1974 and 
1995, which included various subsidised directed lending programmes as well as BRI’s Kupedes (for a full 
list see Appendix Table 45). 
Deflator used was calculated from the GDP deflator reported in The World Bank, 2017, World 
Development Indicators, Washington, D.C.: The World Bank, GDP deflator (base year varies by country) 
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Figure 22: Small-scale to Total Credit Ratios (in per cent) 
 
Source: Calculated from data from Bank Indonesia, Annual Reports (various years), Jakarta: BI.  
Notes: No data for MSME lending in 2004. 
 
 
The next section disentangles these various small-scale business lending programmes 
and their different fates.  
4.2 The Evolution of Small Credit Programmes in Indonesia 
From the 1970s onwards various credit schemes targeting SMEs for the provision of 
smallholder credit were introduced, with mixed results. Between 1974 and 1995 small 
credit was predominantly disbursed through programme credits. In the Bank Indonesia 
Annual Reports this is grouped into ‘credits for the economically weak group’.333 The 
government’s second five-year development plan for 1974/75-1978/79 (Repelita II) 
prioritised the need to support ‘weaker economic groups’ to enable catch-up and 
thereby strengthen the national private sector. Much of the rhetoric focussed on 
strengthening indigenous entrepreneurship, which was equated with these ‘weaker 
economic groups’ and regarded as needing support in order to balance the strength of 
                                            
333 See Appendix Table 45 for an overview of how rapidly these programmes expanded. These included 
the programmes discussed in this chapter such as KIK/KMKP, Kredit Mini, Kredit Midi and 
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large-scale foreign and national private companies.334 Repelita II identified multiple 
channels in order to provide more opportunities for SMEs to increase and expand their 
business: providing access to capital and credit, marketing assistance, skill development, 
technology promotion, and supporting cooperatives.335 In order to strengthen the 
capital base of indigenous small businesses the Indonesian government introduced a 
number of credit schemes (see Table 20). 
  
                                            
334 Republik Indonesia, 1974, Rencana Pembangunan Lima Tahun Kedua 1974/75 – 1978/79 [Second Five-
Year Development Plan], Jakarta: Departemen Penerangan R.I. [Ministry of Information, Republic of 
Indonesia], Book 1, Chapter 5, pp. 142-3,152-3. 
335 Republik Indonesia, 1974, Rencana Pembangunan Lima Tahun Kedua 1974/75 – 1978/79 [Second Five-
Year Development Plan], Jakarta: Departemen Penerangan R.I. [Ministry of Information, Republic of 
Indonesia], Chapter 5, pp. 165-7. 
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Table 20: Key Indonesian Small Credit Lending Programmes and Products in 
Comparison 
 Loan size Interest rate Maturity 
KIK  
(introduced in 1973 to 
assist indigenous small 
enterprises engaged in 
labour-intensive activities) 
IDR 5 million max. 
(no minimum) 
(USD 12,000) 
12% p.a. 5 years 
KMKP  
(introduced in 1973 to 
assist small enterprises) 
IDR 5 million max. 
(no minimum) 
(USD 12,000) 
15% p.a. 3 years 
Kredit Mini 
(introduced in 1974 to 
support off-farm activities 
of  small businesses 
particularly in rural 
areas, which did not 
qualify for KIK/KMKP) 
IDR 10,000 – 
100,000 
(USD 24 - 240) 
12% p.a. for 
investment capital 
15% p.a. for working 
capital 
3 years for 
investment capital 
1 year for working 
capital 
1 season for 
agricultural purposes 
Kredit Midi 
(introduced in 1981 to 
serve those small 
businesses too large for 
Kredit Mini and too 
small for KIK/KMKP) 
IDR 200,000 – 
500,000 
(USD 320 - 800) 
 
10.5% p.a.  
Kupedes 
(introduced in 1984 to 
provide credit to 
creditworthy small 
borrowers for general 
purposes to cover 
investment, working 
capital and trade needs) 
IDR 25,000 – 1 
million 
(USD 25 – 1,000) 
1.5% p.m. on the 
original balance for 
working capital336 
1.0% p.m. for 
investments loans 
Max. 24 months for 
working capital 
Max. 36 months for 
investment loans 
KUK  
(introduced in 1990 to 
foster small-scale business 
development) 
Up to IDR 200 
million 
(USD 110,000) 
Terms and conditions beyond qualifying asset criteria 
were to be determined by banks themselves 
Source: Bank Indonesia, Annual Reports (various years), Jakarta: BI.  
Notes: USD equivalents calculated with annual exchange rate at the year of programme introduction, see 
Appendix Figure 33 for exchange rate; 
Loan sizes, interest rates and credit ceilings at time of introduction of loan programme/product; 
For subsequent changes see Appendix Table 42 (KUK), Table 43 (KIK) and Table 44 (KUK);  
The minimum loan size of Kupedes remained unchanged, but the maximum was gradually increased to 
IDR 100 million (USD 11,000) (see BRI, 2008 Annual Report, Jakarta: BRI, p. 76); smaller Kupedes loans 
continued to be charged at a 1.5% monthly flat rate on the original balance, but the rate was gradually 
decreased for larger loans to 1.2-1.5% p.m. for loans between IDR 3-5 million and 1.2% p.m. for loans 
≥IDR 5 million. The latter being equivalent to a declining rate of ca. 26 %; see BRI, 1996, BRI Unit 
Products, Jakarta: BRI International Visitor Program, p. 7. 
                                            
336 This translated into a declining balance rate of roughly 32% on a 12-month loan, if all payments were 
made on time - BRI, 1996, BRI Unit Products, Jakarta: BRI International Visitor Program, p. 6. 
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KIK (Kredit Investasi Kecil, small-scale investment credit) / KMKP (Kredit Modal Kerja 
Permanen, permanent working capital credit) were both rolled out in January 1974 to 
finance indigenous small firms in need of investment/working capital for labour-
intensive activities.337 In the same year Kredit Mini (mini credit) was introduced, to 
provide credit for off-farm economic activities to small-scale rural businesses which did 
not qualify for financing under KIK/KMKP.338 Kredit Mini was complemented by 
Kredit Midi in 1980, which was introduced to fill the gap for those rural entrepreneurs 
too large for Kredit Mini, but who did not qualify for KIK/KMKP.339 These 
programmes marked a shift from the government’s focus on agricultural credit 
(particularly for food crop cultivation) towards small-scale business credit. 
 The vast majority of agricultural credit was channelled through the 
government’s subsidised large-scale agricultural extension programme BIMAS 
(Bimbingan Masal, Mass Guidance Programme). BIMAS ran between 1970 and 1985, 
initially aiming at rice self-sufficiency through rice intensification as part of the green 
revolution, later expanding its scope from just focusing on rice to other agricultural 
produce.340 BIMAS evolved out of a pilot project which was conducted in some villages 
in West Java in 1964. The first version of BIMAS was short-lived, running from 1964-
68, due to the deteriorating political conditions as well as a number of issues inherent in 
the programme design.341 After Suharto came to power the government made renewed 
efforts at agricultural mass guidance to achieve self-sufficiency in rice production, as 
well as to improve welfare and overall stability in the rural sector by introducing BIMAS 
Gotong Royong (self-help mass guidance programme).342 This second version of 
BIMAS had an even shorter life span and was terminated in 1970. BIMAS Gotong 
Royong was the promotion of self-help in name only; through a top-down approach 
foreign companies provided new rice varieties, fertilisers and pesticides to further push 
                                            
337 World Bank, 1983, Indonesia: Rural Credit Study (Report No. 4566-IND), Jakarta: World Bank (Indonesia 
Programs Division), Annex 3 pp. 7-9. 
338 World Bank, 1983, Indonesia: Rural Credit Study (Report No. 4566-IND), Jakarta: World Bank (Indonesia 
Programs Division), Annex 3 pp. 14-15. 
339 World Bank, 1983, Indonesia: Rural Credit Study (Report No. 4566-IND), Jakarta: World Bank (Indonesia 
Programs Division), Annex 3 p. 16. 
340 Marguerite Robinson, 2002, The Microfinance Revolution, Volume 2: Lessons from Indonesia, Washington, 
DC: International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/The World Bank, pp. 178-9. 
341 Leonardus T. Schmit, 1991, Rural Credit Between Subsidy and Market: Adjustment of Village Units of Bank 
Rakyat Indonesia in Sociological Perspective, Leiden: Faculty of Social Sciences, Leiden University, p. 102. 
342 Leonardus T. Schmit, 1991, Rural Credit Between Subsidy and Market: Adjustment of Village Units of Bank 
Rakyat Indonesia in Sociological Perspective, Leiden: Faculty of Social Sciences, Leiden University, pp. 104, 108. 
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rice intensification amongst local farmers.343 The third version of BIMAS, which ran 
from 1973 to 1985, was conducted on a much larger scale. The rapid growth of BIMAS 
meant a rapid expansion of the Bank Rakyat Indonesia’s (BRI) village or rural unit desa 
system, through which BIMAS was dispersed. Kredit Mini and Kredit Midi were 
channelled through the same financial infrastructure. 
In the third and fourth five-year development plans (Repelita III, 1979/80 -
1983/84 and Repelita IV, 1984/85-1988/89) the government reiterated the need to 
support the weak indigenous entrepreneur through improving access to credit.344 Kredit 
Mini and Kredit Midi had revealed that rural entrepreneurs had a large unmet demand 
for non-agricultural credit.345 However, by the early 1980s government revenues 
contracted because of the fall in oil prices, while simultaneously the agricultural 
extension scheme BIMAS had become unsustainable given its high default rate.346 In 
June 1983 the Government began introducing a series of financial regulation measures, 
including full interest deregulation in 1983 and other measures to stimulate the private 
sector, such as external trade liberalization in 1987.347 These reforms enabled an 
important reform of BRI’s unit desa system, which had been in charge of dispersing 
BIMAS as well as Kredit Mini and Kredit Midi. In late 1983 Kredit Mini and Kredit 
Midi were both discontinued; the last new BIMAS loans were issued in mid-1984.348 
Given the option of closing or reforming the units, BRI decided on reform, 
transforming them into self-reliant financial intermediaries beyond government control.   
                                            
343 L. Jan Slikkerveer, 2019, ‘Gotong Royong: An Indigenous Institution of Communality and Mutual 
Assistance in Indonesia’, in: Integrated Community-Managed Development: Strategizing Indigenous Knowledge and 
Institutions for Poverty Reduction and Sustainable Community Development in Indonesia (pp. 307-320), Cham: 
Springer, p. 316. 
344 Republik Indonesia, 1979, Rencana Pembangunan Lima Tahun Ketiga 1979/80 – 1983/84 [Third Five-Year 
Development Plan], Jakarta: Republik Indonesia, Book 1, Chapter 6, pp. 243-44, 152-3; Republik 
Indonesia, 1984, Rencana Pembangunan Lima Tahun Keempat 1984/85 – 1988/89 [Fourth Five-Year 
Development Plan], Jakarta: Republik Indonesia, Book 1, Chapter 1, pp. 44-5, 59, Chapter 7, pp. 302-4, 
326. 
345 Richard Patten and Jay Rosengard, 1991, Progress with Profits: The Development of Rural Banking in Indonesia, 
San Francisco: International Center for Economic Growth, p. 66. 
346 World Bank, 1983, Indonesia: Rural Credit Study (Report No. 4566-IND), Jakarta: World Bank (Indonesia 
Programs Division), pp. 22-23. 
347 Leonardus T. Schmit, 1991, Rural Credit Between Subsidy and Market: Adjustment of Village Units of Bank 
Rakyat Indonesia in Sociological Perspective, Leiden: Faculty of Social Sciences, Leiden University, p. 147. 
348 Richard Patten and Jay Rosengard, 1991, Progress with Profits: The Development of Rural Banking in Indonesia, 
San Francisco: International Center for Economic Growth, p. 67. 
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A policy turning point was the withdrawal of central bank liquidity credit and 
the shift from subsidised credit programmes to market-led finance with market rates of 
interest on savings and loans. For the BRI’s village units this shift occurred in 1983/84 
with the introduction of two commercial products: Kupedes (Kredit Umum Pedesaan, 
General Rural Credit) and Simpedes (Simpanan Pedesaan, Rural Savings). BRI with its 
units, albeit not with its other business segments, became a trailblazer. Six years later, in 
1990, it was followed by the phasing out of 32 out of 36 subsidized credit programmes. 
They were replaced by an SME lending quota of commercial banks of 20 per cent 
(known as KUK – kredit usaha kecil or small business credit).349 The next section analyses 
each of the main credit schemes targeting SMEs which evolved during the New Order 
period. 
4.2.1 KIK/KMKP  
KIK and KMKP were introduced in 1973 to provide subsidised credit to indigenous 
small enterprises engaged in labour-intensive activities in all sectors of the economy. 
Figure 23 shows the rapid expansion of both programmes. At the time of introduction 
the credit limit was IDR 5 million (USD 12,000) per borrower per programme credit. 
The schemes were not mutually exclusive; a borrower could take up a loan under each 
scheme of up to IDR 5 million to a total of IDR 10 million. In 1984 the credit ceiling 
was increased to IDR 15 million (USD 15,000) per customer for both KIK and 
KMKP.350 Initially the programme had a 100 per cent minimum collateral requirement, 
which was subsequently reduced in 1978.351 In order to qualify for KIK/KMKP, at least 
75 per cent of the capital had to be owned by indigenous Indonesians or more than half 
of the board members had to be indigenous Indonesians, as well as fulfilling the 
following financial criteria:  
 Net worth ≤ IDR 20 million (USD 50,000); and 
 Current assets ≤ IDR 10 million (USD 25,000); and 
                                            
349 Marguerite S. Robinson, 2002, The Microfinance Revolution, Volume 2: Lessons from Indonesia, Washington, 
DC: International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/The World Bank, pp. 31, 34. 
350 Bank Indonesia, 1990, Statistik Ekonomi-Keuangan Indonesia/Indonesian Financial Statistics, Vol XXIII, No 
12, p. 4. 
351 Bruce Bolnick, 1982, ‘Concessional Credit for Small Scale Enterprise’, Bulletin of Indonesian Economic 
Studies, 18(2): 65-85, p. 70. 
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 Outstanding liabilities to banks ≤ IDR 10 million (USD 25,000)352 
 
Figure 23: KIK/KMKP Credit Outstanding, 1974-95 (IDR billion in 2006 prices) 
 
Sources: Bank Indonesia, Annual Reports (various years), Jakarta: BI. 
Notes: Deflator used was calculated from the GDP deflator reported in The World Bank, 2017, World 
Development Indicators, Washington, D.C.: The World Bank, GDP deflator (base year varies by country) 
[Data file] Retrieved from https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.DEFL.ZS?locations=ID 
 
As Figure 24 shows, KMKP was much larger than KIK not only in loan amount 
approved but also in number of loan applications approved. Grizzell found that the 
credit ceiling imposed on banks up until 1983 led to a preference for short-term 
working capital loans to maximise profits.353 Interestingly Figure 24 shows that the 
number and volume of KMKP loans rose at a faster rate than KIK loans even after the 
credit ceilings were lifted in 1983 as part of wider financial deregulation measures. While 
the credit ceilings had been abolished, Bank Indonesia only gave banks short-term 
credits, which, as Grizzell has argued, explains this continued preference.354 Bank 
                                            
352 USD equivalents calculated with 1973 exchange rate. 
353 Steve Grizzell, 1988, Promoting Small-Scale Manufacturing in Indonesia; What Works?, Jakarta: Development 
Studies Project II, DSP Research Memo No. 17, p. 16. 
354 Steve Grizzell, 1988, Promoting Small-Scale Manufacturing in Indonesia; What Works?, Jakarta: Development 
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Indonesia explained the slower growth rate of KIK as an outcome of the overall 
“sluggish economic situation”.355 
 
Figure 24: KIK/KMKP Loan Applications, 1974-90 
 
Sources: Bank Indonesia, Annual Reports (various years), Jakarta: BI. 
Notes: Deflator used was calculated from the GDP deflator reported in The World Bank, 2017, World 
Development Indicators, Washington, D.C.: The World Bank, GDP deflator (base year varies by country) 
[Data file] Retrieved from https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.DEFL.ZS?locations=ID   
 
However, the financial sector deregulation did not just lift credit ceilings, but also freed 
up interest rates and encouraged savings mobilisation to make banks competitive.356 
These changes led to a rapid increase in non-directed lending, leading banks to shift 
personnel and financial activities from programme lending, including KIK/KMKP. A 
project evaluation study found that from this point onwards “KIK/KMKP lending 
became a perfunctory exercise, relegated to junior staff”.357 KIK/KMKP provided 
supply-driven credit, originating in a policy environment which rewarded banks for the 
quantity of funds they channelled through. The new policy environment encouraged 
                                            
355 Bank Indonesia, 1983/1984 Annual Report, Jakarta: BI. 
356 Binhadi, 1995, Financial Sector Deregulation, Banking Development and Monetary Policy: The Indonesian 
Experience (1983-1993), Jakarta: Institut Bankir Indonesia, p. 63. 
357 Hans Dieter Seibel, 1991, Technical Assistance to Bank Indonesia for SEDP II (extended into SEDP III and 
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demand-driven finance. The repayment record of KIK/KMKP has been widely 
criticised for its poor repayment record; Grizzell estimated the default rate to lie around 
27 per cent.358 This was in part the result of poor staff training and misappropriation of 
funds, but the more fundamental issue was the lack of incentives for bank staff to 
collect outstanding loans. KIK/KMKP were abolished in January 1990 as part of the 
wider measures to reduce liquidity credits.359 
Three impact studies have been conducted on KIK/KMKP. The first was a 
sample survey conducted in 1978/79 in East Java, Central Java and West Sumatra. The 
second survey was conducted in 1982 in East Java, South Sulawesi and North Sumatra, 
covering the period 1979-81.360 The third study was a sample survey which interviewed 
620 small-scale business entrepreneurs (of which 470 remained after data cleaning) 
across 13 provinces which had received KIK/KMKP for the first time in 1984.361 All 
three studies have been largely dismissed on methodological grounds.362 However, the 
KIK/KMKP project evaluation report found that “among the less questionable results 
are a relatively high economic rate of return, a notable increase in employment (during 
1978-84 about 300,000 jobs were created through KIK alone), a relatively low level of 
output from the employment generated and a remarkable effect on value added”.363 
Another widely accepted finding from the second and third studies was that the vast 
                                            
358 Steve Grizzell, 1988, Promoting Small-Scale Manufacturing in Indonesia; What Works?, Jakarta: Development 
Studies Project II, DSP Research Memo No. 17, p. 18; World Bank, 1983, Indonesia: Rural Credit Study 
(Report No. 4566-IND), Jakarta: World Bank (Indonesia Programs Division), Annex 3 p. 14; Marguerite 
Robinson, 2002, The Microfinance Revolution, Volume 2: Lessons from Indonesia, Washington, DC: International 
Bank for Reconstruction and Development/The World Bank, p. 101. 
359 Binhadi, 1995, Financial Sector Deregulation, Banking Development and Monetary Policy: The Indonesian 
Experience (1983-1993), Jakarta: Institut Bankir Indonesia, pp. 261-262. 
360 For a critical discussion of the methodology of the second survey see Bruce Bolnick and Eric Nelson, 
1990, ‘Evaluating the economic impact of a special credit programme: KIK/KMKP in Indonesia’, The 
Journal of Development Studies, 26(2): 299-312. 
361 The issues of the first and second survey were covered in the report of the third survey: Central 
Project Management Unit, Cooperative and Small Credit Department, Bank Indonesia, 1986, Economic 
Impact of KIK/KMKP (SEDPI and SEDP II), Jakarta: Bank Indonesia, pp. 3-4; the survey design and issues 
with data collection and representativeness of the third study are discussed on pp. 13-21, 50. 
362 Hans Dieter Seibel, 1991, Technical Assistance to Bank Indonesia for SEDP II (extended into SEDP III and 
IV), Project Evaluation Report EEC NA/82-19, Frankfurt: INTEGRATION, pp. 23-24. 
363 Hans Dieter Seibel, 1991, Technical Assistance to Bank Indonesia for SEDP II (extended into SEDP III and 
IV), Project Evaluation Report EEC NA/82-19, Frankfurt: INTEGRATION, p. 24. 
Chapter 4: Access to Credit for Indonesian SMEs in the 20th Century 
 
 163 
majority of KIK/KMKP loans were given to existing businesses (90-98 per cent) rather 
than start-ups.364 
Set against its own criteria of channelling credit to small-scale enterprises and 
promoting employment generation KIK/KMKP could be a deemed a success. 
However, the programme’s high cost and low repayment rate made it unsustainable. 
Grizzell argued that the majority of KIK/KMKP loans financed trading activities, 
despite the programme’s objective of strengthening small-scale industrial enterprises.365 
Beyond this some have raised questions about the potential negative side effects of the 
programme. Most prominently, McLeod argued that reallocation of credit towards 
indigenous small-scale enterprises meant it was allocated away from, and hence to the 
detriment of, medium and large firms as well as businesses which did not fulfil the 
ethnicity requirements.366  
4.2.2 Kredit Mini & Kredit Midi 
‘Kredit Mini’ (mini credit) was developed to support small business entrepreneurs 
through small and easier to obtain credits. Under Kredit Mini, small entrepreneurs 
could take up a loan of maximum IDR 100,000 (USD 240) per customer at an interest 
rate of 12 per cent per annum. In 1980, a second programme was introduced to 
complement Kredit Mini: Kredit Midi, which provided small business owners with 
loans between IDR 200,000-500,000 (USD 320-800) at 10.5 per cent interest per 
annum.367 Kredit Mini was introduced to support small firms too small for 
KIK/KMKP loans, Kredit Midi was subsequently introduced for those firms either too 
                                            
364 Bruce Bolnick, 1982, ‘Concessional Credit for Small Scale Enterprise’, Bulletin of Indonesian Economic 
Studies, 18(2): 65-85, p. 76; World Bank, 1983, Indonesia: Rural Credit Study (Report No. 4566-IND), Jakarta: 
World Bank (Indonesia Programs Division), p. 27; Hans Dieter Seibel, 1991, Technical Assistance to Bank 
Indonesia for SEDP II (extended into SEDP III and IV), Project Evaluation Report EEC NA/82-19, Frankfurt: 
INTEGRATION, p. 24. 
365 Steve Grizzell, 1988, Promoting Small-Scale Manufacturing in Indonesia; What Works?, Jakarta: Development 
Studies Project II, DSP Research Memo No. 17, p. 15. 
366 Ross McLeod, 1983, ‘Concessional Credit for Small Scale Enterprise: A Comment’, Bulletin of Indonesian 
Economic Studies, 19(1): 83-89, p. 84. 
367 Republik Indonesia, 1984, Rencana Pembangunan Lima Tahun Keempat 1984/85 – 1988/89 [Fourth Five-
Year Development Plan], Jakarta: Republik Indonesia, Book1, Chapter 7, pp. 302-3. 
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large for, or which had outgrown Kredit Mini, but were still too small for 
KIK/KMKP.368 
Kredit Mini and Midi were dispersed through BRI’s village units, which had 
been rapidly expanded with BIMAS. BIMAS, as noted earlier, was a heavily subsidised 
agricultural extension scheme that ran between 1970 and 1985. With the rapid 
expansion of BIMAS credit came the exponential growth of BRI’s village units, through 
which BIMAS was disbursed. However, with presidential instruction INPRES 4/1973 
BRI also received the general mandate to extend non-BIMAS rural credit. Part of this 
diversification was the introduction of the credit scheme Kredit Mini (mini credit).369  
Kredit Mini, and later Kredit Midi, had two crucial differences from BIMAS: 
first, they provided loans in cash rather than in kind, and second, the loan recipients 
were selected by BRI village unit staff rather than government officials.370 Contrary to 
BIMAS, Kredit Mini and Kredit Midi maintained high repayment rates, which was in 
part attributable to the criteria and process followed to establish borrower 
creditworthiness.371  The ratio of arrears to outstanding loans of fTable 43Kredit Mini 
remained below 6 per cent throughout its lifetime, while the long-term loss ratio of 
Kredit Midi was 3.8 per cent when it was terminated in 1984.372 While borrower 
selection had much improved between the two programmes, a World Bank study 
described the loan application procedure as “cumbersome” because it required 
numerous forms, steps and usually had to run through three different administrative 
levels.373 Despite the burdensome application procedure, Table 21 shows that the loans 
outstanding through Kredit Mini – and Kredit Midi in its short lifespan – increased 
rapidly. The data in Table 21 also shows that this increase was driven by an expansion 
                                            
368 World Bank, 1983, Indonesia: Rural Credit Study (Report No. 4566-IND), Jakarta: World Bank (Indonesia 
Programs Division), pp. 28-29. 
369 Richard Patten and Jay Rosengard, 1991, Progress with Profits: The Development of Rural Banking in Indonesia, 
San Francisco: International Center for Economic Growth, pp. 60-1. 
370 Marguerite Robinson, 2002, The Microfinance Revolution, Volume 2: Lessons from Indonesia, Washington, 
DC: International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/The World Bank, p. 185. 
371 Marguerite Robinson, 2002, The Microfinance Revolution, Volume 2: Lessons from Indonesia, Washington, 
DC: International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/The World Bank, p. 185. 
372 Kredit Mini in World Bank, 1983, Indonesia: Rural Credit Study (Report No. 4566-IND), Jakarta: World 
Bank (Indonesia Programs Division), Annex 3, p. 15; Kredit Midi in Marguerite Robinson, 2002, The 
Microfinance Revolution, Volume 2: Lessons from Indonesia, Washington, DC: International Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development/The World Bank, p. 212. 
373 World Bank, 1983, Indonesia: Rural Credit Study (Report No. 4566-IND), Jakarta: World Bank (Indonesia 
Programs Division), Annex 3, pp. 15-16. 
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of short-term working capital; the previous subsection showed that similarly, the 
number and value of KMKP loans (working capital loans) were far larger than those of 
KIK (investment loans). Kredit Mini and Kredit Midi showed that there was a large 
demand for cash loans.  
Kredit Mini and Kredit Midi were gradually phased out during the 1980s when 
the village units could no longer be sustained (without reform) because of the 
termination of BIMAS and its subsidies. In 1983/4, Kredit Mini had still disbursed IDR 
36.6 billion (0.004 per cent of GDP) to 491,000 people; by 1987/88, this had fallen to 
IDR 0.8 billion (0.0006 per cent of GDP) and 7,800 customers. Kredit Midi had 
disbursed IDR 34 billion (0.04 per cent of GDP) to 146,600 people in 1983/4, but by 
1987/88 this had fallen to IDR 0.7 billion (0.005 per cent of GDP) and only 500 
customers.  
 
Table 21: Kredit Mini & Kredit Midi Loans Outstanding and Investment and 
Working Capital Credit Shares, 1975-84 (IDR billion in 2006 prices) 
  1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 
Mini 
Credits 
                    
Credit 
outstanding 
124 239 344 415 457 443 824 1,061 989 526 
Investment 22.9% 21.1% 18.0% 16.5% 18.8% 15.0% 9.8% 10.5% 9.5% 10.8% 
Working 
capital 
short-term 77.1% 78.9% 82.0% 83.5% 81.3% 85.0% 90.2% 89.5% 90.5% 89.2% 
Midi 
Credits 
                    
Credit 
outstanding 
            161 521 659 483 




            
87.5% 85.7% 64.3% 88.2% 
Sources: Bank Indonesia, Annual Reports (various years), Jakarta: BI. 
Notes: Deflator used was calculated from the GDP deflator reported in The World Bank, 2017, World 
Development Indicators, Washington, D.C.: The World Bank, GDP deflator (base year varies by country) 
[Data file] Retrieved from https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.DEFL.ZS?locations=ID 
 
4.2.3 Kupedes 
A scheme that has received much praise and achieved considerably higher loan 
repayment rates is the market-based general rural credit loan product Kupedes (Kredit 
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Umum Pedesaan) as well as its rural savings counterpart Simpedes (Simpanan Pedesaan).374 
Kupedes was introduced in 1984 to replace BIMAS. By the early 1980s the default rate 
on loans provided under BIMAS had risen to over 50 per cent, reflecting the moral 
hazard problem created by subsidised loans.375 In the words of Minister of Finance at 
the time Ali Wardhana: “By the early 1980s we began to realize that year after year, the 
subsidies and arrears of BIMAS, KIK, and KMKP were large, the programs were 
inefficient, and the loans generally did not reach the intended borrowers”.376 The 
financial deregulation introduced in June 1983 made the development of Kupedes 
possible. Some of the major relevant changes included lifting the ceiling on interest 
rates for loans and deposits, granting banks more autonomy and encouraging banks to 
expand their products and services.377  
BRI reorganised and reformed the village units (unit desa), that had been set up 
as part of the BIMAS programme, to become self-sustaining microbanking units, With 
that came increased responsibility at the village unit level and the introduction of a 
simplified transparent accounting and reporting system and improved supervision at the 
branch level. The units were turned into independent profit and loss centres, with profit 
incentives for staff as very effective incentives to borrowers for timely repayment.378 
Loans were made in cash rather than in kind and the selection of borrowers was made 
by the staff of the units, something which had previously been done primarily by the 
Department of Agriculture and various other government officials and committees.379 
When they were founded, BRI village units operated at sub-district (kecamatan) level. 
                                            
374 UNIDO, 1997, Industrial Development Global Report 1997, Oxford University Press, p. 98; The World 
Bank, 1996, ‘Kupedes: Indonesia's Model Small Credit Program, OED Précis, 104, Washington, DC: 
Operations Evaluation Department, The World Bank; Marguerite S. Robinson, 2001, The Microfinance 
Revolution, Volume 1: Sustainable Finance for the Poor, Washington, DC: International Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development/The World Bank, p. xxiv. 
375 Hans Dieter Seibel and Mayumi Ozaki, 2009, Restructuring of State-owned Financial institutions: lessons from 
Bank Rakyat Indonesia, Manila: Asian Development Bank, p. 1; Marguerite Robinson, 2002, The Microfinance 
Revolution, Volume 2: Lessons from Indonesia, Washington, DC: International Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development/The World Bank, p. 218. 
376 Ali Wardhana (Minister of Finance, Government of Indonesia, 1968-83; Coordinating Minister for 
Economics, Finance, and Industry, Government of Indonesia, 1983-88) in: Marguerite Robinson, 2002, 
The Microfinance Revolution, Volume 2: Lessons from Indonesia, Washington, DC: International Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development/The World Bank, p. xxvi. 
377 Marguerite Robinson, 2002, The Microfinance Revolution, Volume 2: Lessons from Indonesia, Washington, 
DC: International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/The World Bank, p. 229. 
378 Marguerite Robinson, 2002, The Microfinance Revolution, Volume 2: Lessons from Indonesia, Washington, 
DC: International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/The World Bank, p. 218. 
379 Marguerite Robinson, 2002, The Microfinance Revolution, Volume 2: Lessons from Indonesia, Washington, 
DC: International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/The World Bank, pp. 181, 220. 
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While the BRI units initially served primarily rural areas, in 1989 the decision was made 
to expand and add urban units (unit kota). While the units are still referred to as BRI 
village units or unit desa this in fact refers to both types of units.380 By 1990 about 20 per 
cent of all BRI units were in urban areas, by 1996 their share is estimated to have grown 
to 25 per cent.381  
Kupedes was administered through BRI, as were KIK/KMPK, however, with 
some important differences with implications for the incentive structure for the 
implementing units. Kupedes was a product of the BRI units, while KIK/KMKP was a 
government programme channelled through BRI branches as well as other banks. 
Kupedes loans were funded through savings mobilisation and were allocated at market 
rates of interest through the unit desa, which bore the credit risk but also paid their staff 
10 per cent bonus on profits, whereas KIK/KMPK loans were subsidised and only 
handled at the branch and higher level, with 75 per cent of each loan insured by the 
state through Indonesian Credit Insurance Ltd.382 Thus while BRI offered both 
KIK/KMKP and Kupedes, they were not offered by the same outlet: in BRI’s technical 
terms, the unit desa provided microcredit whilst SME credits were different business 
segments handled at the BRI branch level. The unit desa offered only Kupedes loans as 
a general purpose loan instrument and provided no other loan products and Kupedes 
loans were not available anywhere other than at the unit desa.383  
 The Kupedes scheme had also in-built incentives for prompt loan repayment 
for the customer: if all payments had been made in full and on time, a quarter of the 
total amount of interest was refunded. Furthermore, by demonstrating creditworthiness 
through a good repayment record subsequent loan sizes would gradually increase.384 
This stood in stark contrast to KIK/KMKP, where borrowers could obtain new loans 
                                            
380 Marguerite Robinson, 2002, The Microfinance Revolution, Volume 2: Lessons from Indonesia, Washington, 
DC: International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/The World Bank, p. 169. 
381 Marguerite Robinson, 2002, The Microfinance Revolution, Volume 2: Lessons from Indonesia, Washington, 
DC: International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/The World Bank, p. 319. 
382 UNIDO, 1997, Industrial Development Global Report 1997, Oxford University Press, p. 98; Robinson, 
2002, pp. 218, 220, 223; Kupedes received start-up funding for the period of $207 million and has been 
profitable ever since 1986. 
383 Marguerite Robinson, 2002, The Microfinance Revolution, Volume 2: Lessons from Indonesia, Washington, 
DC: International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/The World Bank, p. 239. 
384 Marguerite Robinson, 2002, The Microfinance Revolution, Volume 2: Lessons from Indonesia, Washington, 
DC: International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/The World Bank, p. 218. 
Chapter 4: Access to Credit for Indonesian SMEs in the 20th Century 
 
 168 
before repaying existing loans.385 In 1996, President Director of BRI Djokosantoso 
Moeljono (1993-2000) stated that ‘more than 80 percent of Kupedes borrowers borrow 
again, and they need to know that their ability to borrow again depends on their own 
performance, not on factors outside their control’.386 In 1988, a study by Grizzell found 
that the default rate of Kupedes was 2-3 per cent, compared to 27 per cent for 
KIK/KMKP.387 
Borrowing under the Kupedes scheme was particularly attractive given the 
flexibility in loan size and terms, with a minimum loan size of about 25,000 to 25 
million IDR in 1996 (then roughly equivalent to 10.50 to 10,500 USD), loan maturities 
ranging between three and 24 months for working capital loans and up to 36 months 
for investment loans, as well as instalments varying between single, monthly and 
seasonal payments, with monthly being the most common mode.388 The effective 
annual rate of interest was 44 per cent, minus a rebate of the equivalent of 11 per cent 
for timely repayment, which left the borrower with an interest rate of 33 per cent per 
annum.389  
After disbursing its first loans in January 1984, Kupedes more than doubled its 
customers between 1984-87, from 641,000 to 1,315,000 people and its loans disbursed 
increased from IDR 110.7 billion (USD 108 million) to IDR 429.2 billion (USD 300 
million) as shown in Figure 25. Kupedes loan sizes were much more flexible than the 
other schemes, ranging from IDR 25,000 to IDR 2 million.390 The 12 months loss ratio 
of BRI units in Figure 26 shows the overall high repayment rate of Kupedes. The 12 
months loss ratio hit a peak of 5 per cent in 1991, when BRI restricted unit lending in 
                                            
385 Hans Dieter Seibel, 1991, Technical Assistance to Bank Indonesia for SEDP II (extended into SEDP III and 
IV), Project Evaluation Report EEC NA/82-19, Frankfurt: INTEGRATION, p. 50. 
386 In Marguerite Robinson, 2002, The Microfinance Revolution, Volume 2: Lessons from Indonesia, Washington, 
DC: International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/The World Bank p. 238. 
387 Steve Grizzell, 1988, Promoting Small-Scale Manufacturing in Indonesia; What Works?, Jakarta: Development 
Studies Project II, DSP Research Memo No. 17, p. 29. 
388 Marguerite Robinson, 2002, The Microfinance Revolution, Volume 2: Lessons from Indonesia, Washington, 
DC: International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/The World Bank, 2002, pp. 217, 239, 240-
2; initial range of loans in 1984 was between 25,000 and 1 million IDR (equivalent to 23 to 931 1984 
USD). 
389 Hans Dieter Seibel, Agus Rachmadi and Djarot Kusumayakti. 2010, ‘Reform, Growth and Resilience 
of Savings-led Commercial Microfinance Institutions: The Case of the Microbanking Units of Bank 
Rakyat Indonesia’, Savings and Development, 34( 3): 277-303, p. 285. 
390 Republik Indonesia, 1989, Rencana Pembangunan Lima Tahun Kelima 1989/90 – 1993/94 [Fifth Five-Year 
Development Plan], Jakarta: Republik Indonesia, Book 1, Chapter 7, pp. 382-3. 
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response to a tight money period.391 In contrast to the response to this milder crisis in 
1992, BRI did not restrict Kupedes lending during the Asian Financial Crisis. In 
addition to not restricting lending, BRI accepted decreased interest spreads in 1998 
when it raised the interest rates on Kupedes deliberately slowly. Patten, Rosengard and 
Johnson argue that this strategy played to “psychological importance to Kupedes 
borrowers of stability”.392 Figure 26 shows that the arrears ratio indeed remained much 
lower in 1998-99 during this much more severe crisis than in 1991-92. The arrears ratio, 
which measures the number of loan repayments that are late a day or more as a share of 
total loans outstanding, remained remarkably low between 1984 and 2006, including the 
Asian Financial Crisis years. The strong performance of Kupedes in terms of both loan 
disbursement and repayment continued during the Asian Financial Crisis with the 
number of loans increasing from 2.5 to 2.7 million between 1996 and 2000, little change 
in the repayment rate and the system remaining profitable throughout this economically 
turbulent period.393  
Figure 25: Kupedes Loans, 1984-2006 
 
Source: Data from BRI, 2015, Laporan Statistik BRI Unit, Jakarta: BRI. 
Notes: Deflator used was calculated from the GDP deflator reported in The World Bank, 2017, World 
Development Indicators, Washington, D.C.: The World Bank, GDP deflator (base year varies by country) 
[Data file] Retrieved from https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.DEFL.ZS?locations=ID  
                                            
391 BRI, 1996, BRI Unit Products, Jakarta: BRI International Visitor Program, p. 12 
392 Richard Patten, Jay Rosengard and Don Johnston, 2001, ‘Microfinance Success Amidst 
Macroeconomic Failure: The Experience of Bank Rakyat Indonesia During the East Asian Crisis’, World 
Development, 29(6): 1057-1069, p. 1064 
393 Marguerite Robinson, 2002, The Microfinance Revolution, Volume 2: Lessons from Indonesia, Washington, 
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Figure 26: Loss Ratio and Arrears of BRI Units, 1984-2006 
 
Source: Data from BRI, 2015, Laporan Statistik BRI Unit, Jakarta: BRI. 
Notes: Arrears are total payments overdue one day or more as the share of total loans outstanding, 
excluding loans written off; the 12 month loss ratio measures the change in the previous 12 months in the 
cumulative amount of loans that have become due and remain unpaid (see BRI, 1996, BRI Unit Products, 
Jakarta: BRI International Visitor Program, pp. 10-11). 
4.2.4 KUK 
From February 1990 onwards, commercial banks were required to extend 20 per cent of 
their total credit to small businesses as investment and working capital, known as KUK 
(kredit usaha kecil - small business credit).394 When KUK was introduced in 1990 
eligibility was determined by asset criteria: businesses had to have no more than IDR 
600 million (USD 330,000) in net assets (excluding land and business estates).395 In 1997 
the criteria were altered with Board of Directors of Bank Indonesia Decree No. 
29/4/KEP/DIR, which stipulated that eligibility for small-scale business credit was 
based on the definition of Indonesian Law Number 9 of 1995 regarding Small 
Enterprises.396 The new definition set the criteria for small-scale enterprises for 
businesses to qualify to either have net assets worth a maximum of IDR 200 million 
(USD 70,000) (excluding land and business facilities) or have a maximum of IDR 1 
                                            
394 Bank Indonesia, 1990, 1989/1990 Annual Report, Jakarta: BI, pp. 16-17. 
395 Bank Indonesia, 1990, 1989/1990 Annual Report, Jakarta: BI, pp. 16-17. 
396 BI Regulation 3/2/PBI/2001 4 January 2001 concerning Provision of Credit to Small Business & 
Circular Letter 3/9/BKR 17 May 2001 concerning Operational Guidelines for the Provision of Credit to 
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billion (USD 340,000) in sales.397 In addition, qualifying businesses must be owned by 
Indonesian citizens and could not be a subsidiary or branch of a medium or large-sized 
business. Beyond these asset criteria, banks were to determine the terms and conditions 
themselves. McLeod found that as a result banks lent to firms under KUK that would 
have been too large to qualify for KIK/KMKP.398 
 
Figure 27: KUK (Small Business Credit), 1990-2001 
 
Source: Data from Bank Indonesia, Annual Reports (various years), Jakarta: BI. 
Notes: KUK defined as: IDR 200 million max. 1990-93, IDR 250 million max. 1994-97, IDR 350 million 
max. 1998-2000, IDR 500 million max 2001; 
Deflator used was calculated from the GDP deflator reported in The World Bank, 2017, World 
Development Indicators, Washington, D.C.: The World Bank, GDP deflator (base year varies by country) 
[Data file] Retrieved from https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.DEFL.ZS?locations=ID  
 
The May 29 1993 Deregulation Package relaxed the rules somewhat, calculating the 
mandatory lending requirement based on ratio to rupiah denominated credit only, rather 
than the previous rule of having to lend 20% of total credit in both rupiah and foreign 
currencies to small businesses.399 In April 1997, the lending requirement was increased 
to 22.5-25.0% of total lending and the credit ceiling was raised from IDR 250 to 350 
million (from USD 86,000 to USD 120,000). But in the following year when the Asian 
                                            
397 USD equivalents calculated with 1997 exchange rate. 
398 Ross McLeod, 1994, ‘A Changing Financial Landscape: The Evolution of Finance Policy in Indonesia’, 
in: F.J.A. Bouman and Otto Hospes (Eds.), Financial Landscapes Reconstructed: The Fine Art of Mapping 
Development (pp. 85-104), New York: Routledge, p. 102. 
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Financial Crisis hit Indonesia, only a few banks could meet the KUK lending 
obligation.400 The lending obligation was suspended during the financial crisis and 
Figure 27 shows that subsequently loans dropped by almost half between 1998 and 
1999.401 By 1999, Bank Indonesia indefinitely suspended sanctions on banks not 
meeting the lending requirement and on 4 January 2001 with BI Regulation 
3/2/PBI/2000 credit extension to small businesses was no longer a legal obligation but 
rather just a recommendation.  
One of the issues KUK faced was that in order to meet the lending quota, many 
banks extended loans directly to SME owners (who utilised the loans for private 
purposes) rather than to the business as working or investment capital.402 A World Bank 
report found that banks were hesitant to extend credit to SMEs due to their lack of 
collateral and thus the risk of the loan, a problem many SMEs face worldwide.403 KUK 
did little to address these concerns in practice. Rosengard and Prasetyantoko found 
KUK to be “fatally flawed conceptually and a dismal failure operationally”, with banks 
lacking an internal mandate, desire or expertise to lend to MSMEs and circumventing 
the lending requirement through “extremely creative” representation of their loan 
portfolios.404 
4.2.5 Post-Asian Financial Crisis Developments 
Recovery from the Asian Financial Crisis set off in 1998 with immediate policy 
responses, which were based on the fourth agreement with the IMF signed on 24 June 
1998 (Second Supplementary Memorandum of Economic and Financial Policies, 
                                            
400 Board of Directors of Bank Indonesia Decree No 30/4/KEP/DIR, 4 April 1997; Bank Indonesia, 
1999, 1998/1999 Annual Report, p. 91 
401 Marguerite S. Robinson, 2002, The Microfinance Revolution, Volume 2: Lessons from Indonesia, Washington, 
DC: International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/The World Bank, p. 104. 
402 Thee Kian Wie, 2006, ‘Policies for Private Sector Development in Indonesia, ADB Institute Discussion 
Paper, 46: 1-46, p. 31. 
403 The World Bank, 2005, Microfinance Case Studies: Indonesia, Indonesia’s Rural Financial System: The Role of the 
State and Private Institutions, Washington, DC: World Bank, p. 27. 
404 Jay Rosengard and Agustinus Prasetyantoko, 2011, ‘If the Banks are Doing So Well, Why Can’t I Get a 
Loan? Regulatory Constraints to Financial Inclusion in Indonesia’, Asian Economic Policy Review, 6: 273–
296, p. 290; 
In particular giving consumer loans to SME-owners rather than business loans, discussed in Thee Kian 
Wie, 2006, ‘Policies for Private Sector Development in Indonesia, ADB Institute Discussion Paper, 46: 1-46, 
p. 44. 
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MEFP) and set out various policies and measures to implement fiscal and structural 
reforms, including improving access to credit for small-scale enterprises. With Law 
23/1999 of 16 November 1999, Bank Indonesia was no longer allowed to extend 
liquidity credit to support programme credits to ensure the independence of the central 
bank. The MEFP also stipulated measures to encourage the privatisation or closure of 
nonviable state-owned enterprises. The new policy regime also included SME-targeted 
support measures, such as the introduction of the new credit scheme KTA (Kredit Tanpa 
Agunan), which forewent collateral requirements but was restricted to formally 
registered SMEs from all sectors.405  
From 2001 onwards the Bank Indonesia Annual Reports distinguished between 
micro, small and medium credit. Before 2001, the small credit category only 
corresponded to micro and small credit, which encompassed loans of up to IDR 350 
million. The new credit categories introduced with the 2001 Bank Indonesia Annual Report 
were micro credit (up to IDR 50 million / USD 5,000), small-scale credit (IDR 50 – 500 
million / USD 5,000 – 50,000) and medium-scale credit (IDR 500 million – 5 billion / 
USD 50,000 – 500,000). Figure 28 shows that the micro, small-scale and medium-sized 
credit segments expanded at similar rates between 2001 and 2003. However, by 2005 
the share of micro credit had fallen to 41 per cent (from 49 per cent in 2003), while the 
share of small-scale as well as medium-sized credit relative to total MSME continued to 
grow.406 
However over 95% of small-scale loans lent through KUK between 1995 and 
2001 had a maximum credit line of IDR 50 million. Therefore the medium credit 
category (loans between IDR 0.5 and 5 billion) reported from 2001 onwards served 
different consumer segments. The medium-scale credit share of total credit grew 
continuously between 2001 and 2006, from 8.8 per cent to 16.5 per cent. However, 
whether this is reflective of a longer process of medium-scale credit growth or reflective 
of recovery from the Asian Financial Crisis is unclear due to data constraints. 
                                            
405 Tulus Tambunan, 2000, Development of Small-Scale Industries during the New Order Government in Indonesia, 
Aldershot, UK/Brookfield, USA: Ashgate, p. 186. 
406 Note that the Bank Indonesia Annual Reports did not report separate figures for the different 
segments in 2004. 
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Figure 28: Development of MSME Credit in Indonesia, 2001-2006 
 
Source: Data from Bank Indonesia, Annual Reports (2003- 2006), Jakarta: BI. 
Notes: No separated data available for 2004, the total of MSME credit in 2004 was IDR 353 trillion (in 
2006 prices); 
Deflator used was calculated from the GDP deflator reported in The World Bank, 2017, World 
Development Indicators, Washington, D.C.: The World Bank, GDP deflator (base year varies by country) 
[Data file] Retrieved from https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.DEFL.ZS?locations=ID  
 
In terms of post-crisis developments in SME credit Bank Rakyat Indonesia (BRI) 
deserves special attention. As the previous discussion of Kupedes has shown, BRI’s 
units had weathered the Asian Financial Crisis impressively well. However, its bigger 
loans to the corporate sector had performed much worse than BRI’s smaller loans 
during the crisis.407 The government launched the ‘Forward Steps for Bank 
Improvement and Restructuring Program’ in August 1998, which focused on 
restructuring banks which were insolvent but politically too important to let fail. As part 
of this programme BRI was restructured between 1999 and 2003, which entailed 
reducing its corporate loan segment and focusing on micro and SME lending. 
Important milestones in the restructuring process included the recapitalisation of BRI in 
2000 with IDR 29 trillion (USD 3 billion) in government bonds and its partial 
privatisation in late 2003 with a public share of 41 per cent. 408 As a result BRI 
                                            
407 Hans Dieter Seibel and Mayumi Ozaki, 2009, Restructuring of State-owned financial institutions: lessons from 
Bank Rakyat Indonesia, Manila: Asian Development Bank, p. 14. 
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experienced a substantial growth in total assets and profitability. Table 22 shows how 
the MSME loan segment expanded between 1998 and 2006 while the share of corporate 
loans in total BRI lending fell from 35 per cent in 1998 to 13 per cent in 2006. As a 
result of these restructuring efforts the non-performing loan (NPL) ratio fell to “a 
historically low level” in 2000 and remained between 5 and 6 per cent between 2000 and 
2006, compared to 11 per cent in the pre-crisis years (1996 and 1997).409  
When comparing Figure 28 and Table 22, it should be noted that the loan size 
categories between Bank Indonesia and BRI differ: Bank Indonesia’s medium-scale 
credit segment encompassed loans between IDR 500 million – 5 billion, while BRI’s 
medium-sized business segment encompassed loans between IDR 5-50 billion. Table 
23 adjusts for these differences and compares the BI MSME credit data to BRI’s loans 
to its micro and small business segments. The calculations in Table 23 show that BRI 
loans constituted 17-20 per cent of all MSME lending in Indonesia between 2001 and 
2006.410 These reforms and emphasis on MSME banking in urban and rural areas meant 









                                            
409 Hans Dieter Seibel and Mayumi Ozaki, 2009, Restructuring of State-owned financial institutions: lessons from 
Bank Rakyat Indonesia, Manila: Asian Development Bank, pp. 11, 17. 
410 For calculations see Table 23 in Appendix 
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Table 22: BRI Loans Outstanding by Business Segment Shares, 1998-2006 (in per cent) 
Business Segment 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Micro (≥ IDR 50 million) 11.1% 18.2% 29.7% 30.4% 30.5% 30.5% 30.8% 30.2% 30.22% 
Small Consumer Fixed 
Income (≥ IDR 200 million) 
7.3% 11.0% 21.2% 24.0% 24.2% 23.5% n/a n/a 21.21% 
Small Commercial (≥ 5 
billion) 
42.9% 46.8% 17.3% 19.0% 24.2% 26.6% n/a n/a 27.05% 
Small Business  
(= Small Consumer Fixed 
Income & Small 
Commercial) 
50.2% 57.8% 38.5% 43.0% 48.4% 50.2% 51.1% 50.4% 48.27% 
Medium (IDR 5-50 billion) 4.2% 5.4% 11.7% 3.7% 3.7% 4.6% 4.6% 6.2% 8.22% 
Corporate (> IDR 50 billion) 34.5% 18.6% 12.5% 22.9% 17.4% 14.7% 13.6% 13.2% 13.29% 
Total  




 (IDR 70.7) 
100.0% 
 (IDR 47.7) 
100.0% 
 (IDR 51.2) 
100.0% 
 (IDR 58.8) 
100.0% 
 (IDR 67.4) 
100.0% 
 (IDR 81.4) 
100.0% 
 (IDR 86.2) 
100.0% 
 (IDR 90.3) 
Gross non-performing loan 
ratio (NPL) 
53.0% 19.9% 5.0% 4.9% 6.7% 6.0% 4.2% 4.7% 4.8% 
Source: Shares calculated based on data from Bank Rakyat Indonesia, Laporan Tahunan / Annual Reports (various years) Jakarta: BRI; Bank Rakyat Indonesia, Financial Update (various years), 
Jakarta: BRI. 
Notes: USD equivalents for loan sizes: Micro ≥USD 5,000, Small Consumer Fixed Income ≥USD 20,000, Small Commercial ≥USD 500,000, Medium USD 500,000 – 5 million, 
Corporate >USD 5 million; 
IDR totals deflated to 2006 prices, using a GDP deflator  calculated from The World Bank, 2017, World Development Indicators, Washington, D.C.: The World Bank, GDP deflator (base year 
varies by country) [Data file] Retrieved from https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.DEFL.ZS?locations=ID  
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Table 23: BRI Share in Total MSME Loans Outstanding, 2001-2006 (trillion 
IDR, 2006 prices) 
 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
BRI MSME segment by BI 
definition  
(Total of micro, small 
consumer and small 
commercial credit) 
37.6 46.4 54.4 66.6 69.4 70.9 
Total MSME Loans 
Outstanding  
(BI Annual Reports) 
189.5 240.3 293.2 353.4 421.9 427.5 
BRI share in total MSME 
Loans Outstanding 
19.8% 19.3% 18.6% 18.8% 16.5% 16.6% 
 
Sources: Calculated from BRI, Annual Reports (2003, 2006, 2007), Jakarta: BRI; BRI, BRI Financial Updates 
(2004, 2005, 2007), BRI: Jakarta; Bank Indonesia, Annual Reports (2003, 2005, 2006), Jakarta: BI. 
 
4.2.6 Sectoral Comparison 
Table 24 - Table 27 show the relative sectoral distribution of loans of KIK/KMKP, 
Kupedes, KUK, and the category introduced in 2001, MSME credit.411 The majority of 
small-scale business credit went into trade, but there are significant differences in 
relative shares as well as where the rest of credit was allocated. Table 24 shows that 
over half of all KIK loans in 1980 and 1985 were given to small-scale businesses in 
trade and transport, whereas trade alone made up nearly 70 per cent of all KMKP loans. 
However, KMKP only played a very small role in financing transport; instead the 
second largest sector was industry.   
Despite being a rural loan product, only less than a quarter of Kupedes loans 
were used for agricultural purposes; about 60 per cent were used to finance trading 
activities (Table 25). Schmit carried out his PhD research project on BRI and its village 
units between 1986 and 1988 and found that trade loans “were considered the lowest 
risk and the best suited for monthly instalments”, but that in reality loans were often 
                                            
411 Note that there is no sectoral breakdown of the distribution of Kredit Mini and Midi, however by 
design they were intended for off-farm activities. 
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used for multiple purposes. 412 Thee Kian Wie similarly found that there was a 
preference for small-scale business engaged in trade or services rather than 
manufacturing, because the latter carried higher risk, made lower profits and evaluating 
their loan applications required more technical knowledge.413  
Unfortunately there is no data on the sectoral distribution of KUK prior to the 
Asian Financial Crisis. The increasing share of loans for agriculture shown in Table 26 
was the result of people moving back to rural areas and into agriculture.414 The 
hypothesis is strengthened by the falling share of agriculture after 2000, which 
continued in the MSME credit figures in Table 27. The sector receiving the second 
largest share of MSME credit – after trade – was industry. However, Table 27 shows 
that the share of trade rose as the share of industry fell between 2001 and 2006.  
 The overall dominance of trade in sectoral loan allocation is explained by the 
role of trade in the Indonesian economy. The share of non-agricultural firms engaged in 
trade rose from 55 per cent in 1986 to 58 per cent in 1996 and 59 per cent in 2006.415 A 
breakdown of number of firms by firm-size category shows that outside of agriculture 
the majority of microenterprises were in trade in 1996 and 2006 (unfortunately there is 
no data on number of firms by firm-size category and sector in the 1986 Economic 
Census).416 However, the same comparison shows that the largest non-agricultural sector 
in which both small- and medium-sized firms were engaged in 1996 was manufacturing, 
but that this had shifted to trade by 2006. This shift is clearly visible in the change of 
sectoral allocation of MSME credit shown in Table 27.  
                                            
412 Leonardus T. Schmit, 1991, Rural Credit Between Subsidy and Market: Adjustment of Village Units of Bank 
Rakyat Indonesia in Sociological Perspective, Leiden: Faculty of Social Sciences, Leiden University, p. 194. 
413 Thee Kian Wie, 1993, ‘Industrial Structure and Small and Medium Enterprise Development in 
Indonesia’, EDI Working Paper, p. 13. 
414 Lisa Cameron, 1999, ‘Survey of Recent Developments’, Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies, 35(1):3-40, 
p. 17. 
415 Calculated from Indonesian Economic Census data 
416 See Table 40 and Table 41 in the Appendix for underlying data 
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Table 24: Cumulative KIK/KMKP Credit by Sector 1980 and 1985 (in per cent) 
 1980 1985 
 KIK KMKP KIK KMKP 
Agriculture 16.0 7.6 12.8 6.0 
Industry 13.3 16.2 13.0 10.7 
Trade 28.5 68.7 34.2 69.1 
Transport 30.1 1.4 23.5 0.7 
Other 11.3 8.0 16.5 13.4 
Total 100 100 100 100 
Source: Central Project Management Unit, Cooperative and Small Credit Department, Bank Indonesia, 
1986, Economic Impact of KIK/KMKP (SEDPI and SEDP II), Jakarta: Bank Indonesia, Table 2.4. 
 
Table 25: Kupedes Loans by Sector, 1987-92 (in per cent) 
 1987 1990 1991 1992 
Trade 63 58.3 58.9 60.0 
Agriculture 32 23.7 23.4 23.2 
Industry 2 2.3 2.3 2.2 
Fixed Income n/a 11.4 11.0 10.1 
Other 3 4.3 4.4 4.5 
Total 100 100 100 100 
Sources: 1987 from Leonardus T. Schmit, 1991, Rural Credit Between Subsidy and Market: Adjustment of 
Village Units of Bank Rakyat Indonesia in Sociological Perspective, Leiden: Faculty of Social Sciences, Leiden 
University, p. 317, Table 9; 1990-1992 from World Bank, 1994, Project Completion Report: Indonesia – 
BRI/Kupedes Small Credit Project (Loan 2800-IND, Report No, 12973, Washington, DC: World Bank, Annex 
10. 
Table 26: KUK by Sector, 1997-2001 (in per cent) 
 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
Agriculture 10.0 16.7 20.7 16.4 17.6 
Industry 10.0 3.9 3.0 3.0 4.0 
Trade, Restaurant & Hotel 28.1 23.5 23.7 18.2 19.7 
Services 16.5 12.3 9.1 8.3 8.0 
Others 35.5 43.6 43.5 54.1 50.7 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 
Source: Calculated from data from Bank Indonesia Annual Report (various years), Jakarta: BI. 
Notes: The share of “others” is very large, but unfortunately there is no explanation of what this 
comprises in Bank Indonesia’s Annual Reports, Bank Indonesia’s Monthly Financial Statistics or 
Indonesia’s Statistical Yearbooks.  
 
Table 27: MSME Credit by Sector, 2001-2006 (in per cent) 
 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Agriculture 5.4 5.3 4.2 4.5 3.7 3.5 
Mining  0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 
Industry 12.4 13.7 11.8 9.8 8.8 8.6 
Electricity, Water & Gas 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.3 
Construction 2.5 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.1 2.4 
Trade 21.8 24.0 25.5 24.8 25.3 26.7 
Transportation 2.1 2.3 2.5 2.2 1.8 1.5 
Business Services 4.4 5.0 6.4 5.7 6.0 5.9 
Social Services 1.3 1.4 1.4 1.6 1.4 1.4 
Others 49.7 45.7 45.7 48.9 50.6 49.3 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Source: Bank Indonesia Annual Report (various years), Jakarta: BI. 
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Notes: The share of “others” is very large, but unfortunately there is no explanation of what this 
comprises in Bank Indonesia’s Annual Reports, Bank Indonesia’s Monthly Financial Statistics or 
Indonesia’s Statistical Yearbooks.  
4.3 State Pawnshops 
Many of the popular credit institutions established during the colonial period took a 
hard hit in the post-independence era, in particular state pawnshops and village banks. 
Booth showed that in the post-independence period loans from pawnshops at first 
dropped drastically by 80 per cent from 1940 to 1951 and then slowly increased, but still 
remained far below the level sustained during the Dutch period.417 Figure 29 builds on 
the work of Booth and expands the dataset to compare the loans outstanding of the 
popular credit system in the late colonial period to the Old Order period. Figure 29 
shows that state pawnshops only recovered their pre-war lending volume by 1960, but 
then reversed into a rapid decline as inflation accelerated into hyperinflation and the 
public started to lose confidence in the Indonesian currency.418 Village banks did not 
recover their pre-war levels. The figures have been deflated to 1953 prices using the 
index of average retail prices in Jakarta of 15 home produced and 15 imported 
consumption articles. The high repayment rate in Figure 29 as well as in Figure 30 
provides further evidence that state pawnshops in Indonesia do not just serve the 
poorest in times of need, but have been an important source of working capital loans 
for the rural population.419  
 
                                            
417 Anne Booth, 1998, The Indonesian Economy in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries: A History of Missed 
Opportunities, Basingstoke: Macmillan and New York: St. Martin’s Press, p. 315. 
418 Heinz Arndt, 1966, ‘Banking in Hyperinflation’, Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies, 2(5): 45-70, p. 53. 
419 The repayment rate comes with the caveat of being a rather crude measure: it is calculated as the ratio 
of amount borrowed to amount repaid in any given year, hence does not factor in that some loans carry-
over to the next year and does not reflect arrears. 
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Figure 29: State Pawnshops and Village Banks: Loans Outstanding, 1938-66 
(IDR million, 1953 prices) 
  
Source: data from The Java Bank (De Javasche Bank), Report for the Financial Year 1952-53, Jakarta: The 
Java Bank; BI, Report for the Year 1954-55, Jakarta: BI; BI, Statistical Pocketbook of Indonesia 1959, Jakarta: 
BI; BI, Statistical Pocketbook of Indonesia 1968-69, Jakarta: BI. 
Notes: Deflated with index of average retail prices in Jakarta of 15 home produced and 15 imported 
consumption articles (1953 prices) from Statistical Pocketbook of Indonesia 1968-69, pp. 377-9, Table 
XVI.3&4; 
No data available for 1939-1950;  
Loan repayment calculated as the ratio of amount repaid over amount borrowed from state pawnshops in 
a year. 
 
Figure 30 shows how these institutions continued during the New Order period, the 
Asian Financial Crisis and its aftermath. Unlike village banks, state pawnshops played a 
role in small-scale business credit.420  The significance of state pawnshops is also 
reflected in their credit volume. The data shows that state pawnshops began to recover 
as the currency stabilised and the economy recovered in the late 1960s. Until 1990 
outstanding loans increased quite steadily until government regulation No 10 in 1990 
changed the legal status of pawnshops to profit-oriented state enterprise/public 
corporations (from Perjan Pegadaian to Perum Pegadaian), after which lending expanded 
                                            
420 Jan T.M. van Laanen, 1990, ‘Between the Java Bank and the Chinese Moneylender: banking and Credit 
in Colonial Indonesia’, in: Anne Booth, W.J. O’Malley and Anna Weidemann (Eds.), Indonesian Economic 
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much more rapidly. State pawnshops played an important role during the Asian 
Financial Crisis not just to assist the low income groups, but Bank Indonesia reported 
that the sluggish banking industry led a large number of debtors to seek out pawnshops 
as an alternate source of short-term working capital credit.421 In 1998 the number of 
clients of state pawnshops increased by over 90 per cent.422 
By 1990 state pawnshops had five different credit schemes, which ranged from 
a minimum loan size of IDR 5,000 (USD 3) to loans of more than IDR 20 million 
(USD 11,000). Interest rates increased with loan size and ranged from 1.25 per cent per 
15 days for loans up to IDR 150,000 (USD 80) to 1.75 per cent for loans of more than 
IDR 500,000 (USD 270). Standard loan maturity was 120 days, but it was common to 
use the same collateral for loan renewal.423 
Pawnshops have historically been an important source for working and 
investment capital for entrepreneurs; a number of policy changes later formalised and 
expanded that role.424 Bank Indonesia announced a new policy in 1995 to “widen pawn 
services from low income customers to also include middle-income customers by 
broadening lending services coverage and offering innovative products”, which included 
new services offered and increasing loan sizes.425 The role of state pawnshops in 
providing SME finance was formalised with Minister of Finance Letter No. S-121/MK-
06/2004, which appointed state pawnshops as one of the “Operating Financial 
Institutions for the extension of MSME credit”.426 The outreach of state pawnshops was 
further increased when BRI units and state pawnshops began offering each other’s 
services in 2006.427 A 2008 World Bank study found that 25 per cent of state pawnshop 
                                            
421 Bank Indonesia, 1999, Annual Report 1998/1999, Jakarta: BI, p. 100. 
422 Bank Indonesia, 1999, Annual Report 1998/1999, Jakarta: BI, p. 100. 
423 Detlev Holloh, 2001, ProFI Microfinance Institutions Study, Denpasar: Bank Indonesia & German 
Technical Cooperation (GTZ), p. 36. 
424 On the role of state pawnshops in financing small-scale business activities during the late colonial 
period see: John S Furnivall, 1934, ‘State pawnshops in Netherlands India’, in: Studies in the Social and 
Economic Development of the Netherlands East Indies, III, University of Rangoon, p. 11. 
425 Bank Indonesia, 1996, Annual Report 1995/1996, Jakarta: BI, pp. 90-91. 
426 Bank Indonesia, 2004, Annual Report 2004, Jakarta: BI, p. 104. 
427 Bank Indonesia, 2006, Annual Report 2006, Jakarta: BI, p. 172. 
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borrowers used their loans to finance their businesses and a further 15 per cent of 
borrowers used their loans for mixed purposes (personal and business).428 
 
Figure 30: State Pawnshops and Village Banks: Loans Outstanding, 1966-2006 
(IDR billion, 2006 prices) 
 Source: Data for 1966-77 from BPS, Statistical Pocketbook of Indonesia (various years), Jakarta: BPS; Data for 
1978-2006 from BPS, Statistical Yearbook of Indonesia (various years), Jakarta: BPS. 
Notes: From 1990 onwards village banks comprise both Bank Desa and Lumbung Desa, for visual 
simplification the data series has been combined throughout in this chart;  
Loan repayment calculated as the ratio of amount repaid over amount borrowed from state pawnshops in 
a year 
 
4.4 Financing and Access to Credit of Indonesian Manufacturing 
SMEs 
Section 4.1.3 showed that in absolute terms the credit volume dispersed to small-scale 
businesses increased over the New Order period. The previous chapter, as we have 
seen, found that lack of credit was the main obstacle identified by firms to their 
                                            
428 Results reported in World Bank, 2010, Improving Access to Financial Services in Indonesia, 








































































































































































Villagebanks (Bank Desa & Lumbung Desa combined)
Share of pawnshop loans repaid
Chapter 4: Access to Credit for Indonesian SMEs in the 20th Century 
 
 184 
business development, though its importance seems to have declined. This section uses 
the same economic census data for a case study on how financing and access to credit 
changed for Indonesian manufacturing SMEs with the rise of the various SME credit 
schemes. 
Table 28 shows that the majority of micro and small manufacturing enterprises 
in Indonesia were self-financed. In absolute terms the number of firms using loan 
facilities in general, and banks specifically, increased between 1986 and 2006. However, 
only the share of manufacturing microenterprises using a loan facility increased between 
1986 and 1996 (9.2 per cent of all microenterprises in 1986 and 13.1 per cent in 1996 
used a loan facility), while the share of all small-scale enterprises using a loan facility 
actually fell (from 43.1 per cent of all small-scale enterprises in 1986 to 26.8 per cent in 
1996). The share of firms whose main loan came from banks actually fell in both firm-
size categories (from 1.7 per cent in 1986 to 1.5 per cent in 1996 for microenterprises 
and from 21.5 per cent in 1986 to 11.3 per cent in 1996 for all small-scale enterprises). 
When grouping together microenterprises and small-scale enterprises to make 1986 and 
1996 comparable with the 2006 data the share of firms using loan facilities grew from 
11.3 per cent in 1986 to 14.3 per cent in 1996 and 15.9 per cent in 2006. This 
continuous growth was driven by microenterprises, which constituted a growing 
majority in the firm-size distribution.  However, when grouping together micro and 
small-scale enterprises the share of firms fell as expected between 1986 and 1996 (from 
2.9 per cent to 2.3 per cent), but then grew to a peak of 4 per cent in 2006. To interpret 
these developments this section first disentangles loans received from banks to separate 
out the various credit schemes; the second step is to look at the reasons manufacturing 
firms give for not having a loan. 
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Table 28: Source of Main Loan of Manufacturing Micro and Small-scale Enterprises, 1986-2006 (Number of Establishments) 
 
Total Number of 
establishments 




















































































































Sources: Calculated from data from BPS, Economic Censuses (1986, 1996, 2006), Jakarta: BPS. 
Notes: Microenterprises are firms with 1-4 workers, small-scale enterprises employ 5-19 workers. 
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Table 29 shows how many micro and small manufacturing firms took a loan from the 
various schemes discussed in the preceding section. The census results show that in 
1986 KIK and KMKP loans constituted the vast majority of bank loans to micro and 
small-scale businesses. The major caveat here is that the 1986 census results did not list 
Kupedes loans as a separate category. However, Schmit’s analysis of the sectoral 
classification of the Kupedes loan portfolio showed that in 1987 there were 21,649 
loans outstanding classified as industrial loans.429 This indicates that in 1986, two years 
after its introduction, Kupedes was already playing an important role in financing micro 
and small manufacturing enterprises and that in terms of number of loans Kupedes was 
not trailing far behind the government-subsidised KIK/KMKP schemes. In 1986 0.7 
per cent of all manufacturing microenterprises and 3.4 per cent of small enterprises said 
that they had a KIK loan, while for KMKP these figures were 0.6 per cent and 6.1 per 
cent respectively. In 1990 KIK/KMKP were converted into KUK, the small business 
credit scheme that required banks to extend 20 per cent of their loans to small 
businesses. The comparison shows that in 1996 fewer firms had obtained loans under 
KUK than in 1986 from KIK/KMKP. The 1996 census shows that Kupedes not only 
played an important role in financing microenterprises (0.6 per cent of manufacturing 
microenterprises had taken up a Kupedes loan), but also in financing small enterprises 
(3 per cent of manufacturing small enterprises had a Kupedes loan, compared to 3.8 per 
cent that had received credit under KUK). 
 
Table 29: Type of Small-scale Business Credit Scheme/Loan Product Accessed 




















9,774 8,521 n/a n/a 8,043 45,837 
1986 Small 
enterprises 
3,222 5,717 n/a n/a n/a 18,763 
1996 
Microenterprises 
1,775 n/a 13,559 14,758 n/a 8,881 
1996 Small 
enterprises 
2,969 n/a 9,245 7,326 n/a 7,777 
Source: Data from BPS, 1986 and 1996 Economic Censuses, Jakarta: BPS. 
 
                                            
429 Leonardus T. Schmit, 1991, Rural Credit Between Subsidy and Market: Adjustment of Village Units of Bank 
Rakyat Indonesia in Sociological Perspective, Leiden: Faculty of Social Sciences, Leiden University, p. 317. 
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The question remains that if lack of access to credit is the most commonly cited 
constraint, then why did not more firms ask for a loan? The 1996 and 2006 Economic 
Censuses have asked firms about the main reason for not taking a bank loan. 
Unfortunately no such data are available for 1986. It should be borne in mind that the 
share of micro and small enterprises that did not have a bank loan stayed roughly the 
same between 1996 and 2006 (see Table 28). The 2006 economic census results 
reported more options than the 1996 survey allowed for. Captured in “others” in the 
2006 results in Table 30 were the micro and small enterprises that reported the reason 
for not having a loan was that their proposal had been rejected, but these only 
constituted 1.4 per cent of all firms that did not have external funding. Comparing the 
1996 and 2006 results in Table 30 shows that procedural issues in accessing formal 
finance were on the rise. While lack of interest in obtaining a loan constituted the most 
frequently given reason in both 1996 and 2006, the share dropped sharply. These results 
indicate that access to credit was a pervasive issue for Indonesian SMEs during the New 
Order period and beyond. 
 
Table 30:  Reasons for not having a Loan of Manufacturing Micro and Small-
scale Enterprises, 1996-2006 (in per cent) 
 Do not lack 
capital / not 
interested in 
bank loan 
Do not know 
/ difficulty 
with 
procedure Lack collateral Other 
1996 Microenterprises 79.9 5.4 10.3 4.5 
1996 Small enterprises 82.2 3.9 8.7 5.2 
2006 Micro & small 
enterprises 
50.5 29.4 18.7 1.4 
Source: Data from BPS, 1996 and 2006 Economic Censuses, Jakarta: BPS. 
 
4.5 Access to Credit in Comparative Perspective 
Drawing on the experiences of South Korea and Taiwan helps shed light on how 
Indonesia performed in relative terms and ties into the comparative approach of the 
previous chapter. The previous chapter argued that the differences in firm size 
distribution between South Korea and Taiwan can be largely attributed to government 
policy. The cases of South Korea and Taiwan are of particular interest here given the 
similarities with Indonesia in terms of industrial policy histories, shifting from import 
substitution policies towards export orientation as part of general shifts towards market-
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liberalisation and privatisation. However, the similarities between South Korea, Taiwan 
and Indonesia extend beyond their industrial policy histories. Both South Korea and 
Taiwan significantly improved access to finance and credit for SMEs from the late 
1970s onwards, around the time when the Indonesian government introduced a number 
of programmes to provide small-scale business credit. The previous chapter showed 
that Indonesia suffered from a missing middle compared to South Korea and Taiwan, 
and identified access to credit as one of the main constraints. The question follows 
whether differences in access to credit help explain this divergence in firm-size 
distribution. 
South Korean SMEs in the 1960s and 1970s were relatively disadvantaged by 
the aim of the South Korean government to lower the debt-equity ratio and the 
prioritisation of heavy and chemical industries, which naturally favours large enterprises 
because of its capital-intensity and economies of scale.430 This strengthened South 
Korean large enterprises, resulting in their increasing share in employment and value 
added until the mid- to late 1970s. As a result of large enterprise-favouritism it was 
difficult for SMEs to get access to credit until the 1980s.431 From the late 1970s 
onwards, however, the share of SMEs in South Korean manufacturing industry grew as 
their access to finance improved. The 1980s saw an overall shift of South Korean 
government policy towards active support for SME development, which also extended 
to the formal financial market.432  This credit preference given to South Korean SMEs 
from the late 1970s to the early 1990s contributed to the increasing share of SMEs in 
employment and value-added in manufacturing industry. These policies were designed 
“to offset the discriminatory access to credit in the 1970s and to prevent credit market 
domination by large firms”.433 
                                            
430 The greater dependence of SMEs on credit is discussed in Keishi Sugiura, 2002, Japan: The Role of 
SMEs in the Mature Economy, in Charles Harvie and Boon-Chye Lee (Eds.), The Role of SMEs in National 
Economies in East Asia (pp. 325-350), Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing Limited, p. 337. 
431 Linsu Kim and Jeffrey B. Nugent, 1994, The Republic of Korea’s Small and Medium Size Enterprises 
and Their Support Systems, World Bank Policy Research Working Paper, 1404, p. 30; Jeffrey B. Nugent and 
Seung-Jae Yhee, 2001, Small and Medium Enterprises in Korea: Achievements, Constraints and Policy Issues, 
Washington, D.C.: IBRD/The World Bank, p. 22. 
432 Nakki Baek and Wonchan Ra, 2001, Entrepreneurship in Korea: An Analysis of Factors Affecting SME Start-
Up, Seoul: Korea Institute for Industrial Economics and Trade (KIET), p. 35. 
433 Heather Smith, 2000, Industry Policy in Taiwan and Korea in the 1980s: Winning with the Market, 
Cheltenham/Northampton: Edward Elgar Publishing Limited, p. 107. 
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Similar to Indonesia in the 1950s, the South Korean government took control 
over financial institutions in the 1950s, which left SMEs largely dependent on informal 
finance.434 As a result of the increasing political influence over the banking sector, banks 
had little decision-making power over the allocation of credit in South Korea in the 
1960s and in Indonesia in the 1950s and 1960s.435 Moreover, Dollar and Sokoloff’s 
account of credit starved South Korean SMEs in the 1970s leading to a dualistic 
industrial structure in which large enterprises used modern technology and small firms 
used more traditional methods and were lower in productivity bears strong similarities 
with the situation of Indonesian SMEs at the time.436 The late 1970s and 1980s marked 
a significant change in South Korean SME policy and improvement of access to finance 
for South Korean SMEs, at a time when Indonesia began introducing its various SME 
credit programmes. In 1976 South Korea introduced an SME lending quota: 35 per cent 
for national commercial banks and 80 per cent for local commercial banks.437 While this 
is impressive by comparison to Indonesia’s 20 per cent, South Korean SMEs at the time 
were defined as enterprises with 5-299 workers whereas in Indonesia all enterprises with 
more than 100 workers were considered large firms. At least on paper, South Korean 
and Indonesian SME credit policies were more similar than expected at the time, given 
the difference in roles SMEs played in the two economies. 
While Taiwan did not follow directly discriminatory policies in its granting of 
credit, large enterprises with their higher credit ratings (better bookkeeping and 
accounting systems) were more likely to receive a loan from commercial banks.438 Yet 
SMEs similarly relied much more on loans as a capital source than did large enterprises 
(e.g. 41.3 per cent on average of all SMEs 1987-1991, compared to 29.8 per cent of all 
large enterprises), whereas the primary capital source for Taiwanese large enterprises 
                                            
434 Yung Chul Park, 1991, ‘The Development of Financial Institutions and the Role of Government in 
Credit Allocation’ in:  Lee-Jay Cho and Yoon Hyung Kim (Eds.), Economic Development in the Republic of 
Korea: a Policy Perspective (pp. 45-72), Honolulu: East-West Center, pp. 50, 70. 
435 Yung Chul Park, 1991, ‘The Development of Financial Institutions and the Role of Government in 
Credit Allocation’ in: Lee-Jay Cho and Yoon Hyung Kim (Eds.), Economic Development in the Republic of 
Korea: a Policy Perspective (pp. 45-72), Honolulu: East-West Center, p. 48. 
436 David Dollar and Kenneth Sokoloff, 1994, ‘Industrial Policy, Productivity Growth, and Structural 
Change in the Manufacturing Industries: A Comparison of South Korea and Taiwan’, in: Joel Aberbach, 
David Dollar and Kenneth Sokoloff, The Role of the State in Taiwan’s Development (pp. 5-25), Armonk, NY: 
M. E. Sharpe, p. 10. 
437 Nak Ki Baek, 1992, ‘The exploitation of niche markets by small and medium Korean enterprises’, 
Small Enterprise Development, 3(3):48-53, p. 49. 
438 Kuo-Ting Li, 1995, The Evolution of Policy Behind Taiwan’s Development Success (2nd Edition), Singapore: 
World Scientific Publishing, p. 233. 
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was equity (27.7 per cent for SMEs compared to 46 per cent for large enterprises 1987-
1991).439 In 1969 the Taiwanese government announced it would “raise funds for 
providing financial assistance to [SMEs] in meeting their need for medium- and long-
term capital”.440 In the 1970s the difficulty experienced by SMEs in obtaining credit was 
further aggravated by the recession and inflation caused by the oil crisis of 1973, to 
which Taiwanese financial institutions responded with more conservative loan 
requirements. Until 1975 banks were legally prohibited from granting credit for more 
than 70 per cent of the appraised value of collateral.441 The government thus established 
the Small and Medium Enterprise Credit Guarantee Fund of Taiwan (SMEG) as a non-
profit organization in 1974 to help SMEs “cope with these situations”.442 Because of the 
higher risk associated with SME loans lenders preferred short-term loans. In 1977, 70 
per cent of bank loans matured within one year and only 8 per cent of loans had a 
maturity of more than 7 years. This decreased gradually, and in 1996 only 33% of loans 
matured within one year and loans with a maturity of more than seven years increased 
to 41 per cent.443 Providing assistance to SMEs to obtain long-term investments was 
thus identified as a policy goal in the Ten-Year Economic Development Plan (1980-
1989), and credit facilities for SMEs in Taiwan “saw drastic improvement in the 
1980s”.444 In her analysis of the sources of finance of Taiwanese enterprises, Smith 
shows that between 1985 and 1995 37-46 per cent of SMEs relied on formal finance.445  
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The share of Taiwanese SME loans fluctuated between 30-40 per cent of total 
credit between 1972 and 1999.446 For South Korea the share of SME loans out of total 
credit extended by commercial banks grew from 33 per cent in 1979 to 50 per cent in 
1995.447 The ratio of Indonesian small-scale business loans to total credit presented in 
Figure 22 comes with the caveat that it only covers small-scale business lending until 
2001, but shows that the ratio of small-scale business credit to total credit in Indonesia 
fell from 31 per cent in 1990 to 17 per cent in 1996. In 2001 Bank Indonesia began 
publishing MSME credit as a separate category, which grew from 38 per cent of total 
lending in 2001 to 53 per cent in 2006. Any comparison of Indonesia with South Korea 
and Taiwan is complicated by the different firm-size categories grouped into SMEs and 
the lack of separate data on medium-sized business credit in Indonesia prior to 2001, 
but interpreting the data with caution indicates that in the 1990s up until the Asian 
Financial Crisis (a) Indonesian SMEs were roughly on a par with Taiwanese SMEs in 
terms of share of bank loans extended to SMEs relative to total credit; and (b) that both 
lagged considerably behind South Korea. 
4.6 Concluding Remarks 
This chapter has shown the rise of small-scale business credit programmes in the 1970s 
and 1980s. The introduction of these programmes was part of an effort to make credit 
available for off-farm activities. Up until the introduction of KIK/KMKP in 1973 and 
then Kredit Mini in 1974, the vast majority of small-scale credit was only available to the 
agricultural sector and within that mainly for food crops (i.e. the large-scale rice 
intensification programme BIMAS). The rapid expansion of KIK/KMKP, Kredit Mini 
and Kredit Midi revealed that there was a large, thereto unmet demand for non-
agricultural small-scale credit.  
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Despite the introduction of these credit programmes, access to credit continued 
to remain an issue for small-scale businesses in Indonesia throughout the New Order 
period and beyond. The majority of small firms did not benefit from SME-targeted 
credit programmes. Larger small-scale as well as medium-sized firms were more likely to 
benefit from KIK/KMKP and the SME-lending quota (KUK) than smaller firms. The 
sectoral comparison showed that manufacturing SMEs were relatively disadvantaged, 
given the higher lending risk and complexity of project appraisal. In turn, firms seeking 
loans for trading activities were at a comparative advantage, given lower lending risk and 
preference for short-term working capital loans. Another group with a structural 
disadvantage in obtaining formal finance were small, new firms. The vast majority of 
KIK/KMKP loans were given to existing firms. Grizzell argued that access to credit 
generally appeared to be a key constraint for start-ups.448 McLeod, a passionate critic of 
concessional credit programmes for SMEs, acknowledged in a study on Indonesia that 
access to finance is “often considerably more expensive to small firms”. However, 
McLeod continued to argue that given the higher financial uncertainty of lending to a 
new borrower without an established reputation, higher lending costs were in line with 
Pareto efficiency and hence not a market imperfection.449 
 The analysis of the various SME-targeted credit programmes and the success of 
Kupedes indicate that the issue for SMEs in accessing formal finance was not high rates 
of interest. The design of Kupedes implemented many lessons learned from Kredit 
Mini and Midi as well as the negative experience of KIK/KMKP. These included 
simplified loan application assessment procedures; profit incentives for bank staff to 
ensure loan collection; returning a quota of the interest payments to customers and 
increasing loan size upon timely repayment of all instalments by the (exact) due date to 
encourage loan repayment; and setting market interest rates to ensure viability of the 
lending scheme. However, despite the success of Kupedes as a result of all the 
differences in design to KIK/KMKP in particular, the SME lending quota introduced 
in 1990 failed to learn from the still-fresh experience of Kupedes and thus did little to 
address, or compensate for, the inherent issues SMEs have in accessing formal finance 
(lack of collateral and difficulty proving creditworthiness). This resulted in a flexible 
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interpretation by the banks of what type of lending qualified in fulfilling their lending 
obligation, in particular giving consumer loans to SME-owners directly rather than 
actual business credit.  
However, contrary to the failure of implementing lessons learned with the SME 
lending quota, BRI itself did learn from the Kupedes experience. Following the Asian 
financial crisis BRI was restructured in 2000. BRI extended its market-led strategy to all 
its SME business segments, including consumer, small commercial and medium-size 
enterprise credit, while limiting its (formerly loss-making) large enterprise exposure to 
20 per cent of its portfolio. As a result, in the two decades to follow, BRI redefined 
itself as an SME bank and became the largest and most profitable of Indonesia’s 
commercial banks and a model for other banks. 
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Chapter 5: Conclusion 
This dissertation has analysed how the role of SMEs in the Indonesian economy 
changed over time and how the Government’s SME policies evolved, with a particular 
focus on the New Order period. The analysis was guided by two overarching questions: 
(1) What factors influenced the creation and success of SMEs? (2) How did SME 
development in turn affect the national business landscape? Point of departure is the 
observation in the literature that the structure of Indonesian business lacks a middle 
range. As a theoretical framework my analysis applies the Asian development model. 
This includes, amongst others, systematic comparisons with the experiences of South 
Korea and Taiwan. The main finding emphasises the need to differentiate between 
small enterprises belonging to the traditional sector with little growth potential and 
medium enterprises of the modern manufacturing sector resembling the modem 
dynamic SMEs in South Korea and Taiwan. The ‘missing middle’ in Indonesia refers to 
missing medium enterprises rather than SMEs overall. This weakness in terms of 
business structure is linked to path dependence reaching back to late colonial and 
immediate post-independence periods. Self-financing is found to form persistent 
bottlenecks in the development of small enterprises. 
This dissertation makes an important qualification to the existing literature on 
Indonesian SMEs. While small and medium enterprises are often grouped together 
there are important differences between the two groups in the case of Indonesia. Small 
and medium enterprises played different roles in the Indonesian manufacturing sector. 
Small firms, along with microenterprises, showed relatively low value added per worker 
and were concentrated in a few light and labour-intensive industrial subsectors. In 
contrast, medium-sized firms were much more diversified in their activities and had a 
value added per worker relative to large enterprises that was comparable with South 
Korea and Taiwan at similar stages of economic development. The 1996 and 2006 
Economic Census data showed that in terms of value added per worker medium-sized 
firms had even outperformed large enterprises in some industrial subsectors. This 
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indicates that medium-sized firms in Indonesia were part of the structural industrial 
transformation and drivers of growth, while small-scale enterprises for the most part 
remained part of the domestic traditional sector. 
5.1 The Role of Path-dependence in Indonesian SME 
Development 
Chapter two showed how the New Order government inherited a weak indigenous 
entrepreneurial class from colonial Indonesia, reinforced by Indonesia’s first 
independent government. Japan invaded Indonesia in 1942.  Rule under Japanese 
occupation at first took steps to strengthen Indonesian entrepreneurship, but these were 
short-lasting. By 1943 it began to restructure the Indonesian economy to support its war 
efforts, abandoning earlier investments into economic and human capital development. 
When Indonesia gained independence in 1945, the government was faced with a largely 
unskilled labour force, due to insufficient investments into education and little 
opportunity to gain business experience in Dutch firms.  
Under President Sukarno, the government attempted to strengthen indigenous 
entrepreneurship with policies such as the Benteng (Fortress) programme. The 
introduction of the Benteng programme in April 1950 restricted import licenses for 
certain commodities to indigenous importers. However, due to shortcomings in 
education and vocational training, as well as the high working capital requirement for 
eligibility, only few indigenous Indonesian importers benefited from the programme. 
Benteng and other similar measures to promote indigenous entrepreneurship during the 
1950s were largely ineffective. Instead, they were plagued by corruption. Rather than 
contribute to an emerging new entrepreneurial class they fostered growth of a small 
group of rent-seekers. 
Moreover, the Old Order government’s ideological shift towards nationalism 
and growing hostility towards private capitalism created an environment unconducive to 
private sector development. By 1958 the regime abandoned attempts to strengthen 
indigenous entrepreneurs limiting economic power wielded by foreigners, in particular 
the Dutch and the Chinese. Instead the government focussed on nationalising foreign 
enterprises and bringing key sectors under the control of state-owned enterprises as part 
of its move towards a ‘guided economy’. As has been discussed in more detail in the 
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fourth chapter, these shifts also had an impact on credit allocation. Public firms were 
favoured over private as were national enterprises favoured over foreign. With 
accelerating inflation political influence played a growing role in credit allocation 
reinforcing these trends leaving the majority of private firms starved of formal credit. 
The policies of the 1950s and 1960s made it difficult for indigenous businesses to grow. 
 The analysis of government development plans in the third chapter showed that 
this legacy translated into the New Order government’s perception of indigenous 
enterprises as weak, in need of government support and protection. Accordingly, the 
New Order government began introducing SME support policies in the early 1970s 
motivated by welfare considerations, in particular to promote income equality and 
labour absorption. Reflections on the potential of a dynamic SME sector and its role in 
contributing to overall economic development appeared in policy documents only 
relatively late. Repelita IV (1984-89) was the first five-year government development 
plan to even mention the potential of the value added of SMEs. 
5.2 Changing Patterns in Indonesian Firm-size Distribution  
The third chapter showed that during the New Order period the firm-size distribution 
of the manufacturing sector moved from very many microenterprises and a few large 
enterprises towards a decline of the micro segment to the benefit of small and large 
firms. In other words, the firm-size distribution of the Indonesian manufacturing sector 
in the 1970s exhibited a ‘missing top’. With the subsequent declining share in number of 
establishments and employment of microenterprises at one end and rising share of large 
enterprises at the other end, a ‘missing middle’ began to emerge. When measured in 
terms of share of number of establishments, this appeared as a more gradual 
development. However, the employment share-based data set reveals that this shift 
happened between the 1974/75 Industrial Census and the 1986 Economic Census – 
and continued to persist beyond the end of the New Order period and the aftermath of 
the Asian Financial Crisis. This structural transformation of the manufacturing sector in 
terms of the rise of large enterprises is consistent with the observation in the 
Indonesian economic development literature that the liberalisation and deregulation 
measures in the early 1980s paved the way for the rise of private enterprise in Indonesia. 
While these overall trends generally held everywhere in Indonesia, there was still 
considerable regional variation. The share of microenterprises in manufacturing 
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declined everywhere in Indonesia but still constituted a much larger share in the poorest 
regions, particularly Sulawesi and Eastern Indonesia. In contrast, Java saw the sharpest 
decline of microenterprises in manufacturing establishments and employment. 
Conversely large enterprises constituted a much smaller share of the regional economies 
of Sulawesi and Eastern Indonesia than in the rest of Indonesia, while Java had the 
greatest share of large as well as medium-sized enterprises throughout this period. This 
variation reflects the unevenness of the process of industrial development in Indonesia.  
The comparison of the Indonesian firm-size distribution with South Korea and 
Taiwan at a time when they had roughly the same GDP per capital levels showed that 
(a) this missing middle could not be explained by Indonesia’s stage of economic 
development, as well as (b) the differences extended beyond firm-size distribution. 
Indonesia’s SMEs also played a different role in the national economy. Indonesian 
micro and small-scale enterprises had much lower value added per worker during the 
New Order period than in Taiwan and South Korea during the benchmark years of 
comparison. However, interestingly the value added per worker of medium-sized firms 
relative to large firms was comparable between the three countries. Given that 
Indonesian medium-sized firms are so much more productive than micro and small-
scale enterprises, the persistence of the missing middle was an even more worrying 
development. Indonesian SME support programmes generally targeted micro and 
small-scale firms, instead of focussing on the SME segment with growth potential. This 
was the result of the perception of weak indigenous entrepreneurship that needed to be 
supported on welfare grounds. 
5.3 SME Growth and Access to Credit 
The fourth chapter focused on access to small-scale business credit, one of the most 
commonly identified constraints to SME development in general, which was also 
confirmed in the analysis of issues faced by Indonesian manufacturing SMEs in the 
third chapter. In the 1970s there was a shift from agricultural credit (particularly for 
food crop cultivation) towards small-scale business credit with the introduction of a 
number of subsidised directed credit programmes. These programmes included the 
small-scale investment credit programme KIK and its working capital counterpart 
KMKP (introduced in 1973); Kredit Mini (introduced in 1974), which offered loans for 
non-agricultural activities of small-scale businesses too small to qualify for 
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KIK/KMKP; and Kredit Midi (introduced in 1981), which served the small-scale 
business segment either too large for or graduated from Kredit Mini and still too small 
for KIK/KMKP.  
However, there were a number of issues in the design and implementation of 
these directed credit programmes, which all fall under a policy approach of supply 
leading finance. The lessons learned were implemented in the transformation in the 
early 1980s of the former village units (unit desa) of BRI as heavily loss-making providers 
of subsidized targeted credit into highly profitable microbanking units as market-led 
financial intermediaries. They comprised two principal mutually reinforcing products, 
both applying market rates of interest: Kupedes, a general credit loan product, and 
Simpedes, a very attractive savings product mobilizing the resources for the ever-
growing number and size of Kupedes loans. Initially a rural loan product when it was 
introduced in 1984, Kupedes became a general loan product with the expansion of BRI 
units into urban areas in 1989. With the transformation of BRI into an SME bank 
around 2000, the units became the strategic model for the transition from supply 
leading to sustainable market-led finance. 
The rapid expansion and high repayment rate of Kupedes demonstrated that the 
issue for SMEs in accessing formal finance was not high interest rates and hence that 
subsidised SME credit programmes were not the solution. Instead, offering successively 
larger loan sizes upon full timely repayments made it possible for firms to prove 
creditworthiness without the barrier of large collateral requirements. Kupedes also 
showed the importance of simplified loan application and approval procedures, which 
constituted a barrier for many firms to apply for KIK/KMKP as well as Kredit Mini 
and Kredit Midi loans. 
The case study of access to finance for small-scale manufacturing firms linked 
the third and fourth chapter, using the same Economic Census data. The case study 
showed that the majority of small-scale manufacturing firms have been self-financed. 
The share of micro and small-scale enterprises whose main loan came from banks fell 
for both firm-size categories between 1986 and 1996. This leads to the larger question, 
why didn’t more SMEs ask for a loan, given that access to credit was identified as a 
main constraint? This question is particularly relevant in light of the proliferation of 
small-scale business credit programmes. As expected, lack of collateral remained a 
pertinent issue. Particularly the high collateral requirements of KIK/KMKP kept many 
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firms from applying for a loan. But many firms also identified procedural issues as one 
of the main reasons they did not apply for a loan. This stands in line with the findings 
that Kredit Mini and Kredit Midi suffered from cumbersome application procedures. 
KIK/KMKP had lengthy loan approval procedures. Finally, despite the 20 per cent 
SME lending requirement under KUK, many banks had no internal mandate to lend to 
SMEs. They often preferred to lend to larger firms and existing customers. 
However, the case study also revealed that, contrary to the 1986 to 1996 
decrease, between 1996 and 2006 the share of micro and small-scale manufacturing 
enterprises taking up a bank loan increased significantly (from 2.3 per cent to 4 per 
cent). It is perhaps a surprising finding that the share of firms taking a bank loan 
increased between 1996 and 2006, given the credit crunch which followed the banking 
crisis of 1997. However, the comparison of small-scale business to total credit in 
Chapter 4 showed that by 2003 small-scale business credit had recovered to pre-crisis 
levels, whilst total credit outstanding was still around the level it had last had in the late-
1980s. These improvements in SME credit can be explained by post-crisis reforms. BRI, 
for example, underwent thorough restructuring between 1999 and 2003. As part of the 
restructuring BRI reduced its lending to the corporate sector and set the target to lend 
80 per cent of its portfolio to micro, small and medium enterprises. Between 2001 and 
2006 BRI lending constituted a fifth of all MSME loans outstanding in Indonesia. 
Similar to the restructuring of BRI, state pawnshops also increased their MSME 
lending portfolio in the aftermath of the crisis. State pawnshops, which date back to the 
late colonial period, have historically played a different role than their European 
counterparts. State pawnshops in Indonesia were not just a source of cash for the poor 
in times of need, but also an important source for working and investment capital for 
small-scale business entrepreneurs. In 2004 this role was formalised when the Minister 
of Finance declared state pawnshops one of the official financial institutions for the 
extension of MSME credit. The outreach of BRI and state pawnshops was further 
increased in 2006, when state pawnshops and BRI units began offering each other’s 
services. 
Thus while this dissertation has shown that the Indonesian economy stagnated 
in the aftermath of the Asian financial crisis, with little change in GDP per capita as well 
as overall firm-size distribution in the manufacturing sector, there were also important 
improvements for Indonesian SMEs. The share of large enterprises into total value 
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added of the manufacturing sector declined and the value added per worker of large 
enterprises stagnated between 1996 and 2006. However, between the 1996 and 2006 
Economic Censuses the contribution of Indonesian small and medium manufacturing 
enterprises to total value added and their value added per worker increased. This shows 
that at least in aggregate, Indonesian SMEs weathered the crisis better than large firms. 
These improvements went hand in hand with a larger share of small-scale 
manufacturing taking up bank loans and overall improvements in access to small-scale 
business credit as a result of post-crisis banking reforms.      
5.4 Outlook and Further Research 
A number of aspects require further investigation. The third chapter has shown the 
differences in regional development, and these differences could be used to test how 
value added linked to other factors. First, based on agglomeration effects we would 
expect higher value added per worker in areas with large manufacturing sectors in 
general. More specifically between firm-size categories, we would expect higher value 
added per SME worker in areas with more large enterprises. The government’s 
industrial policies have sought to develop the SME sector by building linkages to larger 
firms; policies included encouraging larger firms to buy their inputs from smaller firms 
and setting up business partnerships between small and large firms or state-owned 
enterprises under the Foster Parent Programme (Program Bapak Angkat). 
Second, another aspect to understand the role of SMEs in the Indonesian 
economy is their role in exports. After the decline in oil revenues in the early 1980s, 
Indonesia started to pursue an export-led industrialization strategy. However, it needs to 
be established how far SMEs contributed to exports. SMEs may have served a different 
purpose (or market). In comparative perspective, small enterprises in South Korea and 
Taiwan were primarily producing for the domestic market until the 1980s, but in South 
Korea even medium-sized enterprises were only marginal exporters.450 The relationship 
between enterprise size and export sales ratios in these two Tiger economies reveals that 
SMEs have carried the export drive of Taiwan, whereas in South Korea this was mainly 
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accomplished by larger firms.451 The question remains as to what role SMEs played in 
Indonesian exports, to be dealt with in a future study.  
Third, Indonesian government programmes to promote SMEs have largely been 
dismissed as ineffective for various reasons. Yet more research is required on the role 
that the government played more generally in aspects such as education, human 
resource development and improving market conditions – rather than providing credit, 
which should be left to market-based financial intermediaries. Chapter 4 looked at the 
role of government in improving access to credit for SMEs, one of the most commonly 
identified constraints to SMEs worldwide, but more research is required concerning the 
role that government policy played in improving general framework conditions. 
The case study of the manufacturing sector in Chapter 4 analysed the 
development of access to credit for micro and small-scale enterprises. The Economic 
Censuses contain no separate information on how medium-sized firms were financed. 
This analysis would benefit greatly from an expansion by looking at how many medium-
sized firms relied on external finance, what share of that constituted formal bank loans 
(including Kupedes) and to what degree medium-sized firms also relied on loans 
disbursed through special programmes like KIK/KMKP and KUK. 
A major contribution of this dissertation lies in the data collection of the 
Industrial and Economics Censuses. The dataset built with these sources allows for a 
regional comparison by firm-size category throughout the New Order period and ties 
these findings to the developments in the aftermath of the Asian Financial Crisis. This 
dissertation works with regional summaries in order to ensure narrative coherence. 
However, all regional data presented here has been collected at provincial level. The 
data work for this dissertation includes constructing the first provincial or even regional 
database on value added by firm-size category for the entire New Order period. 
Unfortunately an analysis at provincial level would have exceeded the scope of this 
dissertation, by requiring addressing the variation of 26 provinces rather than five 
regions. Exploiting the underutilised Industrial Census and Economic Census data has 
enabled a detailed analysis of the firm-size distribution of the Indonesian manufacturing 
sector and the differentiation of value added and industrial sub-sectors by firm-size 
category and province between 1974 and 2006. The 1986, 1996 and 2006 Economic 
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Censuses have further provided insights into the main constraints identified by micro, 
small and medium-sized firms to their business development, capital ownership and 
which credit programmes they benefited from. 
The constructed dataset bears even further potential. The 1986, 1996 and 2006 
Economic Censuses provide information on the highest educational attainment level of 
micro and small-scale business entrepreneurs and average working hours per week, as 
well as average wages paid to workers and inputs used by business of all firm-sizes. This 
dissertation has focused on the manufacturing sector because of the consistency of 
firm-size categories between censuses and the wider interest in the role of SMEs in 
Indonesia’s industrial transformation. However, the census data further offers a wealth 
of information on all non-agricultural economic sectors and bears potential for future 
research to expand our knowledge of Indonesia’s economic development during the 
New Order period.     
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Table 31: GDP per Capita of South Korea, Taiwan and Indonesia compared, 
1960-2010 (Int. GK$) 
Year Taiwan South Korea Indonesia Java 
1960 1,353 1,226 1,015 
 1961 1,398 1,247 1,048 
 1962 1,459 1,245 1,025 
 1963 1,545 1,316 951 
 1964 1,679 1,390 978 
 1965 1,810 1,436 990 
 1966 1,916 1,569 965 
 1967 2,070 1,645 934 
 1968 2,186 1,812 1,018 
 1969 2,334 2,040 1,105 
 1970 2,537 2,167 1,231 
 1971 2,804 2,332 1,247 1,076
1972 3,113 2,456 1,364 
 1973 3,448 2,824 1,544 
 1974 3,422 3,015 1,549 
 1975 3,522 3,162 1,515 1,143
1976 3,918 3,476 1,616 
 1977 4,236 3,775 1,698 
 1978 4,717 4,064 1,740 
 1979 4,998 4,294 1,786 
 1980 5,260 4,114 1,898 1,552
1981 5,489 4,302 1,969 
 1982 5,590 4,557 1,860 
 1983 5,979 5,007 1,880 
 1984 6,521 5,375 1,971 
 1985 6,762 5,670 1,984 
 1986 7,477 6,263 2,069 1,927
1987 8,598 6,916 2,138 
 1988 8,898 7,621 2,227 
 1989 9,538 8,027 2,388 
 1990 9,938 8,704 2,514 2,312
1991 10,610 9,446 2,694 
 1992 11,304 9,877 2,842 
 1993 11,950 10,391 2,998 
 1994 12,731 11,199 3,170 
 1995 13,418 12,094 3,374 
 1996 14,050 12,860 3,576 3,544
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Table 31: GDP per Capita of South Korea, Taiwan and Indonesia compared, 
1960-2010 (Int. GK$) (continued) 
Year Taiwan South Korea Indonesia Java 
1997 14,696 13,501 3,684 
 1998 15,069 12,634 3,151 
 1999 15,843 13,890 3,127 
 2000 16,628 14,998 3,229 3,056
2001 16,238 15,481 3,299 
 2002 17,001 16,498 3,399 
 2003 17,547 16,882 3,513 
 2004 18,564 17,589 3,640 
 2005 19,367 18,227 3,799 
 2006 20,340 19,124 3,957 3,859
 
Source:  
Country figures from Maddison Project Database (version 2013); Jutta Bolt. and Jan Luiten van Zanden, 
2014, ‘The Maddison Project: collaborative research on historical national accounts’, The Economic History 
Review, 67 (3): 627–651.  
Indonesian regional figures based on own calculations using data for 1971 from BPS in Budy 
Resosudarmo and Yogi Vidyattama, 2006, ‘Regional Income Disparity in Indonesia: A Panel Data 
Analysis’, ASEAN Economic Bulletin, 23(1):31-44, Table 1; Data for 1975 and 1980 from BPS in Takahiro 
Akita, 1988, ‘Regional Development and Income Disparities’, Asian Economic Journal, 2(2): 165-191, Tables 
2 and 3; GDP Data for 1986 and 1990 from BPS, 1992, Statistik Indonesia / Statistical Year Book of Indonesia 
1992; GDP Data for 1996 from BPS, 2000, Statistik Indonesia / Statistical Year Book of Indonesia 2000; Data 
for 2000 from BPS, 2004, Statistik Indonesia / Statistical Year Book of Indonesia 2004; Data for 2006 from 
BPS, 2008, Statistik Indonesia / Statistical Year Book of Indonesia 2008 (Provincial summaries for 1971 
intrapolated with 1971 population census data; provincial summaries for 1975 extrapolated with 1971 and 
1980 population census data; provincial summaries for 1980 intrapolated with 1980 population census 
data; 1986 per capita calculated with 1985 Intercensal Population Survey figures, except for Jambi, which 
was extrapolated from 1980 and 1990 population census figures; provincial summaries for 1990 
intrapolated with 1990 population census data). 
Notes: Figures in bold mark year and country for which SME data from economic and industrial 
censuses are available. 
Appendices (Chapter 3) 
 
 207 
Table 32: Number of Establishments and Workers in Indonesian Manufacturing by Firm-Size Category and Province, 1974/75 
Island / Province 
Micro (1-4) Small (5-19) Medium (20-99) Large (≥100) Total 
Businesses Workers Businesses Workers Businesses Workers* Businesses Workers* Businesses Workers 
JAVA 944,763 3,000,630 33,923 244,451 4,951 572,208 1,083  984,720 3,817,289 
DKI Jakarta 16,345 57,949 1,983 18,510 660 87,943 218  19,206 164,402 
DI Yogyakarta 86,310 267,860 1,160 9,291 131 13,804 24  87,625 290,955 
East Java 171,716 568,971 11,491 71,157 1,462 205,970 357  185,026 846,098 
Central Java 520,892 1,633,451 9,212 74,026 1,357 147,862 227  531,688 1,855,339 
West Java 149,500 472,399 10,077 71,467 1,341 116,629 257  161,175 660,495 
SUMATRA 101,325 317,424 7,578 52,531 427 54,871 135  109,465 424,826 
DI Aceh 24,574 73,562 741 5,016 20 2,887 5  25,340 81,465 
Bengkulu 4,850 14,837 116 847 3 63 0  4,969 15,747 
Jambi 8,207 27,399 440 2,608 22 3,701 8  8,677 33,708 
Lampung 8,533 28,773 470 3,633 52 4,319 13  9,068 36,725 
Riau 4,836 15,831 684 4,782 38 3,244 11  5,569 23,857 
North Sumatra 15,560 52,407 1,985 15,750 213 25,258 59  17,817 93,415 
South Sumatra 11,823 38,736 1,922 12,185 43 11,111 30  13,818 62,032 
West Sumatra 22,942 65,879 1,220 7,710 36 4,288 9  24,207 77,877 
SULAWESI 97,053 307,836 3,663 23,581 150 8,318 17  100,883 339,735 
North Sulawesi 29,138 98,184 452 3,221 15 1,013 3  29,608 102,418 
Central Sulawesi 355 1,243 296 1,839 5 190 0  656 3,272 
Southeast Sulawesi 1,207 3,790 387 2,678 29 941 1  1,624 7,409 
South Sulawesi 66,353 204,619 2,528 15,843 101 6,174 13  68,995 226,636 
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Table 32: Number of Establishments and Workers in Indonesian Manufacturing by Firm-Size Category and Province, 1974/75 (continued) 
Island / Province 
Micro (1-4) Small (5-19) Medium (20-99) Large (≥100) Total 
Businesses Workers Businesses Workers Businesses Workers* Businesses Workers* Businesses Workers 
KALIMANTAN 36,693 119,539 1,344 9,573 124 14,638 38  38,199 143,750 
East Kalimantan 956 3,369 147 1,267 22 958 1  1,126 5,594 
Central Kalimantan 992 3,409 191 1,508 17 1,224 4  1,204 6,141 
South Kalimantan 22,667 73,761 509 3,694 50 4,434 10  23,236 81,889 
West Kalimantan 12,078 39,000 497 3,104 35 8,022 23  12,633 50,126 
BALI 21,613 64,442 710 5,630 49 5,811 14  22,386 75,883 
EASTERN INDONESIA 33,064 89,985 1,041 7,474 89 5,858 14  34,208 103,317 
East Nusa Tenggara 1,845 5,373 264 2,041 12 785 2  2,123 8,199 
West Nusa Tenggara 30,050 80,292 555 3,557 60 3,288 7  30,672 87,137 
Maluku 186 769 100 855 7 1,023 3  296 2,647 
Papua 983 3,551 122 1,021 10 762 2  1,117 5,334 
INDONESIA TOTAL 1,234,511 3,899,856 48,259 343,240 5,790 661,704 1,301  1,289,861 4,904,800 
Source:  Calculated from BPS, 1974/75 Industrial Census, Jakarta: BPS 
Notes: *Number of employees was only given for medium and large manufacturing establishments combined; 
Figure for numbers of workers of small-scale enterprises in West Nusa Tenggara had to be calculated by subtracting all other provinces from Indonesia total 
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Table 33: Number of Establishments and Workers in Indonesian Manufacturing by Firm-Size Category and Province, 1986 
Island / Province 
Micro (1-4) Small (5-19) Medium (20-99) Large (≥100) Total 
Businesses Workers Businesses Workers Businesses Workers Businesses Workers Businesses Workers 
JAVA 991,644 2,115,745 75,440 617,628 8,852 312,807 2,007 1,015,832 1,077,943 4,062,012 
DKI Jakarta 19,228 38,131 7,852 71,487 2,170 56,320 128 181,600 29,378 347,538 
DI Yogyakarta 67,582 136,292 2,680 19,265 30 6,260 178 11,187 70,470 173,004 
East Java 261,134 556,862 20,094 155,424 2,493 91,995 545 320,509 284,266 1,124,790 
Central Java 421,115 864,239 27,193 238,269 1,775 63,864 393 204,389 450,476 1,370,761 
West Java 222,585 520,221 17,621 133,183 2,384 94,368 763 298,147 243,353 1,045,919 
SUMATRA 145,783 268,897 10,605 78,596 1,056 39,667 369 164,993 157,813 552,153 
DI Aceh 17,661 27,866 1,028 6,874 33 1,245 12 9,865 18,734 45,850 
Bengkulu 4,490 7,385 201 1,338 7 381 2 292 4,700 9,396 
Jambi 6,342 11,639 568 3,678 72 2,467 32 11,349 7,014 29,133 
Lampung 29,698 61,428 1,135 8,645 122 4,348 44 18,569 30,999 92,990 
Riau 12,067 18,695 992 7,628 100 3,840 35 16,516 13,194 46,679 
North Sumatra 26,560 46,532 3,747 29,364 520 19,885 162 69,080 30,989 164,861 
South Sumatra 22,813 48,953 1,608 11,778 113 4,237 60 31,158 24,594 96,126 
West Sumatra 26,152 46,399 1,326 9,291 89 3,264 22 8,164 27,589 67,118 
SULAWESI 112,193 185,525 5,131 34,016 278 9,971 47 19,491 117,649 249,003 
North Sulawesi 21,733 30,782 682 4,777 61 2,238 11 2,333 22,487 40,130 
Central Sulawesi 12,097 23,032 614 4,094 25 952 9 3,855 12,745 31,933 
Southeast Sulawesi 10,482 16,891 464 3,088 60 1,920 1 138 11,007 22,037 
South Sulawesi 67,881 114,820 3,371 22,057 132 4,861 26 13,165 71,410 154,903 
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Table 33: Number of Establishments and Workers in Indonesian Manufacturing by Firm-Size Category and Province, 1986 (continued) 
Island / Province 
Micro (1-4) Small (5-19) Medium (20-99) Large (≥100) Total 
Businesses Workers Businesses Workers Businesses Workers Businesses Workers Businesses Workers 
KALIMANTAN 62,220 88,221 2,575 18,715 225 9,574 178 84,729 65,198 201,239 
East Kalimantan 4,703 8,021 531 4,131 55 1,992 49 32,135 5,338 46,279 
Central Kalimantan 4,750 8,036 432 3,086 41 2,113 38 13,725 5,261 26,960 
South Kalimantan 39,947 53,166 1,020 7,190 89 3,529 52 19,900 41,108 83,785 
West Kalimantan 12,820 18,998 592 4,308 40 1,940 39 18,969 13,491 44,215 
BALI 31,087 54,822 1,819 14,185 209 7,393 34 8,225 33,149 84,625 
EASTERN INDONESIA 78,408 117,668 2,046 14,081 128 4,744 30 4,585 80,612 141,078 
East Nusa Tenggara 25,973 35,630 384 2,675 21 797 3 573 26,381 39,675 
West Nusa Tenggara 43,384 61,173 1,232 8,497 73 2,694 7 1,045 44,696 73,409 
Maluku 7,009 17,543 256 1,710 18 821 16 2,140 7,299 22,214 
Papua 2,042 3,322 174 1,199 16 432 4 827 2,236 5,780 
           
INDONESIA TOTAL 
(excl. East Timor) 
1,421,335 2,830,878 97,616 777,221 10,748 384,156 2,665 1,297,855 1,532,364 5,290,110 
Source:  Calculated from BPS, 1986 Economic Census, Jakarta: BPS 
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Table 34: Number of Establishments and Workers in Indonesian Manufacturing by Firm-Size Category and Province, 1996 
Island / Province 
Micro (1-4) Small (5-19) Medium (20-99) Large (≥100) Total 
Businesses Workers Businesses Workers Businesses Workers Businesses Workers Businesses Workers 
JAVA 1,581,209 3,035,115 163,605 1,349,474 18,237 3,439,413 5,237 
 
1,768,288 7,824,002 
DKI Jakarta 19,592 42,391 16,715 155,856 3,986 448,347 841 
 
41,134 646,594 
DI Yogyakarta 76,546 135,737 5,036 37,619 330 35,966 63 
 
81,975 209,322 
East Java 537,151 1,008,038 40,311 344,805 4,746 881,773 1,291 
 
583,499 2,234,616 
Central Java 623,492 1,163,544 60,004 497,051 3,906 545,437 764 
 
688,166 2,206,032 
West Java 324,428 685,405 41,539 314,143 5,269 1,530,033 2,278 
 
373,514 2,529,581 
SUMATRA 343,070 661,374 30,492 249,410 2,321 459,431 813 
 
376,696 1,370,215 
DI Aceh 84,386 141,940 3,992 30,045 113 15,821 22 
 
88,513 187,806 
Bengkulu 8,948 21,153 826 5,848 13 2,394 11 
 
9,798 29,395 
Jambi 15,398 30,458 1,691 15,431 134 29,505 59 
 
17,282 75,394 
Lampung 60,602 129,690 6,104 52,238 259 37,935 68 
 
67,033 219,863 
Riau 18,236 40,622 2,368 12,589 230 122,234 157 
 
20,991 175,445 
North Sumatra 51,617 103,435 6,286 50,506 1,119 181,244 358 
 
59,380 335,185 
South Sumatra 48,439 94,374 5,028 40,110 286 51,897 107 
 
53,860 186,381 
West Sumatra 55,444 99,702 4,197 42,643 167 16,860 31 
 
59,839 159,205 
SULAWESI 194,293 371,854 13,669 93,115 548 54,795 101 
 
208,611 519,764 
North Sulawesi 49,627 105,448 4,880 26,268 109 14,484 26 
 
54,642 146,200 
Central Sulawesi 27,829 53,223 1,777 12,266 79 4,215 16 
 
29,701 69,704 
Southeast Sulawesi 18,904 39,861 1,249 11,472 53 4,215 5 
 
20,211 55,548 
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Table 34: Number of Establishments and Workers in Indonesian Manufacturing by Firm-Size Category and Province, 1996 (continued) 
Island / Province 
Micro (1-4) Small (5-19) Medium (20-99) Large (≥100) Total 
Businesses Workers Businesses Workers Businesses Workers* Businesses Workers* Businesses Workers 
KALIMANTAN 123,093 224,337 7,742 61,244 486 168,599 253 
 
131,574 454,180 
East Kalimantan 11,171 21,757 1,419 15,234 117 59,010 61 
 
12,768 96,001 
Central Kalimantan 15,999 33,705 1,113 11,207 92 16,860 37 
 
17,241 61,772 
South Kalimantan 59,111 98,673 3,117 23,432 147 51,894 87 
 
62,462 173,999 
West Kalimantan 36,812 70,202 2,093 11,371 130 42,150 68 
 
39,103 123,723 
BALI 82,500 133,876 5,817 43,163 408 29,804 59 
 
88,784 206,843 
EASTERN INDONESIA 170,311 300,690 7,506 74,484 268 50,580 44 
 
178,129 425,754 
East Nusa Tenggara 73,834 122,050 1,359 10,717 44 1,585 5 
 
75,242 134,352 
West Nusa Tenggara 68,902 121,860 4,399 43,133 157 8,430 12 
 
73,470 173,423 
Maluku 18,632 38,351 939 13,383 36 25,290 14 
 
19,621 77,024 
Papua 8,943 18,429 809 7,251 31 16,860 13 
 
9,796 42,540 
      
  
    
INDONESIA TOTAL 
(excl. East Timor) 
2,494,476 4,727,246 228,831 1,870,890 22,268 4,207,960 6,507 
 
2,752,082 10,806,096 
Source:  Calculated from BPS, 1996 Economic Census, Jakarta: BPS 
Notes: *Number of employees was only given for medium and large manufacturing establishments combined. 
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Table 35: Number of Establishments and Workers in Indonesian Manufacturing by Firm-Size Category and Province, 2006 
Island / Province 
Micro (1-4) Small (5-19) Medium (20-99) Large (≥100) Total 
Businesses Workers* Businesses Workers* Businesses Workers Businesses Workers Businesses Workers 
JAVA 1,924,173 5,300,797 210,392 
 
18,356 686,082 5,992 3,220,615 1,930,165 9,207,494 
DKI Jakarta 19,365 184,353 14,803 
 
2,344 81,014 610 326,995 19,975 592,362 
DI Yogyakarta 69,296 182,982 6,654 
 
405 16,102 106 39,320 69,402 238,404 
East Java 610,765 1,555,442 54,162 
 
4,896 180,123 1,361 714,903 612,126 2,450,468 
Central Java 761,124 1,930,809 69,591 
 
4,581 161,581 956 545,956 762,080 2,638,346 
West Java 463,623 1,447,211 65,182 
 
6,130 247,262 2,959 1,593,441 466,582 3,287,914 
SUMATRA 358,279 1,023,358 42,715 
 
1,937 78,163 983 500,238 359,262 1,601,759 
DI Aceh 55,179 156,635 6,804 
 
76 2,981 21 4,950 55,200 164,566 
Bengkulu 11,153 29,408 903 
 
13 368 8 3,059 11,161 32,835 
Jambi 15,277 46,068 1,971 
 
61 2,529 44 28,745 15,321 77,342 
Lampung 80,364 217,744 7,626 
 
292 11,403 108 72,101 80,472 301,248 
Riau 25,742 79,690 3,590 
 
230 11,459 315 207,470 26,057 298,619 
North Sumatra 67,326 204,494 9,531 
 
859 33,956 359 128,635 67,685 367,085 
South Sumatra 51,973 153,700 6,208 
 
259 10,202 95 42,244 52,068 206,146 
West Sumatra 51,265 135,619 6,082 
 
147 5,265 33 13,034 51,298 153,918 
SULAWESI 212,686 518,465 18,030 
 
584 22,614 155 51,389 212,841 592,468 
North Sulawesi 42,092 104,240 3,685 
 
92 4,091 34 9,723 42,126 118,054 
Central Sulawesi 21,748 55,335 2,132 
 
38 1,737 11 5,329 21,759 62,401 
Southeast Sulawesi 36,503 89,348 2,927 
 
120 4,188 14 4,148 36,517 97,684 
South Sulawesi 112,343 269,542 9,286 
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Table 35: Number of Establishments and Workers in Indonesian Manufacturing by Firm-Size Category and Province, 2006 (continued) 
Island / Province 
Micro (1-4) Small (5-19) Medium (20-99) Large (≥100) Total 
Businesses Workers Businesses Workers Businesses Workers* Businesses Workers* Businesses Workers 
KALIMANTAN 110,783 274,228 9,425 
 
294 12,518 199 114,607 110,982 401,353 
East Kalimantan 11,969 40,062 2,152 
 
89 3,994 65 42,939 12,034 86,995 
Central Kalimantan 17,103 41,774 1,084 
 
48 1,851 26 20,864 17,129 64,489 
South Kalimantan 45,330 97,908 2,830 
 
67 3,056 60 30,492 45,390 131,456 
West Kalimantan 36,381 94,484 3,359 
 
90 3,617 48 20,312 36,429 118,413 
BALI 73,691 204,508 9,361 
 
469 16,977 68 16,575 73,759 238,060 
EASTERN INDONESIA 209,199 495,754 15,727 
 
382 13,935 49 21,990 209,248 531,679 
East Nusa Tenggara 66,682 133,779 3,344 
 
53 1,841 5 851 66,687 136,471 
West Nusa Tenggara 114,396 287,452 9,703 
 
240 8,699 16 2,313 114,412 298,464 
Maluku 20,702 51,002 1,659 
 
59 2,312 10 7,221 20,712 60,535 
Papua 7,419 23,521 1,021 
 
30 1,083 18 11,605 7,437 36,209 
           
INDONESIA TOTAL 2,888,811 7,817,110 305,650 
 
22,022 830,289 7,446 3,925,414 2,896,257 12,572,813 
Source:  Calculated from BPS, 2006 Economic Census, Jakarta: BPS 
Notes: *Number of employees was only given for micro and small-scale manufacturing establishments combined; 
In previous censuses Banten was included in West Java figures, North Maluku in the Maluku figures, West Papua in the Papua figures, Gorontalo in the North Sulawesi figures, West 
Sulawesi in the South Sulawesi figures, Kepulauan Riau was included in the Riau figures, Bangka Belitung Islands were included in the South Sumatra figures; the 2006 EC reports these 
provinces separately, however, here they have been merged to facilitate comparison. 
 




Table 36: Average Number of Employees by Firm-Size Category and Region, 
1974-2006 
Province Micro Small Medium & Large 
1974/75 
   
Java 3.2 7.2 94.8 
Sumatra 3.1 6.9 97.6 
Sulawesi 3.2 6.4 49.8 
Kalimantan 3.3 7.1 90.4 
Bali 3.0 7.9 92.2 
Eastern Indonesia 2.7 7.2 56.9 
Indonesia 3.2 7.1 93.3 
1986 
   
Java 2.1 8.2 122.4 
Sumatra 1.8 7.4 143.6 
Sulawesi 1.7 6.6 90.7 
Kalimantan 1.4 7.3 234.0 
Bali 1.8 7.8 64.3 
Eastern Indonesia 1.5 6.9 59.0 
Indonesia 2.0 8.0 125.4 
1996 
   
Java 1.9 8.2 146.5 
Sumatra 1.9 8.2 146.6 
Sulawesi 1.9 6.8 84.4 
Kalimantan 1.8 7.9 228.1 
Bali 1.6 7.4 63.8 
Eastern Indonesia 1.8 9.9 162.1 
Indonesia 1.9 8.2 146.2 
2006 



















Indonesia 1.9 8.1 161.4 
Source:  
1974/75 Data: 1974-5 Industrial Census, Household and Cottage Industries Vol. I; 1974-5 Industrial 
Census. SSE Manufacturing: DKI Jakarta; 1974-5 Industrial Census. SSE Manufacturing: East Java; 1974-
5 Industrial Census. SSE Manufacturing: DI Yogyakarta; 1974-5 Industrial Census. SSE Manufacturing: 
Kalimantan, Irian Jaya, Bali, NYY & NTB; 1974-5 Industrial Census. SSE Manufacturing: Sulawesi; 1974-
5 Industrial Census. SSE Manufacturing: Sumatra; 1974-5 Industrial Census. MLE Manufacturing: 
Indonesia; 1974/5 Indonesian total relative shares of medium and large enterprises calculated from Albert 
Berry, Edgard Rodriguez and Henry Sandee, 2001, ‘Small and Medium Enterprise Dynamics in 
Indonesia’, Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies, 37(3): 363-384, Table 1. 
1986 Data: 1986 Economic Census, Results of Establishment Listing (Final Figures) (various provinces). 
1996 Data: 1996 EC Household/Cottage Industry Statistics; 1996 Medium and Large Manufacturing 
Worker Data from Medium & Large Enterprise Worker Data from more precise provincial sources: 
Kantor Statistik Propinsi Bengkulu, 1997, Statistik Industri Besar dan Sedang Propinsi Bengkulu 1996, 
Bengkulu: BPS Kantor Statistik Propinsi Bengkulu; BPS Propinsi Sumatera Selatan, 1997, Statistik Industri 
Besar dan Sedang Propinsi Sumatera Selatan 1996, Palembangan: BPS Kantor Statistik Propinsi Sumatera 
Selatan; BPS Propinsi Jawa Tengah, 1998, Indikator Industri Besar dan Sedang Jawa Tengah / Large and Medium 
Manufacturing Industry Indicators [Central Java], Semarang: BPS Propinsi Jawa Tengah; BPS Kantor Statistik 
Propinsi NTT, 1997, Indikator Ekonomi Nusa Tenggara Timur 1996, Kupang: Kantor Statistik Propinsi Nusa 
Tenggara Timur; BPS Propinsi Kalimantan Selatan, 1999, Kalimantan Selatan Dalam Angka / Kalimantan 
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Selatan in Figures 1999, Banjarbaru: BPS Propinsi Kalimantan Selatan; BPS Propinsi Irian Jaya, 1999, Irian 
Jaya Dalam Angka / Irian Jaya in Figures 1998, Jayapura: BPS Propinsi Irian Jaya; BPS Propinsi Bali, 2001, 
Bali Dalam Angka/Bali in Figures 2000, Denpasar: BPS Propinsi Bali; BPS Propinsi D.I. Yogyakarta, 2001, 
Daerah Istimewa Yogyakarta Dalam Angka/Daerah Istimewa Yogyakarta in Figures 2000, Yogyakarta: BPS 
Propinsi D.I. Yogyakarta; BPS Propinsi Riau, 2000, Riau Dalam Angka / Riau in Figures 2000, Pekanbaru: 
BPS Propinsi Riau; BPS Propinsi DKI Jakarta, 2001, Jakarta Dalam Angka / Jakarta in Figures 2000, 
Jakarta: BPS Propinsi DKI Jakarta, Table 6.1.6; BPS Propinsi Kalimantan Tengah, 2001, Kalimantan 
Tengah Dalam Angka (Kalimantan Tengah in Figures) 2000, Palangka Raya: BPS Propinsi Kalimantan Tengah, 
Table 6.1.5; For West Java, Jambi, Lampung, Riau, North, South and West Sumatra, Central, Southeast 
and South Sulawesi, East, Central and West Kalimantan, West Nusa Tenggara, Maluku and Irian Jaya 
provincial shares in medium and large manufacturing employment were taken from Frederik Sjöholm, 
2002, 'The challenge of combining FDI and regional development in Indonesia', Journal of Contemporary 
Asia, 32(3):381-393, Table 1 and used in conjunction with the Indonesia medium and large enterprise 
manufacturing number of workers total found in BPS, 1998 Statistik Indonesia / Statistical Yearbook, Jakarta: 
BPS; 1996 relative medium and large manufacturing Indonesian total employment shares calculated from 
Robert Rice and Irfan Abdullah, 2000, A Comparison of Small and Medium/Large Indonesian Manufacturing 
Enterprises from 1986 and 1996 by Sector, Jakarta: Partnership for Economic Growth Project, USAID, 
(mimeo), Table 5.  
2006 Data: 2006EC MSE Manufacturing; 2006 EC MLE Manufacturing Part 1; ); relative shares for 
microenterprises and small enterprises in 2006 calculated from BPS, 2009 Statistik Indonesia Statistical 
Yearbook, Table 7.2.2. 
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Figure 31: Comparison of Indonesia’s, South Korea’s and Taiwan’s Relative 




Indonesia: Calculated from BPS, 1974/75 Industrial Census, Jakarta: BPS; BPS, Economic Census (1986, 
1996), Jakarta: BPS. 
South Korea: Calculated from Economic Planning Board (EPB), Report and Mining and Manufacturing 
Census (1963, 1973, 1983), Seoul: EPB. 
Taiwan: Calculated from ROC, Executive Yuan, Directorate-General of Budget, Accounting and 
Statistics (DGBAS), 1973, The 1971 Industrial & Commercial Censuses of Taiwan and Fukien Area, Volume III, 
Taipei: Executive Yuan; 
1961 and 1981 calculated from Republic of China, 1961-1981 in Makoto Abe and Momoko Kawakami, 
1997, ‘A Distributive Comparison of Enterprise Size in Korea and Taiwan’, The Developing Economies, 
35(4): 382-400, p. 386. 
Notes: *The smallest category in Taiwan in 1961 and 1971 encompasses 4-19 instead of 5-19 workers. 
 
1974/75 1986 1996 2006 1963 1973 1983 1961* 1971* 1981
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Figure 32: Comparison of Indonesia’s, South Korea’s and Taiwan’s Relative 
Firm-Size Distributions by Employment Shares (without Microenterprises) 
 
Source:  
Indonesia: Calculated from BPS, 1974/75 Industrial Census, Jakarta: BPS; BPS, Economic Census (1986, 
1996, 2006), Jakarta: BPS; relative shares of medium and large enterprises for 1974/75 and 1986 
calculated from Albert Berry, Edgard Rodriguez and Henry Sandee, 2001, ‘Small and Medium Enterprise 
Dynamics in Indonesia’, Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies, 37(3): 363-384, Table 1, relative medium and 
large manufacturing Indonesian employment shares for 1996 calculated from Robert Rice and Irfan 
Abdullah, 2000, A Comparison of Small and Medium/Large Indonesian Manufacturing Enterprises from 1986 and 
1996 by Sector, Jakarta: Partnership for Economic Growth Project, USAID, (mimeo), Table 5. 
South Korea: Calculated from Economic Planning Board (EPB), Report and Mining and Manufacturing 
Census (1963, 1973, 1983), Seoul: EPB. 
Taiwan: ROC, Executive Yuan, Industrial & Commercial Censuses of Taiwan and Fukien Area (1961, 1971, 
1981), Taipei: Executive Yuan. 
Notes: *The smallest category in Taiwan encompasses 4-19 instead of 5-19 workers. 
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Table 37: Main Difficulty faced by Microenterprises as Share of Total Number of 
Establishments in that Firm-size Category and Province (in per cent), 1986-1996 












1986       
Java 25.83 74.17 34.46 18.72 1.34 19.65 
Sumatra 9.14 90.86 45.69 21.07 1.61 22.49 
Sulawesi 8.20 91.80 47.91 15.78 3.43 24.67 
Kalimantan 11.52 88.48 44.77 16.24 1.19 26.28 
Bali 16.26 83.74 46.71 14.66 1.79 20.58 
Eastern Indonesia 7.95 92.05 58.90 17.67 2.77 12.72 
INDONESIA 20.92 79.08 38.72 18.47 1.61 20.27 
1996       
Java 47.88 52.12 16.04 15.78 4.02 16.29 
Sumatra 34.32 65.68 28.28 18.99 3.54 14.86 
Sulawesi 40.28 59.72 33.07 12.28 2.67 11.70 
Kalimantan 38.21 61.79 25.01 19.78 3.26 13.75 
Bali 44.36 55.64 17.51 21.32 3.17 13.64 
Eastern Indonesia 30.75 69.25 37.01 19.56 3.62 9.06 
INDONESIA 43.70 56.30 20.93 16.57 3.75 15.04 
Sources: BPS, 1986 Economic Census: Home Industry Statistics, Jakarta: BPS; BPS, 1996 Economic Census: 
Household/Cottage Industry Statistics, Jakarta: BPS. 
Notes: No double-counting, one main constraint identified per establishment. 
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1910 7.38 23.49 0.36 
  1911 8.85 (4.38) 28.85 0.60 
  1912 11.98 (5.98) 40.28 0.71 
  1913 15.68 (7.52) 51.68 0.84 
  1914 18.84 (8.12) 66.85 
   1915 21.68 (10.57) 75.90 7.67 
  1916 27.77 (13.16) 83.97 8.77 
  1917 30.62 (14.44) 99.62 8.71 
  1918 28.95 (13.44) 116.90 7.19 
  1919 30.22 (14.20) 114.78 7.35 
  1920 39.36 (16.63) 136.52 8.78 
  1921 47.54 (19.94) 142.53 11.36 31.41 102 
1922 46.06 (18.29) 151.91 15.91 
 
92 
1923 43.24 (16.23) 150.52 21.71 17.95 98 
1924 46.87 (18.46) 151.05 27.27 
 
103 
1925 52.38 (20.11) 166.25 33.77 19.60 100 
1926 56.31 (23.15) 168.89 37.02 
 
104 
1927 63.29 (24.77) 173.89 41.39 
 
106 
1928 68.3 (26.77) 181.46 45.99 19.49 106 
1929 74.87 (29.20) 207.02 49.64 
 
107 
1930 72.44 (28.19) 194.14 44.39 20.20 108 
1931 50.72 (18.78) 153.12 34.12 
 
105 
1932 24.83 (7.12) 109.77 21.72 
 
106 
1933 17.45 (3.45) 78.12 17.49 8.32 106 
1934 15.46 (7.53a) 69.58 16.45 
 
107 
1935 17.4 (6.53a) 67.52 14.79 8.25 106 
1936 19.39 (6.61a) 65.41 15.22 
 
106 
1937 21.68 (8.62a) 75.30 18.00 
 
106 
1938 26.67 (12.2a) 85.31 20.71 9.17 108 
1939 30.16 (15.28a) 87.00 22.67 
 
111 
1940 28.8 (n/a) 88.19 23.43 9.16 110 
 
Source: Data from CEI, Volume 6, 1980, Changing Economy in Indonesia: A Selection of Statistical Source 
Material from the Early 19th Century up to 1940, Volume 6, Money and Banking 1816-1940 (edited by Peter 
Boomgaard and Jan T.M. van Laanen), The Hague: Nijhoff;  
Village paddy bank data from Jan T.M. van Laanen, 1990. ‘Between the Java Bank and the Chinese 
Moneylender: banking and Credit in Colonial Indonesia’, in: Anne Booth, W.J. O’Malley and Anna 
Weidemann (Eds.), Indonesian Economic History in the Dutch Colonial Era (pp. 244-266), New Haven: Yale 
University Southeast Asia Studies, p. 260. 
Notes: a estimate 
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Table 39: Consumer Price Index based on Average Retail Price in Jakarta of 15 
Home-produced and 15 Imported Consumption Articles, 1938-66 (1953=100) 
Year CPI 
1938 5 
1939   
1940   
1941   
1942   
1943   
1944   
1945   
1946   
1947   
1948   
1949   


















Source: calculated from BPS, Statistical Pocketbook of Indonesia 1968-69, Jakarta: BPS, pp. 377-9, Table 
XVI.3&4. 
Notes: No data available for 1939-1950 
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Table 40: Sectoral Shares of Non-agricultural Firms by Firm-size Category, 1996 
 
Microenterprises Small enterprises Medium enterprises Large enterprises 
Mining & Quarrying 1.16% 1.42% 1.22% 1.45% 
Manufacturing Industry 15.93% 35.76% 31.73% 59.64% 
Electricity, Gas & Water Supply 0.07% 0.23% 0.85% 1.97% 
Construction 1.08% 5.37% 10.36% 6.11% 
Wholesale and Retail Trade, 
Restaurants & Accommodation 
Services 
58.80% 33.21% 19.85% 11.73% 
Transport, Storage & Communication 10.86% 3.66% 4.66% 4.89% 
Financial Institutions 0.24% 4.45% 8.37% 4.66% 
Real Estate, Rental Services & Other 
Services 
11.86% 15.90% 22.96% 9.54% 
TOTAL  









Source: Calculated from BPS, 1996 Economic Census: Complete Count Result Indonesia, Jakarta: BPS. 
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Table 41: Sectoral Shares of Non-agricultural Firms by Number of Firms and Firm-size Category, 2006 
  Microenterprises Small enterprises Medium enterprises Large enterprises 
Mining & Quarrying 1.18% 0.64% 0.32% 0.80% 
Manufacturing Industry 15.33% 8.18% 15.93% 19.69% 
Electricity, Gas & Water Supply 0.05% 0.04% 1.33% 1.70% 
Construction 0.63% 1.09% 3.27% 4.13% 
Wholesale and Retail Trade, 
Restaurants & Accommodation 
Services 
55.42% 76.14% 45.52% 43.10% 
Transport, Storage & Communication 13.24% 5.00% 7.50% 5.22% 
Financial Intermediaries 0.18% 0.74% 8.26% 16.61% 
Real Estate, Rental Services & Other 
Services 
13.98% 8.18% 17.87% 8.75% 
TOTAL  









Source: Calculated from BPS, 2006 Economic Census, Establishment Listing Results, Indonesia, Jakarta: BPS. 
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Figure 33: IDR Exchange Rate to USD, 1966-2006 (annual average, not 
seasonally adjusted) 
 
Source: University of Pennsylvania, Exchange Rate to U.S. Dollar for Indonesia 
[FXRATEIDA618NUPN], retrieved from FRED, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis; 
https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/FXRATEIDA618NUPN, February 7, 2019. 
Figure 34: Indonesian GDP Deflator, 1960-2016 (base year 2006) 
 
Source: Calculated from the GDP deflator reported in The World Bank, 2017, World Development 
Indicators, Washington, D.C.: The World Bank, GDP deflator (base year varies by country) [Data file] 
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Table 42: KIK - Changes in Loan Size, Interest Rate and Maturity, 1973-90 
 Loan size Interest rate Maturity Eligibility 
1973 IDR 5 million  12% p.a. 5 years May be utilised 
for all economic 
activities; 
75 per cent of 
the firm’s capital 
must be held by 
indigenous 
Indonesians or 
50 per cent if at 
least 50 per cent 
of the board are 
indigenous 
Indonesians; 
the firm must 
hold all required 
business licenses 
1975    Net worth of 
borrowers is not 
to exceed IDR 
20 million and 
their net current 
assets IDR 10 
million 







   
1982 IDR 15 million 




10.5% p. a. 10 years  
Source: Bank Indonesia, Annual Reports (various years), Jakarta: BI; eligibility change from BI Circular No 
SE /51/UPK 31 March 1975. 
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Table 43: KMKP - Changes in Loan Size, Interest Rate and Maturity, 1973-90 
 Loan size Interest rate Maturity Eligibility 
1973 IDR 5 million 15% p.a. 3 years May be utilised 
for all economic 
activities; 
75 per cent of 
the firm’s capital 
must be held by 
indigenous 
Indonesians or 
50 per cent if at 
least 50 per cent 
of the board are 
indigenous 
Indonesians; 
the firm must 
hold all required 
business licenses 
1975    Net worth of 
borrowers is not 
to exceed IDR 
20 million and 
their net current 
assets IDR 10 
million 







   
1982 IDR 15 million 




12% p.a. 3 years (with a 
possible renewal 
of another 3 
years) 
 
Sources: Bank Indonesia, Annual Reports (various years), Jakarta: BI; eligibility change from BI Circular No 
SE /51/UPK 31 March 1975. 
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Table 44: Changes in Maximum KUK loan size, 1990-2001 
Year Maximum KUK loan size (IDR) 








1998 350 million 
1999 " 
2000 " 
2001 500 million 
Sources: Bank Indonesia, Annual Reports (various years), Jakarta: BI.  
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Table 45: Credit Outstanding to the Economically Weak Group by Credit Scheme, 1974-95 (IDR billion in 2006 prices) 
  1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 
Small Investment Credits (KIK) 242 844 1,213 1,664 1,976 1,944 2,612 5,004 6,962 6,497 
Permanent Working Capital Credits (KMKP) 178 738 1,267 1,948 2,453 2,658 4,006 7,716 13,105 12,790 
Mini Credits   124 239 344 415 457 443 824 1,061 989 
Midi Credits               161 521 659 
Kupedes (1985 and consecutive includes 
outstanding Mini and Midi credits)                     
Credits for Cooperatives                   3,782 
Credits for farm enterprises (KUT) - prior to 
1985 Bimas                   2,888 
Others               1,792 4,077 14,752 
Total Credit Outstanding 421 1,707 2,718 3,956 4,844 5,060 7,061 15,497 25,726 42,357 
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 Table 45: Credit Outstanding to the Economically Weak Group by Credit Scheme, 1974-95 (IDR billion in 2006 prices) (continued) 
  1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 
Small Investment Credits (KIK) 5,500 4,765 4,267 3,509 3,260 4,089 6,574 5,996 3,588 2,058 1,253 895 
Permanent Working Capital Credits (KMKP) 12,322 12,460 11,636 9,918 9,886 10,791 15,658 13,710 10,658 5,580 2,003 1,173 
Mini Credits 526                       
Midi Credits 483                       
Kupedes (1985 and consecutive includes 
outstanding Mini and Midi credits) 441 2,222 3,573 4,321 4,843 5,812 8,233 11,709 11,545 10,889 10,378 10,698 
Credits for Cooperatives 3,951 3,627 3,927 3,103 3,564 3,878 3,651 3,712 16,577 15,566 4,317 4,850 
Credits for farm enterprises (KUT) - prior to 
1985 Bimas 2,501 2,155 1,898 1,546 1,405 1,273 1,159           
Others 15,989 20,511 29,055 32,147 38,480 45,166 62,536 48,570 34,673 29,990 32,388 28,074 
Total Credit Outstanding 41,714 45,739 54,355 54,544 61,439 71,009 97,811 83,697 77,041 64,083 50,340 45,690 
Source: Bank Indonesia, Annual Reports (various years), Jakarta: BI. 
Notes: “Others” groups together the following credit schemes: ‘Working Capital Credits under Keppres No. 29/1984’ (1985-91), ‘Credits with maximum of IDR 75 million’ (1984-
1995), ‘Credits for Teachers (KPG)’ (1982-95), ‘Credits for Indonesian Students (KMI)’ (1983-1995), ‘Inpres Pasar’ (1983-90), ‘Pension Credits’ (1983-90), ‘Viability Credits up to 
IDR 75 million’ (1983-88), ‘Keppres No 14A/1980 credits’ (1983-88), ‘House Ownership Credits (KPR)’ (1981-95), ‘Credits for Student Dormitories’ (1985-91), ‘Perusahaan Into 
Rakyat (PIR) Plasma/Smallholder Nuclear Estate’ (1983-95), ‘Rejuvenation, rehabilitation and extension of export plantation (PRPTE)’ (1983-95), ‘PT Papan Sejahtera’ (extended 
by non-bank institutions; 1981-94), ‘Petty Trader Credits Candak Kulak Credits (KCK)’ (extended by non-bank institutions, 1981-91); 
Deflator used was calculated from the GDP deflator reported in The World Bank, 2017, World Development Indicators, Washington, D.C.: The World Bank, GDP deflator (base year 
varies by country) [Data file] Retrieved from https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.DEFL.ZS?locations=ID 
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